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L INTRODUCTION
The confluence of the tort of conversion and secured transactions
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code1 creates undercurrents
for legal reform. Courts frequently address claims by secured parties that
third parties converted their security interests. The courts' analyses of the
issues raised by such claims are generally unsatisfactory, and their
holdings are often inconsistent. Despite the lack of judicial clarification,2
an examination of the interaction of conversion with the property interest
of a secured party provides important insights for both Article 9 and
conversion law.
What rights in personal property constitute a security interest? How
is a security interest enforced? While any student of Article 9 readily
answers these questions at one level, the difficulty in finding satisfactory
answers at a deeper level reveals serious inadequacies in Article 9 and
other laws governing personal property. In particular, difficulties arise
when a secured creditor exercises its rights against personal property that
has been sold or encumbered.3
Although Article 9 establishes a fairly comprehensive scheme to
determine priority between secured parties and transferees of personal
property, it does not resolve the meaning of priority.4 If a junior creditor
' Unless otherwise noted, all references to the "Uniform Commercial Code," the
"Code," or the "L.C.C." are to the 1990 Official Text, and all references to "Article
Nine" are to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
2 See, e.g., Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, PEB
Study Group Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, Report, 220-22 (December 1, 1992)
(suggesting revisions to Code comments in order to clarify that conversion is not a fait
accornph when junior reditors exercise rights to the collateral) [hereina&r Mudy Group
Report]; ROBERT A. HULAIAN Er AL., COMMON LAW AND EQUrY UNDER THE UNIORM
COMMERCIAL CODE% 25.0l[3][a][ii]-[iii], 25.02[5] (1985 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the
inconsistencies of court holdings with pre-Code law and the U.C.C., which find liability
for conversion in instances of the mere exercise of rights to the collateral).
' U.C.C. § 9-306(2) continues the security interest intransferred collateral unless the
secured party consents to the transfer or the Code provides a contrary rule of priority,
such as U.C.C. § 9-307(1), which protects buyers in the ordinary course of business.
4 See HIMAN ET AL., spra note 2, I 25.01, 25.02 (1985 & Supp. 1991)
(discussing the inmadequacies of the Code when subordinate buyers control collateral and
when junior secured creditors exercmise their rights before the senior secured creditor); J.
Peter Byme et aL, Junior Creditors' Realization on Debtors' Equity Under U.C.C. Section
9-311: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 77 GEO. L.J. 1905 (1989) (discussing deficiencies
in U.C.C. § 9-311 for junior creditors realizing on their property rights); David Frisch,
The Priority Secured PartySbordinate Lien Creditor Conflict: Is 'Ven-TWo " Out in the
Cold? 33 BuFF. L. REv. 149 (1984) (discussing the legal gaps in reconciling the interests
of secured parties and hen creditors).
1993-941
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
exercises rights to collateral before a senior secured party, can the senior
repossess from the junior or vacate its levy? If the senior secured party
vacates its levy, what rights does the lien creditor retain in the property? If the
junior succeeds in selling the collateral, does the senior have a right to the
sale proceeds? Does the buyer at the sale take the property subject to the
senior security interest?
Currently, such questions are resolved in common law actions used to
assert priority. The Code provides no mechanism for a prior secured party to
assert its rights against buyers of collateral subject to its security interest, or
for junior creditors who first exercised rights to the collateral The traditional
non-Code actions are replevin (or its equivalent)5 and conversion. The Code
attempts no regulation of these remedies or their use in enforcing prior
security interests.
Replevin and conversion differ fimdamentally in character and implica-
tions. Replevin enables the creditor to gain possession of the property. This
power accomplishes the creditor first step inpursuing its bargained-forfights
to transform its property interest into money in order to satisfy the secured
obligation.6 Conversion, in contrast, enables the creditor to recover money
damages in a forced sale of the property. It provides the creditor with the
equivalent of a completed foreclosure7 so that the creditor is able to realize
and apply the full value of the collateral against the secured obligation.
Hence, no need to resort to Article 9 remedies exists. In effect, a secured
party who prevails in a conversion action obtains a third source of recovery
for its debt in addition to the debtor and the collateral: the personal liability
of a third party.
While courts fiequently resolve secured parties'claims ofconversion, they
operate without parameters to ensure that the elements of conversion further
the policies underlying Article 9. Conversion is generally viewed as a tort
protecting possessory rights to personal property, yet it developed as a legal
remedy for serious interference with ownership rights! Attempts to distill the
5The remedy of replevin has long been governed by statute in the United States.
See J.E. COBBEY, A PRACTICAL TREATm ON THE LAW OF REPLEVIN AS ADMnISEE
BY THE COURTS OF THE UNrED STATES §§ 8-9 (2d ed. 1900); PEINEAS P. MORRIS, A
PRAcTICAL TREATIS ON THE LAw OF REPiLviN IN THE UNITrr STATES 67 (3d ed.
1878). The remedy also goes by anumber of other names, such as a"writ of possession,"
"sequestration," or "claim and delivery." See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 512.010-.120
(West 1993) (writ of possession); TEX CIV. PRAC. & RENL CODE ANN. § 62.001 (West
1993) (writ of sequestration); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2716 (West 1988) (claim
and delivery).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 97-101.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 90-94.
See infra text accompanying notes 137-53 (reviewing the historical development
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essential elements of a conversion action identify as the central inquiry
the determination of whether justice requires a forced sale of the property
to the converter.9 Little has been written about when interference with a
security interest is serious enough that justice compels such a forced sale.
An analysis of when justice should compel the forced sale of property
in order to benefit a secured creditor demonstrates the lack of a consis-
tently applied conceptual framework governing interests in personal
property. Secured parties' rights, particularly those dependent on priority,
are based on concepts of constructive notice relating to Article 9's filing
system. Conversion is based upon a framework that establishes rights in
property by possession. The rights of transferees may be governed by
laws grounded in conceptual frameworks that focus on neither Article 9
constructive notice nor possession.
An examination of the justice inquiry, in light of the insights
provided by an understanding of the divergent legal frameworks for
personal property, suggests modifications to the tort of conversion as
applied to security interests. Such modifications not only facilitate just
results, but also significantly clarify the rights of secured parties and
transferees of collateral. Applying the insights to the tort of conversion
facilitates better understanding and development of its doctrines.
IL IMPACT OF LE.GAL CLASSIFICATION
The simple act of classifying a particular body of law profoundly
affects analysis of its principles and development of its doctrines.
Professor Dan B. Dobbs illustrates this point by observing that in the
twenty years between the first and second editions of his treatise on
remedies, the literature of remedies matured to "become an accepted and
important separate field of study"10 rather than "merely adjunct or
subsidiary points" in substantive law fields. The contrast between
treatment as subsidiary points and treatment as an independent field of
study is an equally valid distinction for any body of law that achieves
widely recognized status as a legitimate classification of law.. However,
that distinction has a negative corollary. Classification that disengages a
rule of law from another body of law to which it frequently applies
of the remedy of conversion).
' See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text (outlining the elements of
conversion listed in RESTATmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRiTS § 222A).
10 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGE-EQuIrY-RESmTmIoN
ix (2d e& 1993).
I a
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impedes development and study in harmony with policies unique to the
other context.'
2
Because classifications are imperfect, rules of law classified with one
body of law often may be used to resolve issues arising in transactions
generally governed by another body of law. Because those rules
developed in an environment invigorated by different policies, this cross-
over creates the potential both for new insights and for results discordant
with fundamental policies. Whether the cross-over benefits or detracts
from the other body of law may simply be a function of time. In the short
term, the conflicting policies likely impact more significantly. As the rule
of law is applied with greater frequency, courts, practitioners, and
scholars focus on the issues raised by the interaction, and the fresh
perspectives likely exert a beneficial influence.
A. Classifications of Property Law
Well-recognized classifications of law may result as much from
historical accident as from careful logical philosophical distinctions.
Property law represents one of the broad classifications of substantive
law. Property subdivides readily into personal property 3 and real
property. This subdivision originated in the way legal issues affecting
these types of property were resolved. Real property was so designated
because interests in it were enforced by actions in rem, in which the
propirty itself was recovered. Personal property was so named because
interests in it were enforced by actions in personam, in which damages
rather than the property were recovered. 4 In part because legal actions
involving these two types of property were based on very different
common law forms of action, the two bodies of law followed different
courses of development. Tracing the divergent developments and
postulating reasons for the different courses taken by real property and
personal property law are beyond the scope of this article. Some effects
of this divergent growth, however, underlie the issues to be examined.
'2 Dobbs alludes to a similar problem, albeit not in such pejorative tem2s, in his
observation that "substance and remedy are not always so separable; because remedy
seeks to execute the substantive policy .... "Id. at x.
't "Personal property" is used here in the traditional sense, rather than as used by
Radin to refer to its relationship to personhood. See Margaret I. Radin, Property and
Peronhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
"See RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPEWTY § 1.7 (Walter B.
Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975).
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1. Real and Personal Property Law
In addition to the old forms of action, the characteristics of mobility
and relative value distinguish the two types of property. Real property is
immovable, and each parcel or interest generally has significant value.
Thus, systems were devised readily to keep public records of real
property interests in order to apprise third parties of those interests. Such
recording systems became a central organizing theme for much of real
property law. Rules governing real property developed as a recognized
body of law which was further divided into several subcategories relating
to the nature of the transaction, such as landlord-tenant, real estate
finance, and real estate sales.'5
In contrast, personal property is mobile, 6 and many items have only
modest value. These characteristics militated against development of
similar recording systems for most personal property. Rather, historically,
a presumption that possession was ownership primarily determined
knowledge of valid interests in personal property. Possession failed to
provide the unifying theme for personal property which recording systems
provided for real property. The rules governing personal property
developed as diverse bodies of law relating to particular transactions.
Much of what could otherwise be classified as personal property law
became known as the law of sales; the law of liens, pledges and chattel
mortgages; the law of bailments; the law of bills and notes; or the law of
fixtures. Today a major portion of the law governing personal property
is classified as commercial law, governed in the first instance by the
various Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code.'8
2. Possession and Personal Property
The distinguishing characteristics of being movable or intangible
subclassify personal property as tangible and intangible property. The
historical names for these sub-categories explain key legal principles
15 See generally idL
16Mobility as used here includes not only the ability to physically move tangible personal
property, but also The ease of transferring ownersbip and control of tangible and intangible
personal property. Of comse, knowledge of the financing statement does provide some
protection as The creditor may make further inquiries before extending any credit
17 &ee EDWARD H. WARREN, TROVEI AND CONVERSION AN ESSAY at 4, 5, 12
(1936); J.B. Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARv. L. REV. 23 (1889-90); R.H.
Hehnholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 NW. U.
L. REV. 1221 (1987).
1 E.g., U.C.C. § 9-102 (applying to all secured transactions involving personal
property).
1993-941
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governing them. Tangible personal property (also known as chattels) was
known as choses in possession, while intangible personal property was
known as choses in action.' Rights in chattels were acquired and
enforced by possession, while rights in intangibles were vindicated by
legal action ° These differences profoundly affected the development of
laws governing personal property.
Possession, while not easily and clearly definable,21 provided a
readily available and initially useful basis for determining interests in
tangible personal property. Numerous legal rules were based upon the
concept of possession. In medieval times, possession was ownership (at
least against a wrongdoer), subject to defeat at law by the one improperly
deprived of possession.' Conversion, one of the in personam actions
which distinguished personal from real property, relies heavily upon
possession.e
Although possession was a fundamental concept for the operative
principles of much of the early personal property law, it also deterred
development of the law. It formed a major barrier to the development of
the law of secured ftansactions.' Prior to the promulgation of Article 9,
a myriad of security devices developed to avoid the requirement of
possession by the secured party. The law of secured transactions under
the Code to a large extent addresses issues that arise when the debtor,
rather than the secured party, possesses the personal property colater-
al.2
In our highly commercial society it is widely understood that one in
possession of tangible property may be an owner, pledgee, lessee,
consignee, common carrier, warehouseman, or bailee for some other
purpose. The incidences of ownership have been divided into a large
- BROWN, stpa note 14, § 1.7.
20 Id
" See id. § 2.6.
22 See supra note 17.
3 See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
u See, e.g., Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819); Twyne's Case, 76 Eng.
Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601).
' See infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text; see also Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of ktice
9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175 (1983) (examining the treatment of ownership and possession
of personal property and property interests not considered security interests); Steven
Wechsler, Rights and Remedies of the Secured Pany 4fter an Unauthorized Transfer of
Collateral: A Proposal for Balancing Competing Claims in Repossession, Resale,
Proceeds, and Conversion Cases, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 373, 373-74 (1983) (discussing the
impact of the legal development of non-possessory security).
[Vol 82
SECURn IhY RESTS
number of separate rights and powers in addition to possession, the full
bundle of which is probably not yet fully defined or definable. One of the
most significant rights included in ownership of or title to property is the
right.to use and enjoyment. The present right to use and enjoyment of
tangible personal property includes possession; the reversionary right does
not.
Intangibles did not initially enjoy the benefits provided to tangible
personalty by the concept of possession. Although with the legal fiction
that certain choses in action became reified (represented by a writing that
could be possessed and transferred by delivery), significant developments
occurred in the law governing some intangible property.' More signifi-
cantly, because valuable intangibles often are not capable of possession,
alternative legal concepts have been necessary to the development of law
governing that property. Article 9, by establishing alternatives to
possession, provided significant integration of rules governing both
tangible and intangible property relevant to security interests. Alternatives
to possession which developed, however, were not necessarily integrated
into other rules of law governing the same personal property.
While possession is still an important concept relating to tangible
personal property, it no longer plays the central role it once played.
Certainly ownership and possession are no longer essentially related.
Article 9 has been a significant force in the diminution of the role of
possession. Recognizing this simple fact about possession and personal
property is critical in evaluating laws derived from and still significantly
based upon the "possession equals ownership" concept.
B. Classification of Conversion
Legal rules affecting personal property that were not specific to a
type of transaction or a type of personal property and thus classified as
a separate body of law became legal orphans. They were grouped with
othei'bodies of law with which they shared some substantive characteris-
tics. The personal property remedy of conversion suffered this fate. It
relates to tort law because it generally involves non-consensual transac-
tions. Historically, conversion was classified as tort law in part because
separate coverage of personal property was dropped from the law school
CUrrieulm2? 7
' That body of law became classified as law of bills and notes based in part upon
the nature of the pesonal property and in part upon the type of transaction involved.
" William L. Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 168, 168 nl.
(1957).
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However, the remedy of conversion is a somewhat ill-fitting
appendage to the law of torts. Because conversion has its only impact on
issues of personal property, it has become to a significant extent a mere
backwater of tort law. Warren described conversion as a "no-man's"
land that property professors wanted to give to tort professors and tort
professors wanted to leave to property professors.' Prosser's 1957
assessment that conversion was the "forgotten tort"' because most of
the little that had been written about it was "quite perfunctory" still
holds. At the same time, conversion commands little attention and interest
in the bodies of law governing personal property to which it applies and
upon which it draws. It has become in effect a second-class citizen in
both tort law and the bodies of law governing personal property.
Should conversion be grouped with tort law because it provides a
legal remedy for intentional interference with rights to personal property?
Or should it be considered property law because it is the legal remedy for
resolving conflicting claims to personal property? The law of conversion
combines remedial and substantive elements. A remedy is generally
assumed to simply answer the questions: what relief is to be given and
what-measure is to be used?' The essence of conversion is the reme-
dy'--the market value of the converted property and the vesting of title
in the converter. Vesting of title is very much a property dispute
resolution concept The substantive law rubric applies because conversion
resolves whether the party has a right to be remedied. Its substantive
elements, the questions of whether the plaintiff had the right to immediate
possession necessary to maintain the action and whether the defendant
had inappropriately interfered with that right, are questions often
answered by substantive law governing personal property.'
The effects of classification problems are evident in resolving
personal property disputes. Because conversion is treated as part of tort
law even though it applies to various separate bodies of law governing
personal property, its rules have not developed to relate to the particular
type of personal property transaction to which they will be applied.
2 See, e.g., id
WARsBN, swa note 17, at Foreword.
30 Id.
"t Presser, spra note 27, at 168.
32 Id.
"See DOBas, supra note 10, at 2.
WARREN, supra note 17, at 3.
31 See infra notes 172-75 and accoMpanying text.
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IlL THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Understanding the interaction of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code and the tort of conversion requires an exploration of the significant
historical roots and relevant general concepts that underlie each of these
bodies of law. In such an inquiry, comparisons between the laws governing
personal property and real property law, particularly concerning which body
of law has a more unified character, are occasionally instructive.
A Framework of Article 9
A creditor obtains security as leverage for payment because it deems the
right to sue the debtor for payment or performance' insufficient protection
in the event of default Security provides the secured creditor with specific
property against which it can enforce the unpaid or unperformed obligations.
Article 9s policies and rules focus on obtaining, perfecting, and enforcing
these interests in personal property security.
Article 9 consolidated several legal schemes that had developed to govern
personal property security when failure to take possession had become a
barrier to creditors 7 Its draflers also expanded the role of personal property
as collateral by opting for several sweeping rules benefiting secured creditors
with priority. The 1972 revisions to Article 9 continued this deference to the
prior creditort interests. Many of these expansive rights for secured creditors
impact the rights of claimants of property subject to a security interest. A
review ofpertinent rules and policies establishes the relevant legal framework
for personal property with which the remedy of conversion interacts. The
Article 9 approach frequently diverges from the legal principles governing
real property security.
1. Prior Creditor's Monopoly Power
Under the Code, a creditor can obtain a security interest in virtually all
personal property its debtor now owns or will acquire in the filure to
' A creditor's rights against the debtor on the obligation are governed by the body
or bodies of law specific to the obligafion. For example, Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs
if the security is for an unpaid sales price, Article 3 governs collection of a secured
negotiable instrument, and common law principles govern the collection of obligations not
represented by negotiable instruments.
37 See generally 1 GRANT GiI2ORE, SEcuRrYR INTEREsTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
§§ 1.1-8.8 (1965) (reviewing the historical origins and growth of various personal
property security devices before the Code).
U.C.C. § 9-204 permits all after-acquired personal property of the debtor to serve
1993-94]
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secure pre-existing indebtedness, now value, and obligations which arise in
the future.39 The Article 9 priority rules for future advances expand their
utility40 Buyers are subject to future advances made or committed to before
the earlier of: (1) the date the secured party obtains knowledge of the
purchase, or (2) 45 days after the purchase4' A lien creditor is subject to
future advances made or committed to before the later of (1) 45 days after
the date it becomes a lien creditor, or (2) the date the secured party obtains
knowledge of the lien: 2 Secured creditors are generally subject to all future
advances'
The breadth of these priority rules depends on what constitutes a future
advance. The Code does not define future advance explicitly, but its priority
structure supports a very broad reading. Priority generally dates from the
earlier of filing or perfection." Even though an advance must be made or
committed to achieve perfection,45 an earlier filing may establish the date for
priority." Thus, even without the priority accorded future advances by
section 9-312(7),4' any advance should have priority from the time of filing
as collateral for prior indebtedness, unless the collateral is commer goods, which can
have only a limited role as after-acquired collateral.
39 U.C.C. § 9-204(3) permits future advances to be secured by collateral transferred
under a prior security agreement.
The 1972 Amendments reduced the priority somewhat as to lien creditors, U.C.C.
§ 9-301(4), buyers not inthe ordinary course, id. § 9-301(1)(c), and other secured parties,
id. § 9-312(7). See Richard F. Duncas, The Law and Practice of Secured Transactions:
Working with Article 9, § 2.05[2] Law Journal Seminars Press (1987).
41 U.C.C. § 9-307(3).
42 Id. § 9-301(4).
4Id. § 9-312(7) provides in pertinent part:
If future advances are made while a security interest is perfected by filing, or
the taking of possession or under Section 8-312 on securities, the security
interest has the same priority for the purposes of subsection (5) with respect to
the firture advances as it does with respect to the first advance.
Id. The three methods of perfection covered by the rle-filing, possession and under §
8-312-include the vast rpajority of security interests.
4 Id. § 9-312(5).
" Id. § 9-303 provides that perfection occurs when the security interest has attached
and when the step required by § 9-302 for perfection (filing in this example) has
occmreod. U.C.C. § 9-203 has three requirements for attachment the debtor must have
rights in the collateral, the creditor must have given value, and a security agreement must
exist.
4" The drafters clearly understood this priority to cover situations in which the
financing statement was on file for an extended period of time before the elements of
attachment were met. A Practical Approach to the Vn/brm Commercial Code for the
Practicing Lawyer, 19 Bus. LAW 5, 52 (1963) (transcript of an exchange on the subject
between Peter Coogan and Homer Kripke).
47 Section 9-312(7) appears to have been added to the Code in 1972 to resolve
[Vol 82
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a financing statement. Despite support for an expansive future advance
concept in the Code, its comments, and other official sources, courts
exercise restraint in resolving disputes in this area Even with judicial
questions that had arisen under the 1962 Code regarding priority to future advances. See
generally WI2AM C. HILIMAN, DOCUMEmaG SEC1ED TRANSACTIoNs, PRACnCNG
LAW frrsnumT §§ 6-3 to 6-6 (1991 & 1993 Supp.).
' Courts have frequently limited a secured creditor's ability to rely on its collateral
to secure firture advances when issues regarding the breadth of the future advance concept.
have arisen. See, e.g., Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc.,
746 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that future advances have to be placed at the
disposal of the borrower and therefore do not include advances of overdue interest or
preservation expenses); Texas Kenworth Co. v. First Nat'lBank, 564 P.2d 222, 225 (Okla.
1977) (holding that the contract language "all other indebtedness from buyer to [s]ecured
[p]arty" was not specific enough to secure fiture indebtedness). See generally HuzmAN,
supra note 47, §§ 6-3 to 6-4 (discussing the 'relatedness rule," which limits the effect of
future advance clauses not related to the nature of the original security agreement); David
G. Carlson & Paul M. Shupack, Judicial Lien Prorities Under Artile 9 of the Umform
Commercial Code: Part 1, 5 CARiozo L. REV. 287, 352-59 (1984) (discussing the
priority treatment of increases in secured debt); Duncans, supra note 40, § 2.05[2][c];
Julian B. McDonnell, The Priority of Future Advances and Other Future Obligations
Under the Revised Article 9, in 1C BnNDER's U.C.C. SEa'V. (MB) 21B.02[6][a], [b]
(Apr. 1986); Steve H. Nickles, A Localized Treatise on Secured Transactions-Part f.
Creating Security Interests, 34 ARK. L. REV. 559, 652-73 (1981) (discussing the security
lien on collateral as it is sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of). Part of the support
for this narrower construction comes from Grant Gilmore, who expresses support for pre-
Code limitations to fiture advances. 2 GUORE, supra note 37, §§ 35.2-35.4.
Another important issue concerns whether a future advance clause must be contained
inthe original secuity agreement. U.C.C. § 9-312(7) cant 7, ex. 5 states in pertinent part,
'The same result would be reached even though A's April 1 advance was not under the
original security agreement, but was under a now security agreement under A's same
financing statement or during the continuation of A's possession." Compare Coin-O-Matic
Serv. Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1112, 1120
(LI. Super. Ct 1966) (stating that refinancing with new documents was not enough to
claim earlier priority) with State Bank of Young America v. Vidmar Iron Works, Inc., 292
N.W.2d 244, 248-49 (Min. 1980) (stating that original loan was paid at time second loan
was renewed yet all fiture advances cminmed to be secured). Coin-O-Matic has been
widely criticized. See, e.g., In re Will of Gruder, 392 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (N.Y. CL 1977);
HiLLMAN, supra note 47, § 6-2; JAMEs I. Wrm & ROBRiT S. SUMMERs, UNIFORM
COMMERCLAL CODE 1135 (3d ed. 1988); Ronald DeKoven, Secured Transactions, 37 Bus.
LAW. 1011, 1026 (1982). It was also the subject of a proposed P.E.B. Commentary, which
was ultimately decided to be unnecessary. Penanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code Review Committee For Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
Final Report, 226 (1971); see also HLMAN Em AL., supra note 2, 121.0112] (explaining
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parsimony, the future advance concept retains considerable vitality and
power
The alter-acquired property and future advance provisions place a
perfected secured creditor with priority in a very advantageous position. That
creditor obtains a statutory situational monopoly as against creditorsOre The
only protections for subsequent secured parties are the limited circumstances
where the Code gives priority over the secured party with the prior filingY'
Lien creditors fare only slightly better. They can limit the magnitude of the
security interest to which they will be subject, but they have no way of
ascertaining it at the time they become lien creditorsO2 Buyers are the only
third parties with significant protection under the Code. If they do not qualify
to take the property free of the security interest,ss buyers can limit the
security interest to the amount outstanding or committed by giving the
creditor notice of the purchase.
In consequence of these future advance rules, the collateral becomes
almost useless to junior creditors and something to be acquired cautiously for
buyers not in the ordinary course of business. A party acquiring an interest
in personal property subject to a security interest needs to assume priority will
be accorded to all advances made by the prior creditor.
Personal property security differs significantly from real property security
in the operation of these rules. Mortgagees of real property cannot acquire
alter-,aquired real property, except fittues5 The advances for which a
mortgagee has priority must be described in the mortgage and thus must have
been made, committed to, or contemplated at the time the mortgage was
recordediO
that renewal notes do not extinguish the original debt unless so intended by the parties);
McDonnell, slqra, 21B.03[3][c].I A secured creditor seeking maximum protection for future advances should be able
to achieve that goal by careful drafting. Reciting that a note is secured by a particular
security agreement should remove the obstacles raised by the narrower court decisions.
E.g., Onawa State Bank v. Simpson (In re Estate of Simpson), 403 N.W.2d 791, 793-94
(Iowa 1987) (holding no securing of future advances existed where neither a note nor
mortgage refened to the prior agreement); accord In re Airwest hit'l,70 B.R. 914 (Bankm.
D. Haw. 1987) (looking to the actual intent of the parties).
' See Russell A. Hakes, According Purchase Money &atus Proper Priority, 72 OR.
L. REV. 323, 352-53 (1993); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1167-78 (1979).
s' See Hakes, supra note 50, at 352, 383-84.
See U.C.C. § 9-301(4).
" See id. §§ 9-306(2), 9-307(1), (2).
S' See id. § 9-307(3).
The recording system governing rea property precludes such interests. Specific
property must be described in a conveyance of real property. Any attempted conveyance
before the transferor has a recorded interest creates a "wild deed."
See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHmAN, REAL ESTATE FINANcE LAW §§
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2. Doubling Security on Transfer
Despite the disincentives to acquire an interest in encumbered
collateral, the Code facilitates the voluntary or involuntary transfer of the
debtor's remaining rights, subject to the security interest regardless of
whether the security agreement prohibits such transferY7 The provision
creating that power confirms rejection of the title theory of security
interests by affirming that the debtor retains rights it can alienate.' The
elimination of the title concept is consistent with the Code's policy of
encouraging commerce. 9
.Article 9 attempts to establish workable rules for highly mobile
collateral which facilitate secured lending without undue interference with
transferability and mobility-an ambitious undertaking. In order to
accomplish this, the Code creates expansive rights for the secured creditor
if the collateral is transferred Transfer extinguishes the security interest
only in limited circumstances. Subsection 9-306(2) provides that the
security interest continues notwithstanding sale, exchange, or other
disposition of the collateral, unless the secured party consents or Article
9 provides to the contrary.' The exceptions further the negotiability of
certain types of collateral or support the Code's policy requiring
perfection, but leave much collateral in the hands of third parties subject
to the prior secured creditor's claim.
Subsection 9-306(2) further establishes the Code's scheme for
personal property security by continuing the security interest in identifi-
able proceeds6 of the collateral. The provisions governing security
interests in proceeds were clarified and liberalized in the 1972 version of
2.4, 12.7-.8 (2d ed. 1985).
U.C.C. § 9-311.
' Id. § 9-311 cmts. 1, 2.
,See Id. § 1-102(2)(b).
The most significant exception is U.C.C. § 9-307(l), which frees collateral from
a security interest created by the seller if it is purchased by a buyer in the ordinary course
of business (defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(9)) even if the buyer has knowledge of the
security interest. Article 9 also protects: consumers purchasing from another consumer if
there was no filing, id. § 9-307(2); certain purchasers of chattel paper, id § 9-308; certain
persons obtaining negotiable colHteral, id § 9-309; buyers at the foreclosure sale of a
senior secured party, id. § 9-504(4); and persons acquiring rights if the security interest
was unperfected, id. § 9-301. The linitations on priority for future advances in sections
9-307(3) and 9-301(4) also, in effect, limit the continuation of the security interst in
tramnsferred collateral
U.C.C. § 9-306(1) defines proceeds as: "whatever is received upon the sale,
exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds."
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the Code to eliminate any reading requiring express language in the
security agreement to achieve this claim to proceeds. ' The only
requirement for the security interest to attach to proceeds is that they be
identiflable.' Courts have provided a tracing rule for the most common
challenge in identifying proceeds: proceeds commingled in a deposit
account."
The Code provisions continuing the security interest upon transfer and
providing a security interest in proceeds produce a variety of results
depending on the circumstances of transfer. The creditor's security
doubles if the proceeds are identifiable and the transferee failed to qualify
for an exception. The creditor's security disappears if the proceeds cannot
be identified and one of the exceptions to continuation upon transfer
applies. The creditor may retain only a claim to proceeds or only a claim
to the transferred collateral. The ultimate goal, of course, is to provide the
secured creditor with its bargained-for single recovery against the
collateral. This approach, resulting in collateral upon transfer producing
anywhere from nothing to double the security, may be a rational
accommodation of the mobility of personal property.
The rules governing security interests on transfer of collateral
significantly distinguish personal property security from real property
security. The claim of the real property mortgagee continues in trans-
ferred property unless the mortgage is satisfied.' A mortgagee has no
claim to proceeds of a sale of real property." Claims to rents or other
revenues produced by real property are treated as separate security
" See Uniform Commercial Code § 9-306 Official Reasons for 1972 Change, 3
U.L.A. 440 (1981). The 1962 version stated: "In describing collateral, tei word 'p '
is sufficient without farther description to cover proceeds of any character." U.C.C. § 9-
203(b) (1962).
Subsection 9-203(3) now compliments § 9-306(2) so that a security interest attaches
automatically to proceeds by providing in pertinent part, "Unless otherwise agreed a
security agreement gives the secured party the fights to proceeds provided by Section 9-
306." U.C.C. § 9-203(3).
6 U.C.C. § 9-306(4).
E.g., Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 216
(1st Cir. 1982); In re Intennountain Porta Storage, Inc., 59 B.R. 793, 796 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1986), a'd, 74 B.R. 1011 (D. Colo. 1987); Universal C.IT. Credit Corp. v.
Farmers Bank of Portageville, 358 F. Supp. 317, 324-27 (E.D. Mo. 1973); C.O. Funk &
Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 431 N.E.2d 370, 372-73 (I. 1982); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Norstar Bank, NA., 532 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687-89 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988).
sSee NELSON & WHrrMAN, sura note 56, §§ 5.1, 5.3, 7.2.
See id. § 4.12 (explaining that condemnation is an exception because it defeats the
mortgage but does not have priority).
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requiring separate actions by the mortgagee to perfect its claims against
competing claimants.'
3. Bifurcated Concept of a Debtor
For several reasons, the Code defines debtor to include both the
obligor on the secured obligation and the owner of the collateral for
provisions relating to collateral.' This definition includes two important
groups with interests in a secured transaction: guarantors giving the
secured party collateral rather than undertaking a personal obligation; and
subsequent transferees of the collateral, if the security interest has not
been extinguished. Transferees classified as debtors include those
purchasing at an execution or a foreclosure sale by a junior creditor and
buyers not in the ordinary course of business.' The term debtor does
not include levying creditors or junior secured parties because they are
not owners of the collateral.70
The bifurcated concept of debtor resolves the issue of what rights and
obligations transferees have upon acquiring collateral subject to a security
interest Classification as a debtor gives transferees the rights of the
debtor under the Code without creating liability for the secured obliga-
tion. This result is consistent with the concept of taking the property
subject to the security interest without assuming the obligation. The
secured creditor has no recourse against them on the debt, only a non-
recourse right to the collateral. The distinction between taking property
subject to an obligation and assuming the obligation is common in real
property transactions where, absent express agreement to assume the
mortgage obligation, the purchaser of property also simply takes it subject
to a mortgage.
7'
4. Irrelevant Knowledge, Inadequate Notice
Constructive knowledge is the basic priority principle under Article
9.'2 Actual knowledge of a prior interest in personal property is general-
- See id. §§ 4.20, 4.23, 4.35 (stating that some right to rents from leases executed
before the mortgage was recorded exists if the jurisdiction follows the title theory of
mortgages).
U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(d).
Not all buyers not in the ordinary course of business will be owners of the
collateral subject to a security interest. See s gra note 60 and accompanying text.
7* See Frisch, supra note 4, at 175 n.126.
" See NELSON & WHMAAN, supra note 56, §§ 5.3, 5.4, 5.9, 5.10.72 U.C.C. § 9-312(5) is the basic priority rule; it grants priority to the firstto file or
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ly irrelevant to priority.73 The Code's narrow exceptions?' are inapplica-
ble to the vast majority of priority disputes affecting security interests.
Although constructive notice plays a central role in Article 9, priority
sometimes exists without meaningful notice. Article 9 starts from the
presumption that security interests are enforceable against third parties
without any filing, recording, or other acts providing notoriety The
exceptions, however, virtually eliminate this presumption.7 More
important are the significant number of situations contemplated by the
Code in which one searching for evidence of the security interest either
will be unable to find it or will be able to find it only after ascertaining
the history of the collateral Furthermore, filed financing statements
perfect. Id.
See U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt 3; Dan Coenen et al., Special Project, The Priority Rules
of Article Nine, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 834, 848 (1977). But see HuimAN Er AL., Stqr
note 2, 24.04 (stating that unjust enrichment may subject a perfected creditor to a
security interest of which it has knowledge); Coenen, sqpra, at 857 (noting that estoppel
may cause a secured creditor with knowledge to lose priority).
I' U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (some future advances made with knowledge of property
interests of lien creditors and transferees in bulk fail to obtain. piority); id. § 9-307(1)
(knowledge that the purchase violates a security interest precludes buyer in the ordinary
course status as defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(9)); id. § 9-307(2) (knowledge of a security
interest in consumer goods); id. § 9-307(3) (future advances made with knowledge of
property interests of buyers not in the ordinary course of business fail to obtain priority);
id. § 9-308(a) (knowledge of the prior interest precludes purchasers of chattel paper taking
possession from achieving priority over certain prior secued parties); id. § 9-309 (certain
knowledge precludes priority as a holder in due course of an instrument, a holder to
whom a document of title has been negotiated, or a bona fide purchaser of a security);
id. § 9-314(3) (knowledge of an earlier security interest in an accession precludes priority
for a subsequent claimant of the whole chattel); id. § 9-401(2) (improperly filed financing
statement effective against creditor with knowledge of its content).
' U.C.C. § 9-201 provides that a security interest is enforceable against the debtor
and third parties, unless otherwise provided inthe Code. Under U.C.C. § 9-203, a security
interest becomes enforceable when it attaches.
6 E.g., U.C.C. § 9-301 (exceptions include lien creditors, other secured parties, and
buyers not in the ordinary course if the security interest is not perfected); id. § 9-307(1)
(exception for buyers in the ordinary course of business).
Id. § 9-302(l)(d) (no filing necessary to perfect apurchase money security interest
in consumer goods); id. § 9-302(4) (no filing necessary to perfect security interest in
certain other collateral for short periods of time); id. § 9-314(1), (3) (unperfected security
interest in accessions before they are affixed obtains priority over prior interests in goods
to which affixed); id. § 9-403(1), (4) (despite the filing officer's obligation to file and
index financing statements, lost, misfiled or misindexed financing statements still perfect
a security interest). See generaly Uniform Commercial Code Comm. of the Bus. Law
Section of the St. Bar of California, Report Regarding Legal Opinions in Personal
Property Secured Transactions, 44 Bus. LAW. 791, 795 (1989) (providing general
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remain effective despite changes in the facts which determined where to
file,78 requiring a person to know the relevant history to obtain construc-
tive notice from the filing." This knowledge is available only from the
debtor, who may not remember or may purposely withhold information
to its advantage.
Knowledge and notice play significantly different roles in real estate
transactions than in Article 9 transactions. Actual knowledge of an
interest in real estate generally subjects the interest of the party with
knowledge to the other interest 0 Constructive notice of real estate
interests is created by recording in the real estate records, and the location
of the appropriate records is easy to determine. Interests in real property
typically must be recorded in those public records to be enforceable
against third parties.'1
The rules governing knowledge and notice described in the preceding
paragraphs make it far more likely with personal property collateral than
with real estate collateral that a person will claim an interest in collateral
in a good faith, albeit erroneous, belief that no prior interest in the
collateral exists.
5. Code Remedies
An Article 9 security interest is not title to personal property.'
Rather, it is an interest in the nature of a lien. Part 5 of Article 9 creates
observations of personal property law includin perfection) [hereinafe Bar Committee
Report]; Gerald T. McLaughlin, "Seek But You May Not Find'" Non-UCC .Recorded,
Unrecorded and Hidden Security Interest Under Art'le 9 of the Umform Commercial
Code, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 953 (1985) (discussing Article 9 of the Code and security
interests which may be overlooked when detennining priority).
7'U.C.C. § 9-103 (financing statements remain effective for four months after the facts
change, determining the state law governing perfection); id. § 9-315 (security interest in part of
the collateral extends to the whole upon commingling without further filing); id. § 9-401
(refiling generally unnecessary when the facts change, determining location of filing within a
state); id. § 9-402(7) (transfer of collateral does not necessitate refiling and financing statement
remains effective for collateral acquired within four months after any change in mne, or
corporate structure, unless change renders filing seriously misleading); Ud § 9-402(8) (not
serious misleading standard validates financing statements containing errors); see also David
Frisch, UCC Section 9-315: A Hitorcal and Modern Perpe'e, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1985).
" Of course, knowledge of the existence of a filed financing statement does provide
some protection as the secured creditor may make further inquiries before extending any
credit to the debtor.
'* See NELSON & WHrmAN, sprra note 56, § 7.13.
I1d.
n Any attempt to retain title to secure obligations is treated merely as a security
interest. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 2-401, 9-102.
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and describes rights constituting a security interest The rights are
generally exercisable only upon a debtor's defaults which is defined by
the parties and not by the Code." The Code contemplates four types of
rights: those established by the Code, those expressly permitted by the
Code if included in the security agreemen, 5 those provided in the
security agreement if they do not violate policies of the Code," and
those provided by other law.' Subject to minor Code limitations, the
creditor is free to choose among these rights.'
Most important to the present inquiry are the rights established by the
Code and those provided by other law. The Code establishes a self-help
right to repossess the collateral, provided no breach of the peace is
committed.'e The only essential non-Code remedy for a secured party
against a debtor is a mechanism for repossession f self-help fils.9'
E.g., id. § 9-501(1) (introductory clause).
u Courts will probably hold nonpayment of the secured obligation to be a default if
no default provision was included in the security agreement See Whisenhunt v. Allen
Parker Co., 168 S.E.2d 827, 830 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
" The Code expressly sanctions the following rights, if provided for by agreement
the right to collections prior to default, U.C.C. § 9-502; the right to recover reasonable
attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred in the enforcement of the security interest as
part of the secured claim, id. §§ 9-504(l)(a), 9-506; the right to a deficiency with a sale
of accounts or chattel paper, id. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2); and the right to require the debtor
to assemble the collateral and make it available to the creditor at a reasonably convenient
place, id. § 9-503.
"U.C.C. § 9-501(3) provides in pertinent part: "To the extent they give rights to the
debtor and impose duties on the secured party, the rules stated inthe subsections referred
to below may not be waived or varied except as provided with respect to compulsory
disposition of collateral ... and with respect to redemption of collateral ..... Id. Section
9-501(3) then refers to U.C.C. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2), (3), 9-505(1), 9-506, 9-507(1).
These contractually created remedies will have a limited affect on third parties.
Certainly, they cannot be relied upon as a way to resolve disputes with a party not bound
by the contract.
,7 U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (stating that a secured party "may reduce his claim to judgment,
foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure.").
" U.C.C. § 9-505 precludes a creditor's access to strict foreclosure against consumer
goods if 60% of the obligation has been paid by requiring resort to § 9-504 within 90
days of taking possession, unless the debtor waives the right in writing after default That
section also requires resort to § 9-504 if an appropriate party makes a timely objection
to the creditor's strict foreclosure proposal. Id. If the secured party does not proceed in
accordance with the provisions of Article 9, § 9-507 authorizes orders to dispose of or
refrain fomn disposing of collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-501(1) provides that the rights and remedies are cumulative.
o Id § 9-503.
U.C.C. § 9-503 contemplates legal action if self-help is unavailable. This step
requires the creditor to resort to the non-Code remedy of replevin or its equivalent
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Repossession simply starts the process of realizing the collateral's value
in order to satisfy the secured debt. The Code provides three ways to
realize the value: collect collateral involving rights to payment,9 retain
the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt,93 or foreclose (sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of the collateral).9 After applying foreclosure
proceeds or collections, the Code permits the secured creditor to sue the
debtor for any deficiency?' The secured creditor limits this right by
failing to proceed in accordance with its obligations under Article 9.'
Finally, the Code contemplates the secured party's access to non-Code
remedies. Absent the explicit reference to non-Code remedies in section
9-501, these remedies would be available under section 1-103 unless
displaced by the Code. By making explicit reference, the drafters
apparently tried to be as expansive as possible for the benefit of secured
creditors, rather than simply contemplating other laws as gap fillers. This
broad authorization is, at least in part, an attempt to permit Article 9 to
change with changing needs of commerce. The Code specifically
describes two non-Code remedies.97 The Official Comments to section
Judicial foreclosure is another option. See Hmrn4AN Er AL., supra note 2, 1 25.01[2][a].
Conversion, which awards damages rather than possession, is another possible remedy.
U.C.C. § 9-502.
"Id § 9-505.
' Id. § 9-504.
Id. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2). A deficiency judgment is only available for a sale of
accounts or chattel paper if the security agreement contains a deficiency clase. Id.
' Courts take one of three approaches to determine a creditor's fights if the creditor
violates its obligations under Article 9, usually either by failing to give notice or by
disposing of the collateral in a commercially unreasonable manner. The first approach
bars a deficiency judgment See, e.g., C.I.T. Corp. v. Anwright Corp., 237 Cal. Rptr. 108,
110-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773, 777 (Del.
1980); Bank Josephine v. Conn, 599 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). The second
approach presumes that the collateral was worth the amount of the debt; thus, no
deficiency would have occurrd if the creditor had proceeded apropriately. The creditor
must rebut the presumption to obtain a deficiency. See, eg., In re Nardone, 70 B.R. 1010,
1014 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., NA. v. Incendy, 540 A.2d
32, 37 (Conn. 1988); First Galesburg Nat'lBank & Trust Co. v. Joannides, 469 N.E.2d
180, 183 (1L 1984); Mathias v. Hicks, 363 S.E.2d 914, 916 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987). Finally,
the third approach is to reduce the creditor's deficiency judgment by the damages for non-
compliance the debtor establishes under § 9-507(1). See, e.g., Gulf Homes, Inc. v.
Goubeaux, 664 P.2d 183, 186 (Ariz. 1983); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Young, 612 P.2d 1357,
1359 (Okla. 1980).
9 3Subsection 9-501(1) authorizes reducing a claim to judgment and foreclosing or
enforcing the security interest by any available judicial procedure. This extra-Code
foreclosure procedure may result in a lower priority under certain circumstances than
would resort to the Code foreclosure procedure in § 9-504. Section 9-501(5) gives the lien
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9-306 contain the only other specific reference to a non-Code remedy by
providing that a secured party may in "an appropriate case maintain an
action for conversion'"8 against a transferee of the property.'
The Code provides significant protections to all "debtors7 ® and
certain creditors. At any time prior to the completion of a foreclosure
sale, debtors or junior creditors may redeem the collateral by paying the
entire amount due with costs.'' If the secured party is not complying
with its Article 9 obligations, these parties under subsection 9-507(1) may
bring a suit to enjoin the secured party or to order it to dispose of the
property. If disposition has occurred, the right to damages for the secured
party's failure to comply runs only in favor of debtors and persons
"entitled to notification or whose interest has been made known to the
secured party prior to the disposition."'" Only the debtor has an
express right to a conversion action in lieu of damages under section 9-
507(1), if the secured party fails to foreclose within 90 days after it takes
possession of consumer goods. 3
The secured creditor's duty to provide notice of a sale and proceed in
good faith"' provides some protection. However, the Code does not
require the foreclosing creditor to notify junior or senior creditors, unless
they requested notice. 05 Prior to the 1972 revisions to Article 9, notice
was required to all secured creditors who had filed financing statements
against the debtor in that state or of which the foreclosing creditor had
knowledge. 10
of any such levy priority only as of the date of perfection rather than the earlier of filing
or perfection provided in § 9-312(5).
Subsection 9-501(4) authorizes resort to real estate foreclosure procedures ifbothreal
property and personal property secure the same obligation. This reference creates
uncertainty, because real estate foreclosure procedures are based upon procedures and
requirements that will not apply to, and perhaps cannot be complied with, for personal
property.
U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt. 3.
9 Id.
j' See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
101U.C.C. § 9-506. The Article 9 Study Committee has recommended including lien
creditors. ,Sudy Group Report, siqra note 2, at 247.
U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
', Id. § 9-505(1).
104 Id. § 9-504(3).
"5 U.C.C. § 9-504(3) only requires notice to debtors and to any creditor who has
requested notice. Whether a levying creditor has to provide notice to secured parties
depends on the state's law governing judgment liens. See Frisch, supra note 4, at 152
n.14.
1- U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1962) provided in pertinent part
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The rationale for reducing the notice requirement was to relieve the
secured party from the burden of searching files and maintaining records
of correspondence and telephone calls, because junior interests are fairly
uncommon and equity for satisfaction of junior's claims is even less
common." This rationale loses its force when a junior creditor fore-
closes. Why should a junior creditor be able to foreclose without
notifying the senior creditor? Likewise, should there not be a duty to
notify prospective buyers that the collateral continues to be subject to a
senior security interest? The rationale that junior creditors are few in
number is also suspect in light of the Code provisions creating junior
creditors by establishing purchase money priority and the 1972 changes
creating junior creditors out of purchase money creditors by changing
priority rules as to proceeds of purchase money inventory collateraL'
Buyers at foreclosure sales need assurances that they are receiving
good title and are not vulnerable to defects in the sale in order for such
sales to be facilitated. Buyers at a public sale obtain such protection if
they are not in collusion with the secured party, any other bidders, or the
one conducting the sale and if they are without knowledge of a defect in
the sale." The sole remaining duty is to act in good faith." ° The
Code comments disclaim any duty of the buyer to inquire into the
sale." A buyer for value obtains all the debtor's rights to the collateral,
the foreclosing creditor's security interest is discharged, and any lien or
[R]easonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable
notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended
disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, and
except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has a security
interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed
inthe name of the debtor in this state orwho is known by the secured party to
have a security interest in the collateral.
1- Uniform Commercial Code § 9-504 Official Reasons for 1972 Change, 3 U.LA.
129 (1981) provides in pertinent part 'These burdens of searching the record and of
checling the secured party's files were greater than the circumstances called for because
as a practical matter there would seldom be a junior secured party who really had an
interest needing protection in the case of a foreclosure sale." See also General Comment
On The Approach Of The Review Committee For Article 9, § J-3 (1972 Official Text)
(explaining the reason for the amendment to the § 9-504 notice requirements).
1C. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) only gives a purchase money creditor in inventory purchase
money priority over the original collateral and cash proceeds of cash sales. The proceeds
of credit sales are subject to the claim of prior creditors. Id. § 9-312(5).
'0 U.C.C. § 9-504(4).
1
'0 Id. § 9-504(4)(a), (b).
U" Id. at cmt 4.
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security interest junior to the foreclosing security interest is dis-
charged. 112
The Code is silent regarding liens or security interests senior to the
foreclosing interest. Because such liens and security interests are not
extinguished by the foreclosure sale, the logical implication is that
foreclosure sales by junior secured parties are made subject to the senior
interests.' This result is consistent with the common law derivation
principle governing interests in property-a subsequent taker can only
receive what its transferor had not already transferred.
114
6. Incomplete Rules on Meaning of Priority
Against whom may an Article 9 security interest be enforced? The
Code authorizes enforcement once it has attached1 against the debtor
and third parties, unless otherwise provided."' Numerous provisions in
the Code effectively immunize third parties from enforcement of the
security interest by granting them priority."7 Thus, enforcement against
third parties first requires the secured creditor to establish priority. Article
9 provides a relatively complete priority scheme for security interests."
The Code's remedial scheme for a secured party to enforce its
security interest against its debtor is also quite complete. If the "debtor"
1 U.C.C. § 9-504(4).
1 3U.C.C. § 9-306(2) also implies that the security interest continues because the
secured party did not consent to the disposition.
"n See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403 cmt.1; PEB Commentary No. 6 Section 9-301(1), 3B
U.LA. 623 (1992); BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3.08[4] (2d ed. 1988); Julian B. McDonnell, First to File
vs. Purchase Money: Competing Principles of Priority, in 1A SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER. THE UNIFORM COMMERCL41 CODE § 7B.03[4] (Peter Coogan et al., eds., 1991).
uS Attachment requires three elements: the debtor must agree to give a security
interest, the secured party must give value, and the debtor must have rights in the
collateral. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1).
1Id. § 9-201.
1 E.g., id § 9-301(1)(b) (stating that a lien creditor, including a trustee in
bankruptcy, prevails over an unperfected security interest); id. § 9-307(1) (stating that a
buyer in the ordinary course of business takes inventory free of any security interest
created by the seller); id. § 9-312(5) (stating that a secured party who has filMd or
perfected earlier has preference over a subsequent secured party).
... However, a number of potential priority contests are not clearly addressed by
Article 9: a security interest versus a non-possessory statutory or judicial lien; two
purchase money security interests in the same collateral; and two security interests inthe
same collateral created by different debtors. These contests do not arise frequenfly and
the Code provides some basis for a rational resolution of the dispute.
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is a third-party transferee of the collateral who did not take free of the
security interest, the results regarding the collateral should not change.
Although such debtors do not have monetary obligations to the secured
party because they have not assumed the debt or obligations under the
security agreement,"1 9 they are subject to all property rights it created
in the collateral. 2 The following questions should be answered the
same for a debtor transferee as for the original debtor. Can the secured
creditor repossess the collateral and pursue its Article 9 remedies? Does
sale or encumbrance of the collateral trigger rights of the secured party?
Does the secured party have a security interest in the proceeds in its
hands?121
Article 9 fails, however, to provide any rules governing a secured
party's rights if the collateral is in the control of a third-party transferee
who does not qualify as a debtor, such as another secured party or a lien
creditor. Can the secured party vacate a levy? Does that depend on
whether default occurred before or after the levy?'" If the levy is
vacated, what rights does the levying creditor retain?' Can a junior
secured party repossess from a senior secured party?" 4 Can a senior
secured party repossess from a junior secured party?" Article 9 does
not set forth the meaning of priority in these circumstances."
If the party having priority conducts a foreclosure sale under the
Code, the buyer takes free of all subordinate security interests, liens and
other interests, 27 and the foreclosing creditor has first claim to the
t See U.C.C. § 9-112; HuImAN r AL., supra note 2, 25.01[2][b].
See U.C.C. § 9-501 (providing any judicial remedy, including replevin, upon default).
'2In the case of third-party buyers, this could include the unpaid purchase price from
the buyer's acquisition of the property because it constitutes proceeds. See HnuMAN Er
AL., supra note 2, § 25.01[4][b].
' See Frisch, supra note 4, at 152-54.
See id. at 183-87.
U.C.C. § 9-503 gives any secured party a right to possession upon default Courts,
however, are virtually unanimous in favor of the senior secured party. See HMIhWA Er
AL., supra note 2, 25.02[2].
1 2 If the debtor is in default under both the junior's security agreement and the
senior's security agreement, the Code provides no direct answer as to whether a senior can
repossess from a junior secured party. U.C.C. § 9-503 appears to authorize this and such
a ght appears to be a minimum meaning of priority. See HnIAN HT AL., smpra note
2, T 25.02[2][a]; Cynthia Starnes, U.C.C. Section 9-504 Sales by Jumior Secured Parties:
Is a Senior Parly Entitled to Notice and Proceedr?, 52 U. PITr. L. REv. 563, 582-83
(1991).
' See Friscb, supra note 4, at 191; HnnmAN Er AL., supra note 2, In 25.0[1l],
25.02[l].
'"U.C.C. § 9-504(4).
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foreclosure proceeds.' The same result probably obtains when the prior
creditor claims an interest different than an Article 9 security interest but the
rationale is different.1 But the Code is silent on whether a subordinate
secured creditor may foreclose first" or whether an execution may occur
first. It is also silent on the relative rights if the junior creditor does exercise
its remedies first. Presumably the prior security interest is not extin-
guished,.3. and the debtor is entitled to any sums exceeding the secured
obligations and the costs and expenses enumerated in the Code if a junior
secured creditor forecloses." But who has the right to the sale proceeds in
the hands of the junior creditor?... Can the prior creditor enjoin the
execution or foreclosure proceedings? These questions often arise in the
context of a conversion action.
B. Framework of Conversion
Establishing the legal fiamework of conversion requires inquiry into its
history and current trends. This inquiry reveals a closer relationship with
property concepts than tort concepts and simultaneously provides principles
which, if properly applied, resolve critical issues in the application of
conversion to security interests.
1. Common Law Conversion
Courts have struggled to establish a clear and widely accepted definition
of conversion and have even suggested that the endeavor was futile."l
'2Id. § 9-504(2).
"9 In Eartmlnovers, Inc. v. Clarence L. Boyd Co., 554 P.2d 877 (Okla. CL App.
1976), a creditor with a security interest in a used bulldozer was unable to block
foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. Id. at 877. The mechanic purchased at the non-judicidal
foreclosure sale to satisfy its possessory lien and acquired title free and clear of the prior
security interest. Id. at 878. The court rejected the secured party's contention that the
debtor's interest in the collateral was transferred at the foreclosure sale without any effect
on the security interest, because U.C.C. § 9-310 gave the possessory mechanic's lien
priority over the prior security interest. Id, see Frisch, supra note 4, at 187-88 (stating that
the execution sales do not terminate perfected security interests).
" See Starnes, supra note 125, at 578-80 (criticizing the limited authority for
prohibiting foreclosure sales by junior creditors).
1 This result is the negative implication of § 9-504(4) for foreclosures by junior
secured parties. See Frisch, supra note 4, at 187-89 for a discussion of the cmtinuation
of prior security interests after execution.
132 This result would be the outcome under U.C.C. § 9-504(2).
u3 See Frisch, supra note 4, at 174-79; HLLmAN Er AL., supra note 2, 25.02[4];
Starnes, supra note 125, at 572-74.
' In a nineteenth century English case, Baron Bramwell concluded that "it seems to
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Definitions were either too narrow or too general and vague. As reporter for
the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatemen'f )," Prosser mused that
the judicial consistency in applying the doctrine of conversion despite this
lack of a definition was "as if the courts have arrived, more or less instinc-
tively, at a tacit agreement as to the nature of this tort, which they have not
succeeded in putting into words."' Part of the difficulty results from two
distinct applications for the doctrine of conversion. Conversion provides a
means to resolve adverse claims to personal property and a remedy to
property owners for serious tortious interferences.
a. Histoical Development
Conversion originated as a device for resolving property disputes. The
modem tort of conversion descends from the action of trover which was used
by a true owner to recover damages for goods a finder refused to deliver
upon demand.'37 In time, the action expanded to become available in
situations where the defendant possession was wrongful from the beginning,
including tortious interferences. The nature of the remedy distinguished
conversion of chattels from trespass to chattels. With trespass, the owner had
to accept a tendered return of the chattels and was compensated for loss of
use and damages to the chattel; such results were consistent with tort
concepts. With conversion, no obligation to accept a tendered return existed,
the damages were the fair market value of the chattel at the time and place
of conversion, and title was vested in the converter when the judgment was
satisfied." Requiring the defendant to pay the fair market value of the
property and vesting title in the defendant by operation of law created a
forced sale of the property. The conversion remedy reflects its nature as a
personal property dispute resolution device.
As courts in the United States applied the English common law of
conversion, a shift in emphasis from protecting rights of ownership to
protecting rights of possession occurred." This shift probably resulted from
courts uncritically following old English commentary.'40 As originally
me that, after all, no one can undertake to define what a conversion is." Burroughes v.
Bayne, 157 Eng. Rep. 1196, 1200 (Ex. 1860).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, supra note 9. Unless otherwise indicated, all
references to the "Restatement!' are to the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Prosser, supra note 27, at 168.
" See 1 FowIR. V. HARPa ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 2.7 (2d ed. 1986).
' Prosser, supra note 27, at 170-73; see 1 HARPER Er AL., supra note 137, §§ 2.11-
.12; WARREN, supra note 17, at 30.
WARREN, supra note 17, at 4.
140 Id Wae traced the focus on possession-ather than possession under a claim
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applied, trover for conversion protected ownership interests in property,
and those interests were most readily evidenced by possession.14 The
language of the older English cases described the interest to be protected
as possession under a claim of ownership." The shift from ownership
to possession not only permitted persons without claims of ownership to
maintain an action in conversion, but also created difficulties with the
measure of damages.
By overlooking the claim of ownership aspect of the doctrine, courts
in the United States reached some irrational results. Because the market
value of the property had developed as the measure of damages to
compensate for ownership interests," convoluted rules developed when
the plaintiff had a possessory interest other than ownership to avoid
unjust enrichment by having that party hold the damages in trust.1'"
Because a person in possession, a person entitled to immediate posses-
sion, and a person entitled to possession at a future time could each bring
an action in conversion, 45 the potential for multiple liability was
created.' Although some legal doctrines exist to preclude that result;
they do not adequately resolve the problems. 47
Conversion has also expanded to include interference with the right
to dominion and control over certain types of intangible property. That
expansion began with intangible rights considered to have merged into a
document; such as a negotiable instrument; stock certificate, warehouse
receipt; or bill of lading, where possession of the document had legal
significance in enforcing the right.'" The expansion continued to rights
under insurance policies and savings account books where the writing is
of ownership-to a widely cited comment by the English annotator Serjeant Williams. Id.
'4' See id. at 4-5.
14
2 Id. at 5-11.
' Warren was of the opinion that without that measure of damages, the tort of
conversion would lose its appeal. Id. at 3.
' For example, an owner-bailor without an immediate right to possession could not
maintain an action of conversion, due to the bailee's interest; however, the bailee could
maintain the action for the full value of the property, but then was required to hold most
of the proceeds for the bailor. See id. at 3-22.
141 See 1 HARPER Er AL., supra note 137, § 2.8, at 161.
46 This potential was clearly a concern of the judges in the early cases which found
conversion in favor of someone other than the one with title to the chattel See WARREN,
supra note 17, at 12-13.
147 See I HARIP Er AL., supra note 137, § 2.8, at 162-64; RESTATMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 895(2), 895 cmts. j, k, 1 (1979) (explaining that being subject to judgments
in favor of multiple parties is not precluded by the principle ofjus ten/i, but a tortfeasor
only has to pay for the chattel once).
'41 See 1 HARPER Er AL., supra note 137, § 2.13.
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important to protection of the rights. 49 Without such expansion,
conversion of the document would have resulted in damages based upon
the value of the document itself plus special damages, not the value of
the right the document represented!" The Restatement, using the
fiction that the document representing or useful to enforcing the right is
a chattel,' recognizes _conversion of certain choses in action and
contemplates continuing expansion of the doctrine in regard to intangi-
bles." Tort commentators have expressed mixed views regarding the
propriety of such developments."
b. Tort and Propery
The attempts of commentators to define conversion and its elements
significantly influenced the development of modem conversion law. The
primary efforts in this regard are the Restatement of Torts"s and the
Restatement, 55 which focus on the tort aspects of the doctrine and the
work of Warren which was contemporary with the Restatement of
Torts.
As the drafters of the Restatement searched the case law for an
understanding of conversion, they found a frustrating absence of a clear
definition.5 The Reporter noted that although hundreds of conversion
cases were reported every year, "most of them are concerned only with
the ownership of the disputed property, and the tort itself is not in
issue."'5 Although conversion's role in resolving property disputes
underlies much of the Restatement's discussion,' the elements of
14 Id.
' See id. § 2.13, at 178; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242(1) crnt a.
... RESTATEnT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 241A, 242.
L' Id. § 242 cmats. d, e, f.
' Compare 1 HARPER ET AL., supra note 137, § 2.13, at 179-80 (expressing.
misgivings about the potential efficacy of this tort to adequately address the need for a
legal remedy in connection with intangible property) with Lester Rubin, Comment,
Conversion of Choses in Action, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 425 (1941) (expressing the need
for the tort doctrine to stay abreast of the expansion of intangible property as a source of
wealth).
"I RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934).
"5 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS (1965).
'-WARREN, supra note 17.
"'Prosser, smpra note 27, at 168.
"Id.
"'Prosser's article, The Nature of Conversion, Id., sets forth illustrations used in the
Restatement of Torts and authority, where available, to support the suggested outcome.
The illustrations demonstrate some noteworthy features. First, the majority involve
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conversion elaborated and elucidated in the Restatement reflect the natural
bias toward tort terminology and tortious interferences.
Warren's work presents a valuable supplement to the Restatement of
Torts. He described the elements of a conversion action as requiring that
the defendant obtain possession of the property by misfeasance of a
nature constituting a serious wrong and not involving circumstances that
excuse the misfeasance.'" Warren viewed the requirement of misfea-
sance as necessary to eliminate negligent interferences with personal
property.16' Warren categorized the serious wrongs under six headings:
using force or fraud to obtain possession, withholding possession,
transferring the property, altering the property, using the property, and
denying the plaintiff's title to the property.'a
Warren's elaborations on these headings and the correlative excuses
illuminate the basic nature of conversion as a property dispute resolution
doctrine. The first, second, and sixth headings involved only adverse
claims. Possession obtained by force or fraud involved a claim of title in
the defendant or a denial of title in the plaintiff which was not excused
by good faith or due care." The second heading, withholding posses-
sion, simply referred to cases involving a defendant who had power to
deliver possession but who refused, without ajustifying excuse, a demand
for possessioni" made by a plaintiff with a right to immediate posses-
sion.6  Warren expressly characterized such cases as trying
title-conversion was the vehicle used to present the controversy to the
court.'" The sixth heading, denying plaintiffs title, spoke for itself.
The other three headings were more consistent with tortious
interferences, yet his discussion again supports the concept of property
assertions of ownership or denial of the plaintifis ownership. Second, for a number of
them "no cases have been found." E.g., id. at 175 n.27, 181 r.63, 182 nnm75-76. Third,
cited cases for illustrations not involving assertions of ownership occasionally involve
factual circumstances quite different than the illustrations they are to support. E.g., id. at
175, illus. 3 (conversion due to loss of mistakenly taken hat is supported by dictum from
a non-conversion case involving an agent, mistaking the identity of the owner and
removing property from a locker, conversion by appropriation of cut grass in good faith
belief .of right to cut it).
16 WARREN, supra note 17, at 31.
' Id. at 35-38; accord 1 HARPER Er AL., supra note 137, § 2.9-.10.
.'. WARREN, supra note 17, at 38.
16 Id. at 41.
' Id. at 47 (explaining that the primary justifying excuse to avoid conversion was
a qualified refusal to permit determination of the legitimacy of the demand, which, in
practicality, required interpleader).
16 Id. at 44.
'66 Id. at 46.
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dispute resolution. He discussed only three transfers of property which
constituted serious wrongs: a bailee selling or pledging without authority,
a bailee misdelivering, and transfer of possession by a person having no
rights in the property." Each such transfer is by one without legal
power to transfer. Warren found little authority for the mere alteration of
property, an interference that is more tortious than an adverse claim,
constituting conversion." Conversion by using the property involves
use beyond what is authorized, again implicating a dispute as to rights in
the property. Warren found few cases and characterized the essential
inquiry as determining whether the unauthorized use was of sufficient
seriousness to justify a label of conversion. 69 Such serious acts effec-
tively justify an inference that the converter was asserting a paramount
claim.
Finally, Warren observed that bona fide purchasers from one not
having rights in the property were generally converters, while pledgees
from one not having rights in the property were not because they were
not claiming ownership. 7' Pledgees, however, converted the property
if they refused the true owner's demand for delivery.171
Warren's discussion of conversion precedents fairly supports a
conclusion that in order to be liable in conversion, a person must take
such actions with property that can be justly characterized as an assertion
of the rights of ownership. Conversion then provides an appropriate
remedy for the true owner by forcing a sale of the ownership interest to
the converter.
c. Elements and Principles of Conversion
The Restatement, the primary reference for conversion law today,
defines conversion as: "an intentional exercise of dominion or control
over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to
control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full
value of the chattel' The definition's focus on the party's dominion
16 Id. at 51.
10 Id. at 97-99.
10 Id. at 100-02.
"TO Id. at 92-94, 103-05. Warren relied on the cour's analysis of the issue in Leuthold
v. Fairchild, 27 N.W. 503 (Mimi. 1886), modified, 28 N.W. 218 (Minn. 1886). The
justificadon for this departure from the rule of a purchaser being liable in conversion if
is transferor had no power to transfer was to facilitate lenders taking security and thus
acilitating commerce.
i7 Id. at 51.
" RESTAi'TM (SECOND) 0OF TORTS § 222A (1).
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or control rather than "possession!' in describing both the required acts of
the tortfeasor and the interests interfered with could portend a broader
reach than the common law. However, the remainder of the Restatement
maintains the close tie to possessory interests. Except for plaintif with
possessory rights,"73 only limited references are made to a right to
recover." Most of the specific acts of conversion discussed in the
Restatement involve interference with possession.7
The intent requirement refers to an intent to do the act, not an intent
for the consequences that follow." In fact, intervening events may
change an act not constituting conversion into a conversion." The
Restatement does not describe acts establishing conversion per se, but
only describes acts that may constitute conversion if other factors are
present.78 Three types of these acts are significant to conversion of
" Those who can maintain actions are those inpossession, id. § 224A, those entitled
to immediate possession, id. § 225, or those entitled to future possession, id. § 243.
17 See, e.g., id. § 222 (stating that dispossession seriously interfering with right of
another to control chattel may also subject actor to conversion liability); id. § 227
(explaining that a use seriously violating another's right to control its use constitutes
conversion); id. § 228 (noting that uses exceeding authority if another's right to control
is seriously violated constitutes conversion); id. § 241A (stating that payment of a
negotiable instrument over a forged endorsement is a conversion); id. § 242 (discussing
that preventing the exercise of intangible rights merged in a document subjects" e to
liability similar to conversion even though the docmnent is not itself converted).
' ' See, e.g., id. § 223 (dispossessing another of a chattel); id. § 226 (destruction or
material alteration of its physical condition to change its identity or character); id. § 229
(receipt of chattel with the intent to acquire proprietary interest which the other has no
power to transfer); id. § 230 (receipt of possession for storage, safekeeping, or
transportation with knowledge that another has right to immediate possession); Id § 231
(receipt of possession on behalf of principal for purpose of giving principal a proprietary
interest); id. § 233 (agent delivering to another a chattel if agent negotiated the
disposition, but not for mere delivery if the principal negotiated the disposition); Id. §§
234, 235 (certain misdeliveries of a chattel ame conversions); Id. § 237 (refusal to return
on demand without proper qualification).
'
76 Id. §§ 224 cmt. a., 244.
17 "See McCurdy v. Wallblom Furniture & Carpet Co., 102 N.W. 873 (Minn. 1905)
(stating that bailee moving goods to another warehouse without notice to or consent of
bailor is liable in conversion when the goods were destroyed by fire); Prosser, sqnz note
27, at 184. Compare RESTATEMENT § 222A cmt d, illus. 5 iith illus. 7 (illustrating that
temporary storage of furniture is not a conversion, but intervening fire changes it to a
conversion).
'7, RsTATmaENT § 223 limits the acts described tein by use of the term "may.:
See id. cmt a. That section cross-references all acts of conversion described in the
Restatement except § 230 (receiving possession for storage, safekeeping or transportation)
and § 235 (conversion by misdelivery as against one not a bailor).
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security interests: taking possession,'79 interference with the ability to
take possession,'" and inappropriate use of the property."'
Damages for conversion are the fair market value of the converted
chattel at the time and place of conversion." If multiple acts of
conversion have occurred or the property is customarily traded on an
exchange, the injured party has a choice of the time for determining
market value." The injured party is also entitled to interest, the value
of additions to the property not made in good faith,'" and other loss
caused by the deprivation."
A study of the Restatement reveals seven significant concepts that
should influence application of conversion to security interests. First and
foremost is a justice inquiry. A fundamental theme in the Restatement
requires that the interference be sufficiently serious that "the actor may
justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel. ' " The
justice theme is central because the remedy for conversion is a forced sale
of the property."7 Although subsections 222 A (2)(a)-(f) of the Restate-
ment list six factors to aid in the case-by-case inquiry of the seriousness
of the interference and the justice of the forced sale, little substantive
discussion of the justice inquiry follows. The frequent examples of
" These acts include non-consensual taking of a chattel from the possession of
another, id. §§ 221(a), 223(a); taking a chattel into custody of law, id §§ 221(e), 223(a);
and receiving a chattel with intent to acquire it from one not having power to transfer, Id
§ 229.
" These acts include barring access to a chattel, id §§ 221(c), 223(a); and an
unqualified refusal of a demand to deliver the chattel, id. §§ 222 A(2)(b), 224 cmt d,
237.
.. These acts include altering physical condition, Id. § 226 (comment d states that a
purchaser of raw materials may convert by subjecting the raw materials to the
manufacturing process, because the citical question is not ultimate value but the value
in the hands of the owner in its original condition); use of a chattel, id. § 227; and
exceeding the authorized use of a chattel, id. § 228.
132 Id § 927(l)(a) (1979).
3 The injured party can choose the date of any conversion. Id § 927 cmt d. If a
commodities mare exists, damages equal the highest value within the reasonable period
during which replacement might have occurred. Id. § 927(1)(1).
"The additional damages for additions to the property depend on whether the
converter had knowledge that the act of conversion was wrongful. Id § 927 cmts. t g.
135 Id. § 927(2).
'Id. § 222A(l) (emphasis added). The drafters deemed the justice requirement to
be of such importance that it is used as a qualification in the Comments to virtually all
sections describing acts which amount to conversion. E.g., id. §§ 222 cmt. a; 222A cmts.
c, d; 223 cmt. a; 226 cmts. c, d; 227 cmt. b; 228 cnts. b, c, d; 234 cmt. a; 235 cmts. c,
g; 237 cmt. a; see also Prosser, supra note 27, at 172-74.
13 RSATEMENT § 222A cmt. c.
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interferences that do not rise to a conversion also fail to elucidate the
justice component." In fact, the influence of these six factors is
sometimes minimized by other provisions. For example, good faith of the
tortfeasor is one of the six factors, but it apparently provides little support
for an argument that an innocent converter should not be liable in
conversion.'
Second,- the presence or absence of knowledge should be an important
factor in determining whether conversion is just. Although knowledge that
the act will effect a conversion is unnecessary, it can be a factor in
establishing a serious interference. Knowledge of the interest of the
property owner transforms minor interferences with property into acts of
conversion.' In addition, lack of knowledge protects agents, servants,
and bailees from conversion liability in some ircumstances.'9 '
" See, e.g., id. § 222A illus. 1, 5, 9, 12, 14, 18, 19, 21, 25.
"'E.g., id. §§ 222A cmt. d, illus. 7, 224 cat c. Although good faith is to be
considered expressly in connection with mistake to detennine if the interference is
sufficiently serious to constitute conversion, id. § 244 cnt b, no examples are presented
in which good faith shields an actor who believes; duo to a mistake of fact or law, that
it is either justified in its possession or right to immediate possession, acting on the
consent of the other, or acting under a privilege.
' E.g., compare Prosser, supra note 27, at 177, llhis. 14 with id at 176-77, illus. 10-12;
compare id. at 178, iMhns. 23 with llhus. 22; compar id. at 180, illus.34 with id. at 179,ltmus. 32.
9 RESTATIAENT § 230 (stating that receipt of possession on behalf of master is
conversion only if there is knowledge or reason to know of third person's right to
immediate possession); id. § 231(1), (4) (explaining that receipt of possession by agent
who negotiated for proprietary interest on behalf of its master is conversion, unless the
agent becomes a holder in due course of the document or instrument received); I. §
231(2) (holding that no liability exists for negotiating for a proprietary interest for the
principal if agent does not take possession, know, or have reason to know of another's
right to inmediate.possession); id. § 231(3) (stating that no liability attaches for receiving
possession if agent did not negotiate for proprietary interest and has no knowledge or
reason to know of right to immediate possession in another); id. § 233(2) (stating that
negotiating to transfer proprietary interest from master to another is not a conversion if
agent does not deliver possession or know of the immediate possessory right of another);
id. § 233(3) (explaining that delivery of possession where master has negotiated transfer
of a proprietary right is not a conversion unless there is knowledge or reason to know of
another's right of immediate possession); Id. § 233(1), (4) (stating that no conversion
exists if agent receives negotiable document or instrument where he or master qualify as
holder in due course in delivering chattel to one with whom the agent negotiated a
disposition as agent); Id. § 234 (illustrating that no conversion exists if unauthoized
delivery is made by agent to one entitled to immediate possession); id § 235(2) (noting
that no conversion occurs for Tedelivery by agent to principal unless one entitled to
immediate possession has made an adverse claim on the agent); id. § 235(3) (stating that
agent delivering pursuant to the principal's instructions is not liable unless there is
knowledge or reason to know that the principal is not authorized to so deliver).
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Third, the agreement of the parties is relevant to whether an act
constitutes conversion. Determination of whether the authorized use of a
chattel was exceeded necessitates inquiry into the agreement between the
parties.' The Restatement contemplates no conversion liability if a
third party consents to an act contrary to an agreement between the
injured party and the third party, unless the actor had knowledge of the
contractual restriction. 93
Fourth, negotiability laws should be followed when applicable. The
Restatement provides important elaborations on conversion by receiving
property by transfer from a transferor with the power but not the
authority to transfer. The transferor has converted,'9 but resolution of
whether the transferee converted depends on the law governing negotia-
bility of the property. 5
Fifth, damages should relate to the interest converted. The Restate-
ment departs from the fair market value standard when a person with a
right to future rather than immediate possession brings an action for harm
caused to a chattel."6 Damages then equal the value of the interest of
which the plaintiff has been deprived rather than fair market value. The
Restatement expresses indifference as to whether such an action is called
conversion or an action for damage to the future interest?2
Sixth, support exists for a limited right to tender return and avoid
conversion liability. Liability maybe avoided if one enfiled to possession
recovers the converted chattel, 9 but the defendant is generally not
permitted to tender return of the chattel unless the injured party con-
sents.' However, if the conversion was in good faith and under a
reasonable mistake and the tender was made promptly after discovery, the
court has discretion to require the plainti to accept on equitable grounds,
if the value is not substantially impaired.2° Some commentators favor
SId. § 228 cmt c.
Id. § 253 cmt c.
SId. § 222 cmr. f.
r'Id. § 229 cmt. d.
'Id. §§ 243 cmt. b, 895(3) cmt. 1(1979).
'9 Id. § 243 cmt. b.
" See id. § 922 (1979); WARREN, supra note 17, at 107-10; see also 1 DOBBS, supa
note 10, § 5.14(4), at 870-72 (noting that damages are reduced by the value of property
recovered).
' Because conversion requires atortious nterference of sufficient gravity that justice
demands forcing the defendant to purchase the chattel, it is undesirable to permit such an
easy defense for the converter. See 1 HARPER Er AL., supra note 137, § 2.11; WARREN,
supra note 17, at 3.
' See Rutland & Wash. R.R. v. Bank of Middlebury, 32 Vt. 639 (1850); RESTATE-
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making tender of return a matter of right for an innocent converter
desiring to mitigate damages.0  Exercising that option, if available,
makes a conversion action a close alternative to replevin.
And seventh, certain qualifications and privileges preclude conversion
liability. Qualifications justify refusing a demand for delivery 20' if they
are clearly communicated and a prompt and appropriate attempt is
undertaken to eliminate the qualification by determining the right of the
one making demand.0' Several privileges are significant to conversion
and Article 9. Consent by the injured party to the interference precludes
conversion liabilty 2  Exercising rights to repossess is privileged
against the one in possession if the acts involved in repossession are not
tortious2 s Finally, acts pursuant to a court order valid on its face are
privileged 2 6
2. Conversion of Security Interests
Courts applied conversion doctrine to protect a creditor's right to
personal property before adoption of the Code.2' But such applications
received little attention from commentators. Warren takes note of a case
involving conversion of a security interest in passing,2' but his only
discussion regarding conversion and secured creditors involves pledgees
converting pledged property.2o The Restatement of Security briefly
addresses conversion of a secured creditor's interest in the context of a
pledgee who had possession at the time of the conversion and describes
the pledgee's rights as more limited if it was not in possession or entitled
MENT §§ 922(2), 922 cmt. e (1979); 1 HARPER ET AL., s pra note 137, § 2.11, at 169-70;
see also 1 DOBs, supra note 10, § 5.14(4), at 871-72.
21 1 HARPER ET AL., supra note 137, § 211, at 169-70.
' These qualifications include: if the content of the demand is mreasonable, (such
as unreasonable time or location), RESTATEwNT § 238; if the identity of the person
maling the demand needs verification, id. § 239; and if the validity of the claim is in
reasonable doubt, id. § 240.
= Id §§ 238-41.
2 Id. §§ 252, 253.
- Id. § 272 & cmt b.
2
w Id. § 266 & cmt. d.
See infra notes 218-26 and accompanying text.
z Warren cites and briefly discusses Hudmon Bros. v. DuBose, 5 So. 162 (Ala.
1888), but only to illustrate a point relative to conversion by an agent. WARREN, supra
note 17, at 89.
9 WARREN, suipra note 17, at 58-79 (discussing stockbrokers repledging stock to
secure debt greater than the customer's debt).
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to immediate possession at the time.21° Other than noting that a secured
creditor can maintain an action for conversion,21' the Restatement,
promulgated about the same time as the Code, gives no special consider-
ation to the conversion of a security interest.2 To a limited extent, this
position reflects the fact that secured creditors may not have a right to
immediate possession, but only a right to possession in the future. The
Restatement expresses indifference as to whether interference with such
interests constitutes denominated conversions."
It appears that the drafters of the Code gave little consideration to
either the role .of conversion as a secured party's remedy or the appropri-
ateness of conversion doctrines when applied to security rather than
ownership interests. The drafters were cognizant of conversion as a
remedy of the secured party, as evidenced by Official Comment 3 to
section 9-306 which provides that the creditor will have the right to
possess the property from a transferee "or in an appropriate case maintain
an action for conversion." 14 But that is the only reference to conversion
of a secured party's interest in property contained in Article 9.2"
Similarly, Professor Gilmore devotes a section of his classic treatise to
conversion by a secured creditor of the debtor's property," but offers
no discussion of conversion of the creditor's interest.
a. Early Applications
Into the nineteenth century, personal property could be used to secure
a debt only through a pledge-the pledgee had possession.2 7 Conversion
of such interests was infrequent, and doctrines involving the deprivation
210 Compare RESTATMIENT OF ScjERIY §§ 38(2), 39(c) (1941) with id. § 38 cmt.
b.
21 RESTA'TEM § 243 cmt. c, illus. 2 (contrasting mortgagee with right to
immediate possession with mortgagoer's right to future possession).
2 The silence on the question of a secured party being entitled to maintain an action
in conversion can be contrasted with the discussions of the right of agents, servants, and
bailees to bring conversion actions and their liability for conversion. In that context, the
Restatement abounds with specific rles and commentary. E.g., Id. §§ 230, 231, 233, 234,
235. Much case law existed in this area and it had been a fruitful area for scholarly
commentary. See WARREN, supra note 17, at 19-28.
SRESTEMENT § 243 cat. b.
-4 U.C.C. § 9-306 cnt. 3.
2'1 Te Code is more explicit if the secured party is the converter. See supra note 103
and accompanying text.
26 2 GI2MoRE, supra note 37, § 42.13.
2'" See id. § 2.1.
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of current possession fit well. As non-possessory methods of obtaining
personal property security developed, the issues surrounding a mortgag-
ee's claim of conversion increased. As discussed below, treatment of the
cases varied depending on whether the jurisdiction followed the title
theory or the lien theory of mortgages.
Title theory jurisdictions found conversion doctrines worked well.
Mortgagees had title with the absolute right to possession upon the
mortgagor's default. Interference with possessory rights was interference
with the mortgagee's interest 1  In title theory cases, knowledge was
generally irrelevant once the mortgagor's right to redeem the property had
been eliminated by default.2 Reference to knowledge in title theory
cases 220 appears to be directed to ensuring that the mortgage had been
recorded (imparting constructive notice) and was therefore enforceable.
Courts, however, departed from general conversion doctrine by awarding
damages in the amount of the secured debt unless it exceeded the market
value of the converted property." '
21, For example, in Judson v. Easton, 58 N.Y. 664 (1874), the mortgagee, having
absolute title as against the mortgagor, repossessed a canal boat upon default and
prevailed in a conversion action against the lessee who had recaptured the barge. The
lessees know of the mortgage when they leased the barge. They not only had knowledge
of the rights they were violating, but also had knowledge that the violation was a
wrongful taking. Id.
' See Robinson v. Bird, 33 N.E. 391 (Mass. 1893) (stating that auctioneer in good
faith and without knowledge was liable in conversion because its principal had no right
of possession as against the mortgagee); Coles v. Clark, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 399, 402
(1849) (explaining that since mortgagor had no power to transfer and no title that could
be transferred, the sale by its agent was conversion); Kleinelrger v. Brown, 8 N.Y.S. 866,
867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890) (stating that demand and refusal were necessary before default
to establish conversion liability, but after default, the transfer was a conversion because
the mortgagor had no rights).
2 See Hudmon Bros. v. DuBose, 5 So. 162 (Ala. 1888) (relying on constructive
notice from the registration of the mortgage to find agent liable in conversion); Ross v.
Menefee, 25 N.E. 545 (Ind. 1890) (holding purchaser of property liable to the mortgagee
in conversion because constructive notice of the mortgage existed); McFadden v. Hopkins,
81 Ind. 459, 461-63 (1882) (stating that second mortgagee, which had expressly
subordinated its interest, had both actual and constructive knowledge of the prior
mortgage and converted by purchasing chattels from debtor and reselling them for credit
against its debt); Duke v. Strickland, 43 Ind. 494, 502 (1873) (overuling a demurer
because title had vested in the mortgagee and the recording of the mortgage had given
constructive notice of its contents to a buyer in the ordinary course of business, but who
refused to deliver wheat upon demand and sold it into a foreign market).
" See Blanchard v. Farmer's State Bank, 124 S.E. 695, 696 (Ga. 1924); McFadden,
81 Ind. at 462; Boydston v. Morris, 10 S.W. 331, 332 (Tex. 1888).
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The traditional elements of conversion did not correlate nearly as well
with the concept of a personal property security under a lien theory. In
lien theory states, the courts reached similar results, but often pursuant to
new but analogous remedies such as willful interference with superior
property rights. 2m In some lien theory cases, knowledge apparently
played a greater role in ensuring that the defendant's actions were
wrongful."' Not all lien theory jurisdictions avoided the conversion
labeL?'
Fundamental issues surrounding conversion of security interests were
raised by the dissenting opinion in Eade v. First Nat7 Bank;' a 1926
" In Harris v. Grant, 23 S.E. 390 (Ga. 1895), the court, in a case of first impression,
found a cause of action for a "willful violation' by a subordinate lienholder of the private
right of a superior lienholder based on "general principles" and "analogies of the law.'
Id. at 391. Although the court cited conversion cases which relied on the title theory of
mortgages, it did not purport to apply the law of conversion. Id. The same court in the
syllabus of a later case, Benton v. McCord, 23 S.E. 392 (Ga. 1895), described the Haris
remedy as permitting a mortgagee to maintain an action for damages in the amount of the
impainnent against a third party having "actual or constructive notice ... [of the
mortgage and who] wrongfully or fraudulently" impaired the security. Id. at 392. Almost
30 years later, the same court sustained the cause of action in tort, required knowledge,
but still did not label it a conversion. Blanchard v. Fanners State Bank, 124 S.E. 695 (Ga.
1924). See also Randall v. Higbee, 37 Mich. 40 (1877) (explaining that since a mortgage
is a lien, no action existed in assumpsit for converting the property to money, but noting
that an action might exist if defendn acted wrongfully and injured the security with
knowledge of the lien); Yates v. Joyce, 11 Johns. 136, 140 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1814)
(approving an action by a judgment creditor for "wilful" violation of a private right
against one alleged to have removed buildings from a lot before the sheriff's execution
sale of the lot).
E.g., BIandhard, 124 S.E. at 696-97 (noting that sales made under actual
knowledge of mortgage wrongfully impair lien); Randal, 37 Mich. at 40 (discussing how
knowledge of the lien with wrongful action injuring security may give right of action);
Yates, 11 Johns. at 140 (stating that defendant alleged to have knowledge committed
"wilful" violation of a private right).
m E.g., Eade v. First Nat'lBank, 242 P. 833, 833-34 (Or. 1926) (holding subsequent
mortgagee liable in conversion for the repossession and sale of collateral at a public
foreclosure sale when the prior mortgagee had a right to immediate possession upon
breach); Western Mortgage & Inv. Co. v. Shelton, 29 S.W. 494, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.
1894) (holding sale of goods without making the sale subject to a chattel mortgage to be
conversion under a provision in the chattel mortgage act). Compare Boydston v. Momis,
10 S.W. 331 (rex. 1888) (upholding a damage judgment in favor of a chattel mortgagee
of a corn crop against a buyer without referring to the action as conversion) with Focke
v. Blum, 17 S.W. 770 (Tex. 1891) (allowing a lienholder or mortgagee to sue for
conversion).
" 242 P. 833 (Or. 1926) (Bunett, J., dissenting).
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case decided in a lien theory state. Because a mortgage was a lien, the
debtor still retained title and had a right to transfer its interest in the
collateralY6 The dissent expressed the view that conversion did not lie
where the subordinate lienholder's repossession and foreclosure on
collateral were rightful absent a demand for possession and a refusal to
deliver. 7
b. Current Applications
Conversion actions by secured parties have become very common
since adoption of the Code. An examination of the elements of conver-
sion applied by the courts in these cases and of the factual circumstances
in which conversion liability is found facilitates understanding why
secured parties resort to conversion. It also establishes a basis for
determining whether changes are required to coordinate conversion with
Article 9 concepts and policies.
(1) Elements of Conversion
A significant number, perhaps even a majority, of the cases involving
conversion of a security interest have little or no discussion of the
elements of conversionYm Cases that describe the legal rules either
simply cite section 222A of the Restatement' or describe the elements
of conversion with language similar to the Restatement. It is not
2 Id. at 837-40.
2Id. at 837.
"' E.g., United States v. Winter Livestock Comm'n, 924 F.2d 986, 990 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding that an agent without knowledge who sells in violation of principal's
security agreement converts); Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. FH USA Corp.,
805 F. Supp. 133, 145 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that because the other creditor had
priority, the repossessing creditor is "liable for conversion of the goods as a matter of
law"); Hill v. Farm Credit Bank, 726 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (explaining
that because debtor no longer had rights in property, its use and sale constituted
conversion); United States v. Fullpail Cattle Sales, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 976, 980, 983 (E.D.
Wis. 1986) (holding that the right to possession and priority establish right to conversion
damages); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Commercial Credit Corp., 188 S.E.2d
110, 112-13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (noting that repossessing creditor without priority
converts senior's interest).
' E.g., Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of Now England-Old Colony Nat'lAss'n,
85 B.R. 1, 3 (D.R.I. 1988), a~fd in part and vacated in part, 897 F.2d 611 (lst Cir.
1990); De Kalb Bank v. Purdy, 562 N.E.2d 1223, 1232 (M1 App. CL 1990); Central
Washinigton Bank v. Mendelson-Zeller, Inc., 779 P.2d 697, 703 (Wash. 1989).
no E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Halmar Distribs., Inc. (In re Halmar Distribs., Inc.), 968
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apparent that any of those formulations create a different outcome than
would be reached by reliance on the Restatement definition.
To maintain an action for conversion, a secured creditor must
establish a superior right of possessionY' Section 9-503 of the Code
creates a right to immediate possession upon default by the debtor.
F.2d 121, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1992) (discussing intentional and wrongful exercise of control
when no right to possession exists); Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 934
F.2d 635, 651 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing repudiation of the owner's rights); Pioneer
Commercial Funding Corp. v. United Airlines, Inc., 122 B.R. 871, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(discussing the exercise ofunauthorized dominion to the exclusion of other party'srights);
Lafayette Prod. Credit Ass'nv. Wilson Foods Corp., 687 F. Supp. 1267, 1274, 1278 (N.D.
Ind. 1987) (discussing appropriation of property of another in defiance of the owner's
rights and under an inconsistent claim of title); Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate
Indus., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 197, 201 (D. Minn. 1980) (discussing willful interference with
a chatiel without lawfl justification that deprives another of rightful possession), rev'd
on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1981); Sears Consumer Fin. Corp. v.
Thunderbird Prods., 802 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing wrongful
dominion or control over property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights of another);
Messerall v. Fulwider, 245 Cal. Rptr. 548, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing wrongfid
act inconsistent with the fights of another); Blessing v. Norwest Bank Marion, NA, 429
N.W.2d 142, 144 (Iowa 1988) (discussing act of dominion wrongfully exerted over
another's property in denial of; inconsistent with, or in derogation of his title or rights
therein); State Say. Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 431 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa CL App.
1988) (discussing wrongful act of dominion); Installment Fin. Corp. v. Hudiburg
Chevrolet, Inc., 794 P.2d 751, 753 (Okla. 1990) (discussing wrongful act of dominion);
Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank, Fairview v. State Bank, Fairview, 766 P.2d 330, 334
(Okla. 1988) (discussing wrongful assumption of the rights of another); Grocers Supply
Co. v. Intercity Inv. Properties, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)
(discussing exercise of unauthorized acts of dominion over the property to the exclusion
of the creditor's rights); Paris American Corp. v. McCausland, 759 P.2d 1210, 1215
(Wash. CL App. 1988) (discussing willful interference with a chattel without lawful
justification that deprives another of rigbful possession).
ni E.g., Hong Kong & Shangi Banking Corp. v. HFH USA Corp., 805 F. Supp.
133, 139 (W.D.I.Y. 1992); United States v. Fullpail Cattle Sales, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 976,
980 (E.D. W-is. 1986); see also Otto Farms, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank at York, 422 N.W.2d
331, 336 (Neb. 1988) (holding that prejudgment interest is allowable in a conversion
action where damages are liquidated); c. Mack v. Newton, 737 F.2d 1343, 1354-55 (5th
Cir. 1984) (holding that trustee inbankruptcy could not maintain an action for conversion
because it had no ownership interest and was not in legal possession); City of Wichita
Falls v. IT Commercial Fin. Corp., 827 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Tex. CL App.) (holding that city
with tax hen with statutory priority could not maintain an action against repossessing
secured creditor for conversion without an ownership interest, possessory interest, or right
of immediate possession), afd in part and rev'd in pail, 835 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. 1992).
,, The right of possession in U.C.C. § 9-503 depends only upon attachment and
default; perfection is not required. Courts are not always careful in determining whether
the right to possession exists. The court in Blessing v. Norwest Bank Marion, N.A, 429
N.W.2d 142 (Iowa 1988), held that an unperfected secured creditor could not maintain
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If the default provisions of the security agreement are inadequate to cover
the event claimed as conversion, the secured creditor may not be able to
maintain a conversion action?3  Unless the tortfeasor's possession is
wrongful or demand is excused because delivery is impossible, a
demand for delivery and a refusal are necessary. Any deferral of
action on the demand for the purpose of investigating whether the secured
party's claim is legitimate is limited to a reasonable period of time.'
If the foregoing elements are satisfied, few defenses are available to
the party charged with conversion. The tortfeasor's intent, good faith, and
lack of actual knowledge are not available as defenses. 7 Mistakes of
a conversion action against a perfected secured creditor onthe erroneous grounds that it didnot
have a right of possession. Id. at 144. Despite this error in reasoning, te court was probably
correct in the outcome, because the unmperfected creditor did not have priority and therefore its
right to possession was subordinate to the right of the alleged converter.
' See, e.g., In re Ayers, 25 B.R. 762, 775 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (holding that no right
to conversion action exists when security agreement does not include transfer of collateral
as a default); First Nt'lBank v. Sheriff of Milwaukee County, 149 N.W.2d 548, 549-50
(Wis. 1967) (explaining that secured party failed to establish a default before execution,
thereby precluding replevin against the sheriff executing the levy); accord United States
v. Fullpail Cattle Sales, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 976, 983 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (holding that
existence of default established right to immediate possession); cf Chadron Energy Corp.
v. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 459 N.W.2d 718, 734 (Neb. 1990) (explaining that no
default existed at time of conversion but apparently a right to possession for perfection
did).
' E.g., United States v. Fullpail Cattle Sales, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 73, 75 (E.D. WIS.
1985) (stating that demand and refmal requirement is not necessary where it would be
impossible for the defendants to return the collateral); Bues v. First Nat'l Bank, Port
Lavaca, 806 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (making an exception to the
requirement that plaintiff make a demand if the demand would be useless or possessor's
acts amount to clear repudiation of owner's rights).
, E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Halmar Distribs., Inc. (In re Halmar Distribs., Inc.), 968
F.2d 121, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1992); First Interstate Bank of Arizona, NA. v. Intrfund
Corp., 924 F.2d 588, 593-95 (5th Cir. 1991); Centerre Bank, NA. v. Now Holland Div.
of Sperry Corp., 832 F.2d 1415, 1423 (7th Cir. 1987).
3 See, e.g., Messerall v. Fulwider, 245 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
Gimiting bailee to a reasonable opportunity to investigate claimant's right to possession).
," See, e.g., Centerre Bank, NA v. New Holland Div. of Speny Corp., 832 F.2d
1415, 1423 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that intent and knowledge ame unnecessary for
liability); United States v. Equity Livestock Auction Mkt, 575 F. Supp. 1524, 1527 (E.D.
Wis. 1983) (explaining that good faith and lack of actual knowledge are not defenses);
rIT Indus. Credit Co. v. H & K Mach. Serv. Co., 525 F. Supp. 170, 172 (E.D. Mo. 1981)
(holding that lack of knowledge and good faith are not relevant to an action in
conversion); Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Indus. Inc., 490 F. Supp. 197, 201 (D.
Minn. 1980) (intucting that innocence is no defense), rev'd on other gmunds, 654 F.2d
1245 (8th Cir. 1981); State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 792 S.W.2d 626,
627 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that motive, intent, and good faith are immaterial to
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law or fact do not preclude conversion liability. Available defenses
include waiver, 9 laches u and subsequent settlement between se-
cured creditor and debtor?'1
conversion liability); Paris Am. Corp. v. McCausland, 759 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Wash. CL
App. 1988) (explaining that wrongfil intent is not required and good faith is not a
defense).
2 E.g., Hill v. Farm Credit Bank, 726 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (noting
that finn belief that foreclosure was improper did not excuse conversion by debtor).
"39 E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Halmr Distribs., Inc. (In re Halmar Distribs., Inc.), 968
F.2d 121, 129 (1st Cir. 1992) (discussing waiver by acquiescence); First Interstate Bank,
NA. v. Interfimd Corp., 924 F.2d 588, 593-95 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that consent to take
the collateral is waiver, but that neither waiver nor consent was present); Parkersburg
State Bank v. Swift Indep. Packing Co., 764 F.2d 512, 514 (8th Cir. 1985) (explaining
that buyer of collateral is not liable in conversion when creditor had never enforced its
prohibition on sales of collateral); United States v. Security State Bank, 686 F. Supp. 733,
736 (N.D. Iowa 1988) (explaining that a waiver may occur when sale is within prior
course of dealing between debtor and superior creditor, but none was found); Branch
Banking & Trust Co. v. Columbian Peanut Co., 649 F. Supp. 1116, 1118-19 (E.D.N.C.
1986) (noting that buyer did not convert portion of crop purchased with secured creditor
declining request for payment by joint check, but did convert portion of crop it purchased
that was not specifically authorized); FS Credit Corp. v. Troy Elevator, Inc., 421 N.W.2d
537, 538-39 (Iowa 1988) (preventing the buyer from being liable in conversion because
this was the first security agreement to require consent to sales and prior course of dealing
had continued implicitly waiving the consent requirement); Citizens Nat'lBank of Madelia
v. Mankato Implement, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 483, 485-87 (Minn. 1989), aff'g 427 N.W.2d
23 (Minn. CL App. 1988) (holding that purchase money seller of new equipment taking
trade-ins was not liable in conversion to secured party with security interest in old
equipment because creditor had waived right to written consent to sales by giving oral
consent); cf. De Kalb Bank v. Purdy, 562 N.E.2d 1223, 1229-31 (1l. App. Ct. 1990)
(stating that authorization of sale of collateral precludes conversion).
I See Associated Indus. v. Keystone Gen., Inc. (In re Keystone Gen. Inc.), 135 B.R.
275, 282 (Banlr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (stating that laches is established by unreasonable,
unexplained, and inexcusable delay which results in hardship on the opposing party).
21 E.g., Farmers State Bank . Easton Farmers Elevator, 457 N.W.2d 763, 765-66
(Minn. CL App. 1990) (holding that no conversion was committed by elevator purchasing
grain under representations of no liens and paying a portion of price with credit against
antecedent debt because a settlement agreement was said to have satisfied the debt, even
though the settlement agreement expressly permitted the secured creditor to pursue
conversion claims against third parties); Austin Farm Center, Inc. v. Austin Grain Co.,
418 N.W.2d 181, 185-86 (Minn. CL App. 1988) (stating that purchaser of encumbered
grai was not liable in conversion as a result of agreement between debtor and secured
creditor in settlement of the secured debt because creditor cannot pursue collateral of an
already settled debt); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(2) (stating that a
tortfeasor is relieved of all liability when a third person entitled to recover discharges the
tortfeasor by settlement). But cf. United States v. Winter Livestock Comm'n, 924 F.2d
986, 988 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing a creditor who settled with debtor and reserved
rights to obtain balance from all third parties, then later successfully sued debtor's sales
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The measure of damages for conversion described in the Restatement is
generally recognized by the courts in security interest cases, 2 but if that
amount exceeds the secured obligation, damages are limited to the secured
obligatione'3 Damages beyond the value of the converted property in the
form of interest' or the value of loss of use" are awarded to compen-
sate the secured party under certain circumastances. Interest, however, better
describes the necessary compensation to a secured party.u" In a few cases,
the plaintiff had obtained possession of the disputed property, and the courts
relied on "conversion!' to award damages caused by the delay in obtaining
agent).
' See, e.g., Pennian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 934 F.2d 635,652-53 (5thCir.
1991); Associated Indus. v. Keystone Gen., Inc. (In re Keystone Gen. Inc.), 135 B.L 275,282
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991); United States v. Fulipail Cattle Sales, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 976, 984
(E.D. Wis. 1986); United States v.New Holland Sales Stables, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1162,1164-66
(E.D. Pa. 1985); State Say. Bankv. Allis-ChalmerS Corp., 431 N.W.2d 383,386 (Iowa CL App.
1988); State Auto. Mut Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Credit Corp, 792 S.W.2d 626,627 (Ky. CL App.
1990); National Bank of Harvey v. International Harvester Co, 421 N.W.2d 799, 804 (NDl.
1988) (providing alternative damages for conversion: 1) the value ofproperty at conversionpus
interest 2) the highestmaketvalue ofproperty between conversion andverditwithout intems
and 3) compensation for time and money expended to get property back). Bid c International
Harvester Credit Corp. v. Commercia Credit Corp., 188 S.E.2d 110, 113 (Ga. CL App. 1972)
(awarding damages for the reasonable "hire" of the collateral from time of conversion).
Valuation may be going concern value rather than liquidation value. Barnett v. Everett
Trust & Say. Bank, 534 P2d 836, 838 (Wash. CL App. 1975) (valuating the restaurant
equipment in place rather than as used items of equipment).
243 E.g., Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 934 F.2d 635, 652 (5th Cir.
1991)- Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, Inc., 424 N.W.2d 649, 659 (S.D. 1988); accord
Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. HFH USA Corp., 805 F. Supp. 133, 147
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (identifying the issues on remand as being the value of the converted
goods and the amount secured by them).
u" Compare Lafayette Prod. Credit Ass'nv. Wilson Foods Corp., 687 F. Supp. 1267,
1274, 1278 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (fair markt value and interest); IT Indus. Credit Co. v. H
& K Mach. Serv. Co., 525 F. Supp. 170, 172-3 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (fair markAt value and
interest); Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. F & A Dairy, 477 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Wis. CL
App. 1991) (price plus interest), rev'd on other grounds, 482 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1992)
with National Acceptance Co. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (E.D.
Va. 1980) (explaining that interest was not awarded because creditor would not have
received the money immediately ifthe bank had not converted, as debtor was in financial
trouble), affld in part and rev'd in part, 673 F.2d 1314 (4th Cir. 1981); Otto Farms, Inc.
v. First Nat'l Bank of York, 422 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Neb. 1988) (explaining that interest
was not to be included unless the damages were liquidated).
"' E.g., Bures v. First Nat'lBank, Port Lavaca, 806 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Tex. CL App.
1991).
u6 A thoughtful evaluation of interest as a component of damages for a converted
security interest is contained in Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 934 F.2d
635, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1991).
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possession." Because of its tort heritage, conversion results in punitive
damages in the infrequent case' where the secured party establishes
malice, willful wrongdoing, or other wanton disregard of its rights "
A review of the cases establishes that some of the policies underlying
conversion are not receiving significant discussion. Very few courts
considering the conversion of security interests focus on inquiries set out in
the Restatement to achieve justice and to assure that the acts are sufficiently
serious. One court refused to find conversion absent unjust enrichment
or wrongdoing by the converterr' while others have articulated a need for
the secured party to mitigate damages.O2
(2) Debtor and Secured Party
Conversion by a secured party of a debtorA property is similar to any
other conversion' and provides an important remedy for the debtor.
' See, e.g., Foy v. First Nat'lBank of Elkdart, 693 F. Supp. 747, 754, 759 (N.D. Ind.
1988) (awarding costs of keeping vehicles as damages for conversion of their certificates
of origin), aftda 868 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1989); Grocers Supply Co. v. Intemcity Iv.
Properties, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding damages to be in the
amount of the costs to regain control).
u, See, e.g., State Savings Bankv. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 431 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1988) (awarding punitive damages because the purchase money creditor could
not prove that all the proceeds of debtor's bulk sale were proceeds of collateral in which
it had a security interest).
The court's award of punitive damages probably went beyond what was appropriate
because the court did not require an affirmative showing of intentional disregard for
whether the creditor had an appropriate claim to the proceeds.
' See, e.g., Lafayette Prod. Credit Ass'nv. Wilson Foods Corp., 687 F. Supp. 1267,
1274 (N.D. Ind. 1987); Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Columbian Peanut Co., 649 F.
Supp. 1116, 1120 (E.D.N.C. 1986); National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Virginia Capital
Bank, 498 F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (E.D. Va. 1980), affldinpart and rev'd inpart, 673 F.2d
1314 (4th Cir. 1981); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Boat Trading, Inc., 389 S.E.2d
555, 557 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
Two of the few examples are General Elec. Co. v. Halmar Distribs., Inc. (In re
Halmar Distribs., Inc.), 116 B.R. 328, 334-35 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990) (analyzing the case
in light of Restatement § 222A criteria resulting in no conversion), rev'd on other
growud, 968 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1992) and State Sav. Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 431
N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa CL App. 1988) (using Restatement § 222A factors indetermining
the seriousness of the offense).
11 Millers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 893 F.2d 165,
169 (8th Cir. 1990).
1 Lafayette Prod. Credit Ass'nv. Wilson Foods Corp., 687 F. Supp. 1267, 1277-78
(N.D. Ind. 1987); United States v. New Holland Sales Stables, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1162,
1164-66 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
' Some minor differences exist. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Extensive discussion of this use of conversion is beyond the scope of this
Article, but a brief summary presents an important contrast between
conversion of ownership interests and conversion of security interests.
The debtor has ownership and the requisite right of possession, yet the
secured party also has rights in the property, including a right to
possession upon default. Secured parties may be liable in conversion for
wrongful repossession, foreclosing on or applying proceeds of
collateral not covered by the security interest 5 or in violation of
agreements with the debtor,' refusal to return collateral or proceeds
after the debt has been satisfiede or failure to properly care for
collateral in their possessione' The common element in each of these
acts is the secured party exceeding the scope of its rights.
4 See suipra note 205 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Barclays Bank of New York,
N A v. Heady Elec. Co., 571 N.Y.S.2d 650,.653 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding an issue
of fact to be whether self-help provisions of U.C.C. § 9-503 were violated when secured
creditor deemed itself insecure, declared default, accelerated the loan, repossessed, and
sold the collateral at auction), appeal dismissed, 576 N.Y.S.2d 221 (N.Y. 1991); cf.
Mushitz v. First Bank of South Dakota, N.A., 457 N.W.2d 849, 855-56 (S.D. 1990)
(holding that secured creditor's action for replevin when debtor was not in default was not
conversion only because property was in possession of the court).
2 Compare Johns v. Park, 773 P.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
foreclosure against inventory included in financing statement but not in the security
agreement was a conversion) with Barton v. Chemical Bank, 577 F.2d 1329, 1333 (5th
Cir. 1978) (holding conversion action alleging application of proceeds of a certificate of
deposit to loan rather than to purchase a new certificate unsuccessful because a security
agreement existed).
2m See, e.g., Chemical Sales Co. v. Diamond Chem. Co., 766 F.2d 364, 367, 369 (8th
Cir. 1985) (remanding case where secured creditor managed the debtor's business in
which it had a security interest and the business foreclosed); Friendly Credit Union v.
Campbell, 579 So. 2d 1288 (Ala. 1991) (holding that secured creditor foreclosing under
pressure from regulatory agencies converted because ithed agreed to deferred payments).
2 See, e.g., Pittston Warehouse Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 739 F. SOpp.
904, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that, upon cancellation of secured bonds, the creditor
was liable for conversion of collateral); Trailmobile, Inc. v. Cook, 540 So. 2d 683, 687.
(Ala. 1988) (stating that debtor was entitled to recover for decrease in value of trailers
when creditor refused demand to return title to 12 trailers even though debtor still owed
secured creditor $815); Lee County Nat'l Bank v. Nelson, 761 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tex. CL
App. 1988) (holding creditor liable in conversion for retaining title to vehicles after debt
was paid despite claim that additional obligations were secured); Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek
Holding En Financiering, B.V., 816 P.2d 808, 813 (Wyo. 1991) (entitling debtor to pursue
conversion claim because no interest was to be paid on note.-making retention of stock
as collateral no longer authorized).
2 See, e.g., In re Biglari Import Export, Inc., 130 B.R. 43, 45-46 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1991) (discussing debtor who alleged loss of rugs in possession of secured party but was
unable to prove lack of reasonable care).
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Similarly, debtors sometimes convert the security interests they grant
to creditors by violating rights given the creditor, either by failing to
deliver the collateral or proceeds' 9 or by selling or dealing with the
collateral in violation of the agreement. But why bother to sue the
debtor in conversion when the debtor is already personally liable to the
creditor on the secured obligation? The answers to that question help
establish relevant inquiries in evaluating conversion as a secured party's
remedy. The debtor's obligation becomes non-dischargeable in bankrupt-
cy" if the conversion constituted willful and malicious injuries to the
• See, e.g., United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 1991)
(failure to remit proceeds of collateral sales); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Littleton
(In re Littleton), 106 B.R. 632, 635 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (failure to report a sale and
remit sales proceeds), afd 942 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hint a, 806
F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1986) (failure to remit proceeds); Vaughm v. Murray (In re
Murray), 116 B.R. 473, 476 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (delivery of inventory to unperfected
creditors and payments to unsecured creditors); Hill v. Farm Credit Bank, 726 F. Supp.
1201, 1209 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (grazing cattle and harvesting hay after creditor had acquired
land at foreclosure); Fricke v. Valley Prod. Credit Ass'n, 778 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (conversion of proceeds of sales); Avocet Dev. Corp. v. McIean Bank, 364
S.E.2d 757, 761 (Va. 1988) (removal of proceeds from a savings account).
' See, e.g., United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1208 (10th Cir. 1991) (sale of
collateral); First Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Luce (In re Luce), 109 B.R. 202, 208 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1989) (misrepresentation to secured creditor that leased computer system had
been delivered so that advances were made), affdin part and vacated in part, 960 F.2d
1277 (5th Cir. 1992); Lee Ludwig & Assoc., Inc. v. Seasport, Inc. (In re American Sports
Innovations (ASI)), 105 B.IL 614, 618-19 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1989) (transfer of
collateral to a partnership); Mercury Marine Acceptance Corp. v. Wheeler (In re
Wheeler), 96 B.L 201, 202-03 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (sale of repossessed boat subject to
creditor's security interest without notifying buyer of security interest); c. Chase
Manhattan Bank, NA. v. J & L Gen. Contractors, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 204, 212 (rex. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that transfer by successor owner of corporation of encumbered assets
to a different corporation was not conversion because perfection was defective). Contra
Braun v. Champion Credit Union (In re Braun), 141 B.R. 133, 135-37 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1992) (holding that sale of parts of a car was not conversion, as remainder of the vehicle
was still available to the creditor as collateral), aff d in part and rev'd in par, 152 B.R.
466 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
u" Mercury Marine Acceptance Corp. v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 96 B.R. 201, 203
(W.D. Mo. 1988); cf Vaughn v. Murray (In re Murray), 116 B.R. 473, 476 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1990) (stating that willful and malicious elements were met by using an implied
malice standard, but reliance on advice of counsel precluded non-dischargeability); Borg-
Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 106 B.R. 632, 634 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1989) (stating that an attempt to achieve non-dischargeability failed because proceeds
were not required to be deposited into a separate account), affd, 942 F.2d 551 (9th Cir.
1991).
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property of another.2" In addition, conversion may occur after the debt
has been discharged.263 The debtor may have violated criminal conver-
sion statutes designed to protect the creditor" Finally, the creditor
may seek punitive damages 5
Significantly, the "debtors" sued in conversion may include third
parties who would not otherwise have personal liability, such as a
shareholder,2" family member,2" or other close associate " Such
closely affiliated persons, to the extent their actions facilitate a wrong on
the secured creditor, are certainly prime candidates for a policy favoring
personal liability rather than a requirement that the creditor resort first to
the collateral. The Code's bifurcated concept of a debtor,2" however,
sets the stage for a more intriguing use of the remedy of conversion. The
term "debtor" includes persons performing a guaranty function by giving
the secured party collateral rather than taking on a personal obligation,
persons purchasing at an execution or the foreclosure sale of a junior lien,
and buyers who do not take free of the security interest. Such debtors
have no personal liability to the secured creditor. If the creditor success-
fully pursues conversion against such a debtor, the tort creates personal
liability to the secured party in the amount of the market value of the
collateral
2 70
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (Bankruptcy Code) (1988).
E.g., Hill v. Farm Credit Bank, 726 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
2s 18 U.S.C. § 658 (1985) creates criminal liability for conversion of collteral of the
Fanner's Home Administration. E.g., United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Hintzman, 806 F.2d 840, 840 (8th Cir. 1986).
us E.g., De Kalb Bank v. Purdy, 562 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (111. App. Ct. 1990).
uS See, e.g., Privitera v. Addison, 378 S.E.2d 312, 314-15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding shareholder liable in conversion to corporation's creditor and to seller of shares
for wasting assets by writing corporate checks to his benefit even though the purchase
was under warranty that no liens on accoumts receivable existed); Chase Manhattan Bank,
NA v. J & L Gen. Contractors, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 204, 213 (Tex. CL App. 1992) (holding
that conversion was committed by sister corporation which had encumbered the collateral,
but was not liable on the secured obligation); Avocet Dev. Corp. v. McLean Bank, 364
S.E.2d 757, 761 (Va. 1988) (holding that conversion was committed by president and sole
shareholder of debtor who indorsed the original notes and pledged the collateral, but did
not indorse the renewal notes).
' E.g., United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1208 (10th Cir. 1991) (convicting
debtor's father of criminal conversion for selling collateral and not remitting proceeds).
' See, e.g., Fricke v. Valley Prod. Credit Ass'n, 778 S.W.2d 829, 830-31 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that conversion was committed by associate of debtor to whose
benefit the sales proceeds were applied).
See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
z" See infra notes 282-84 and accompanying text.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Ascertaining the appropriate role of conversion as a secured party'
remedy requires reconciling the conceptual frameworks underlying conversion
and Article 9. The right to possession is central to conversion doctrines, yet
its remedy revolves around ownership.27' Article 9 involves a framework
where relative rights depend on constructive notice and other statutory rules,
rights to possession are divided between at least two parties, and the right to
possession is generally separate from ownership. Thus, conversion actions by
secured parties often involve defendants who also have possessory rights to
the property, and a statutory scheme to resolve the rights exists. Careful
evaluation of the conflicting possessory rights ensures that each is appropri-
ately accommodated.
A. Conceptualizing Conversion
If more than one remedy is available for the same wrong, it is important
to determine the appropriate role for each 2  In Warren's view, conversion
"deters serious wrongs to personal property, blocks dishonest men from
profiting by their dishonesty, and makes for extremely careful methods of
conducting important business matters.'  The first two goals are generally
irrelevant to conversions of security interests. Modifications to conversion as
it relates to security interests should expand its role beyond encouraging
careful business methods to include other salutary goals.
1. Property Remedy or Tort?
Despite the tort label, conversion at its heart resolves conflicting claims
to property.274 Successful conversion claims force a sale of the personal
property to the defendant who acquires title upon satisfying the judgment. Its
remedy of damages rather than possession results from the early English
practice of only enforcing personal property rights in damage actions2s
' Conversion doctrines developed when possession was the primary evidence of
ownership. See mqira notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
T For example, Warren contrasted breach of contract remedies and conversion
remedies when the wrog was a conversion and a breach of contrct He perceived that
an importa role for each exists, with conversion having the role of deterrent WARREN,
supra note 17, at 76-77.
2 3Id at 78.
z Under early common law, possession under a claim of ownership was required to-
qualify as a plaintiff. See id. at 4-15.
' See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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The expansion of conversion doctrines in the United States included
a shift in focus from ownership to possession276 and an emphasis on
tortious interferences. Such expansion enables conversion to be a much
broader dispute-resolution device, but it also suggests close scrutiny in its
development." Some courts characterize conversion as a strict liability
tort2  Usually, it is characterized as an intentional tort 8 Although
courts do not always require it; most definitions require that the
converter's volitional act be wrongful 279 Even if those three character-
izations are merely different attempts to describe the same constellation
of court decisions, they portent different courses of development. The
proper characterization probably differs if conversion resolves competing
claims to property than if it compensates for tortious interferences with
property. If the converter has an interest in the property that should be
accommodated, the need for a wrongful act increases.
Pursuing one of two distinct paths for future development would
benefit conversion doctrine. First, attention should be focused on its role
in resolving competing property claims so that its principles may better
accommodate that goal. Particular attention should be given to its use to
protect property interests other than ownership and to accommodate
property rights held by the competing claimant.
Second, a more radical, but perhaps ultimately necessary, path
separates the property claim resolution role from the tortious interference
role. For example, conversion could be limited to resolving competing
property claims, and trespass to chattels could be expanded to cover
tortious interferences that do not involve claims or interests in the
property. This distinction would permit property concepts to become
preeminent when the dispute involves conflicting property claims and
would permit tort doctrines to focus on compensating for injuries to
property interests.
Re-conceptualizing conversion as a damage remedy for a variety of
interests in personal property and shaping its rules to track that concep-
tion eliminates many of the problems created by the doctrine. ° Instead
of focusing on interference with possession, the focus could be on
interference with the particular property interest of the plaintiff and any
party with a property interest could bring the action. Damages could be
276 See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
mE.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Southwestern Livestock, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1515, 1520
(D. Kan. 1985), aft'd, 859 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1988).
n See U.C.C. § 223, 224 and comments.
2" This is consistent with the principles of RESTATEMENT § 222A cmt. a.
20 See sqna notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
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determined by a forced sale of the interest with which the defendant
interfered rather than the ownership interest, so the plaintiff would only
receive what it was due and the defendant would acquire only the
plaintiff's interest
An important step down either path is a careful analysis of the
compatibility of current conversion doctrines with resolving disputes
between secured parties and other claimants of personal property. This
application of conversion provides a useful starting point, because very
important differences exist between security interests and ownership and
other possessory interests in personal property. Such an analysis does not
exist in the conversion literature. The ensuing discussion attempts to fill
this void.
2. Coordination with Artcle 9
Answers to many questions about the meaning of priority to personal
property collaterall come from conversion actions. The questions arise
because Article 9 not only unified diverse bodies of personal property
security law, but also advanced it by creating new concepts and rights.
Legal concepts like conversion which are historically linked to the
concepts Article 9 expanded are unlikely to resolve these issues without
significant modification. Moreover, the questions may be resolved most
effectively by modifying the expansive concepts of Article 9 to facilitate
just results. These considerations suggest incorporating the law of
conversion, as it relates to security interests, into Article 9 to facilitate
resolution of these issues.
The interrelationship between conversion and negotiable instruments
law presents a valuable parallel In the original promulgation of Article
3, section 3-419 set forth the measure of conversion damages and defined
five situations which constituted conversion, two of which limited
conversion liability. These statutory modifications and clarifications
were designed to eliminate problems that had arisen and to clarify the
n' See sipra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
n U.C.C. § 3-419(1) (1962) provided that refusal of a drawee to return an instrument
delivered for acceptance, refusal to pay or return an instrument delivered for payment, and
payment over a forged indorsement constituted conversion. Subsection (3) limited
conversion liability to proceeds remaining in the bands of a representative who in good
faith and pursuant to reasonable commercial standards dealt with an instrument on behalf
of someone who was not the true owner. Id. § 3419(3). Subsection (4) precluded
conversion liability for banks other than depositary banks if proceeds of a restrictively
indorsed item are applied in contravention of the indorsement unless they are the
immediate transferee of the indorser placing the restriction on the item. Id. § 3-419(4).
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intended interaction between conversion and negotiable instruments law.
The 1990 revision of Article 3 again modified the conversion rules. New
section 3-420 affirms that the law of conversion applies to instru-
ments, describes two broad sets of circumstances that constitute conver-
sion, and describes two groups which cannot bring conversion ac-
tions." It explicitly limits damages to the plaintiff's interest in the
instrument and provides a broader limitation on conversion liability when
representatives deal with the instrument in good faith. The lengthy
Official Comments to the revised section illustrate the importance of
keeping development of conversion law relating to negotiable instruments
consistent with other aspects of Article 3 and commercial practices and
both the necessity for and the potential pitfalls of statutory rules to
accomplish that goal?
The frequency with which conversion is invoked as a remedy in
secured transactions and the unique issues raised by the conversion of
security interests argue for taking a similar approach in Article 9.
Regulating conversion in Article 9 would facilitate future development of
conversion law governing security interests by increasing incentives to
ensure that it remains consistent with Article 9 goals, policies, and
principles.
B. Should Conversion Protect Security Interests?
A remedy should reflect the right being remedied as closely as
possible to further the policies behind the right.W A secured party's
fundamental property right is to take control of property and sell or
2 nTwo of the specific acts defined as conversion in the original Article 3, refusal to
return an instrument delivered for acceptance and refusal to pay or return an instrubent
delivered for payment, are no longer included. The Official Comment explains that the
old rule is inconsistent with some accepted practices. U.C.C. § 3-420 c=t 1.
21 U.C.C. § 3-420(a).
235 Id. § 3-420(b), (c).
23 Id. § 3-420 cmt 1 explains that some of the fonner section's rules on what
constituted conversion were deleted because the general law of conversion would probably
better resolve the issues in light of common business practices. That same comment
explains that other portions of the section were either designed to resolve particular issues
that could arise or to resolve a judicial split of authority in a mamer consistent with
Article 3 concepts. U.C.C. § 3-420 cat. 2 explains that prior statutory provisions were
modified because they had the potential of creating unnecessary issues. U.C.C. § 3-420
cat. 3 describes one of the changes as resulting fiom rational judicial criticism of the
prior Code rule.
W See 1 DOBBS, upra note 10, § 1.7, at 27-30.
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otherwise transform it to proceeds to be applied to the debt. Replevin
closely reflects the secured party's right by providing a means for
obtaining possession. Conversion reflects the rights by transforming the
property into proceeds to be applied to the debt in one action.' Thus,
conversion may be an ideal way to resolve competing claims in disputes
regarding personal property collateral
For justice to be served, however, a remedy should also be tailored
to the wrong committed. Replevin requires the defendant to relinquish
possession to one with a paramount possessory right, providing a close
fit with the wrongful possession. Conversion, on the other hand, presents
a more complicated situation. Rather than relinquishing possession, the
defendant is forced to purchase the collateral Conversion as a secured
party's remedy is appropriate only if the defendant's wrong justifies
requiring payment of fair market value for the collateral'
Rights to possession accompany very different interests in the
property- the interests of an owner, bailee, lessee, secured party, or
consignee. Several possessory rights can coexist and be transferred
without creating immediate conflicts over possession. Failing to thorough-
ly examine the competing rights in personal property before vindicating
one of them through conversion may miscarry justice. A defendant's
wrongful actions can be determined only after its rights in the property
are understood. If the defendant's actions are consistent with its rights and
the secured party's rights are unaffected or insignificantly affected, then
conversion should not lie.
1. Securidy Interests vs. Ownership Interests
A precise description of what rights and powers in personal property
constitute "ownership" is not readily available. If rights and powers
to the property have not been divided, then ownership includes the right
to dominion and control (possession if tangible property), the right to use
and enjoyment the right and power to transfer, the right to appreciation
in value (and the risk of depreciation), and perhaps others. A person with
those rights and powers can transfer many of them in whole or in part
and still be considered the owner of the property. The essential rights and
2 See npra notes 138, 242-43 and accompanying text.
n9 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
2 The term "ownersh" is used to convey the sense of primary or ultimate right to
the property reflected in the common understanding of property having an "owner." The
term "ownership" rather than "title" is used because title or legal title has had historical
meanings and uses that may create confusion.
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powers constituting ownership of property are probably most generally
understood to include at least reversionary rights to use, enjoyment,
dominion, and control
Applying traditional conversion doctrine to a serious interference with
ownership rights is an appropriate remedy. The owner has either the right
to current dominion, control, use and enjoyment or the reversionary
interest in those rights. If those rights are paramount, the interfering party
will be liable in conversion. The interfering party recompenses the owner
by acquiring the ownership interest in a forced sale.
The basic rights to personal property encompassed in a security
interest are discrete and readily definable: the right to obtain dominion
and control (possession if tangible property) upon the debtor's default, the
right to transfer the debtor's interest in the property for value, and the
right to apply that value to the secured obligation. The secured party
almost never has possession at the time of conversion, but merely has a
right to it upon default. Its possession is also for a purpose other than use
and enjoyment.
Traditional conversion doctrines do not correlate as well with the
rights of a secured party. A secured party's conversion action asserts its
previbusly unasserted right to dominion and control and simultaneously
relinquishes that right in exchange for its other rights in the property.
receiving its value and applying it to the debt. In essence, conversion is
an expedited foreclosure at maximum price to a "buyer" whose actions
or interests may not include a claim of or desire for ownership. In
addition, that buyer's possession of the property may not seriously
interfere with the secured party's rights, if the property is still subject to
its unasserted right to possession. Remedies to protect 4 security interest
should not exceed the scope of the secured party's rights if they derogate
rights of another. Thus, it is critical to determine whether compelling
purchase of the property serves justice.
2. Benefits to the Secured Party
Conversion may give the creditor greater rights than it had in the
collateral. The secured party obtains the full benefit of its security interest
without resorting to remedies provided in Article 9 and without the risk
of liability for mistakes in exercising those remedies? 1 It obtains the
fair market value of the collateral, unless it exceeds the secured obliga-
tion. Fair market value is predictably higher than the amount obtained at
291 See supra notes 96, 101-03 and accompanying text.
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a foreclosure sale. With a financially sound third party, conversion
substitutes a solvent defendant for the debtor whose inability to pay
necessitated recourse to the collateral. The secured party now has three
options to satisfy its claim: the collateral, the proceeds, and the personal
liability of a creditworthy third party. If the acts constituting conversion
include the mere transfer of collateral, it could be exploited by a secured
party pursuing the creditworthy entity, even if the collateral or the
proceeds were readily accessible. Is this too solicitous of secured parties'
rights?
A conversion action also creates an opportunity for exploitation of
changes in the market The secured party has the option of taking the
market value .at the time of conversion if the market has dropped, or of
repossessing and foreclosing if the market has increased Absent
conversion law, the creditor could not obtain the value at the time of
conversion unless it had declared default and completed foreclosure. In
contrast, limiting conversion so the transferee could avoid personal
liability does not encourage exploitation by the transferee. If the market
has gone up, the secured creditor can use replevin and obtain the benefit.
If the market has gone down, the transferee is better off relinquishing
possession than incurring personal liability, but that advantage is not
anticipated or created by the transferee. Any party with an interest in
collateral risks declining value. Absent delay tactics by the transferee, no
particular reason compels shifting this risk from the secured creditors to
innocent transferees.
The potential for greater recovery through conversion than through
traditional foreclosure remedies may argue for the measure of damages
to be foreclosure rather than fair market value. However, many potential
unfair advantages are eliminated if conversion rules encourage a secured
party to act before a buyer's purchase or a junior creditor's foreclosure or
execution. Delay by a secured creditor with timely knowledge of an
impending sale or repossession of its collateral should be a waiver of its
The facts of State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 792 S.W.2d 626
(Ky. CL App. 1990), illustrate the potential issues, although the creditor in that case, for
some xeason, pursued conversion rather than the then more valuable collateral. The
defendant in the conversion action was a liability insurance company which paid
$5,801.25 to the owner of the vehicle damaged by its insured and sold the totaled vehicle
to a salvage company for $1,215.50. Id at 627. A subsequent buyer restored the vehicle
at a cost of $2,500.00 and resold it to the salvage company. The court found conversion
by the insurance company in the amount of the salvage value and ordered title delivered
to the owner upon payment of that judgment. Id Seeking to enforce its security interest
in the auto would have been the economically more advantageous course of action.
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right to sue in conversion. 3 Laches provides another possible protec-
tion, but its discretionary nature reduces its effectiveness. Some
courts articulate a need for the secured party to mitigate damages, 5 but
that protection has not been widely adopted nor well developed.
3. Do Innocent Converters Deserve Protection?
Innocent converters of security interests are those who in good faith
exercise legitimate rights of dominion and control over the secured party's
collateral. Generally such parties derive those rights from the debtor,
albeit subject to the security interest. If innocent converters' property
interests are subject to the security interest, do adequate justifications for
limiting their liability for conversion exist? That question is addressed for
four significant groups of innocent converters: junior secured parties, lien
creditors, buyers who have not taken free of the security interest, and
agents of the debtor.
a Junior Creditors
Absent a subordination agreement, junior secured parties and lien
creditors cannot take free of the prior security interest. Prompt notice of
the lien by lien creditors only limits the secured obligation to the amount
outstanding at the time of the lien plus advances made or committed
' See General Elec. Co. v. Halmar Distribs., Inc. (In re Halmar Distribs., Inc.), 968
F.2d 121, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that purchase money creditor who acquiesced
in payment of inventory proceeds into other creditor's lockbox account thereby waived
right to receive proceeds directly, but a demand and refusal reintated right as to future
collections); C & H Fam Serv. Co. v. Farmers Say. Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866, 872 (Iowa
1989) (stating that creditor waived right to claim conversion because of knowledge of and
acquiescence in a course of dealing contrary to the terms of the security agreement).
The bakruptcy court in In re Halmar Distribs., Inc. had relied on the equitable
doctrine of laches to achieve the same end, but waiver is the more precise doctrine on
those facts. 116 B.. 328 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990), revd, 968 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1992).
' Laches requires passage of time and a resulting hardship. See supra note 240 and
accompanying text. The relevant statute of limitations for conversion may make the
passage of time a significant barrier to the use of the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v.
Security State Bank, 686 F. Supp. 733, 735-36 (N.D. Iowa 1988) (rejecting claim of
reliance on a delay of over two years because the statute of limitations for conversion
actions was six years); Associated Indus. v. Keystone Gem, Inc., 135 B.R. 275, 282
(Banmkr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that burden to sustain laches was not met in light of
a four-year statute of limitations for conversion); see also supra note 293.
29 See supra note 252.
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within forty-five days thereafter z6 Junior secured creditors are unable
to place any limit on future advances against the collateral. In short,
the Code-created monopoly position for the prior creditor" is amelio-
rated only by subordination, which is generally not available.
The risks created by the monopoly position raise the question: Why
does a junior creditor obtain its interest? Each possible answer implicates
different concerns about the justice of conversion. The creditor may know
of the security interest and tactically decide to obtain whatever security
it can on the theory that anything is better than nothing. Provided there
is equity in the collateral, these creditors deserve some protection of their
interests.
The creditor may not know of the security interest, either because it
relied on representations of the debtor and failed to search the files or
because a reasonable search failed to disclose the security interest. The
filing system affords greater protection to potential converters of security
interests than ownership interests, because ownership interests generally
are not filed. Requiring creditors to rely on the filing system enhances its
integrity. Little incentive exists to provide additional protection to a
creditor who fails to search.
The creditor who made a reasonable search, however, is more
sympathetic. The notice system is far from perfect.' A creditor may
obtain encumbered property despite thorough inquiry and searching. The
more attenuated the connection between the converter and the original
debtor, the more difficult the task of obtaining knowledge of the security
interest. The Code filing rules attempt- to accommodate the needs of
subsequent parties to learn of the security interest and the countervailing
needs of the secured creditor to monitor changes and not be penalized for
filing office errors. The accommodations placed the risk of filing office
error and. the burden'to ascertain information about the collateral on
subsequent parties.' The debtor, of course, may misrepresent the
required information to obtain an advantage.
An additional significant reason for a change is evident when
considering a creditor with a junior interest. Frequently, a creditor
justifiably assumes it has priority even though that assumption ultimately
proves wrong. Such creditors present the most persuasive argument for
modifying conversion doctrine.
- U.C.C. § 9.301(4).
2Id. § 9-312(7).
29 See sipra text accompanying notes 50-54.
See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text
o See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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One significant group of such creditors are those who have security
interests in after-acquired collateral other than inventory which, without
their.knowledge, is subject to a purchase money security interest. Even
if the secured party learns of that subsequent interest, determining priority
depends on information not in the public record: Was the value used to
acquire the collateral? Was filing made within ten days of acquisi-
tion?
301
In a number of other circumstances, a creditor's good faith assump-
tion of priority turns out to be wrong. Priority may turn on the resolution
of a close issue. For example, in Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate
Industries, Inc.' the lower court found a creditor collecting accounts
receivable not liable in conversion because it had priority. On appeal, the
court reversed the summary judgment on the grounds that the collecting
creditor did not have priority because the other creditor's earlier finan ing
statement contained an adequate description of future accounts receiv-
able3
03
The priority question maybe sufficiently involved to require litigation
to resolve it. In Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Six Consignments of Frozen
Scallops,' repossessing creditors with priority to after-acquired
property faced a conversion claim for refusing a demand for delivery by
the issuer of a negotiable bill of lading who had delivered the collateral
to the debtor without obtaining possession of the bill. The court reversed
a summary judgment in favor of the creditors because it found the issuer
of the bill of lading had priority.3"
Other priority questions not only involve uncertain legal issues, but
also cannot be resolved without ascertaining facts unavailable to the
creditor at the time it enforces its interest. In Sears Consumer Financial
Corp. v. Thunderbird Products, a prior creditor converted a boat by
repossessing it from a boat dealer to which it entrusted the boat after a
prior repossession. Without authority, the dealer sold the boat and a
subsequent creditor financed the purchase. The buyer had not taken
possession and the subsequent creditor had not properly recorded its lien.
301 U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
2 490 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minm. 1980), rev'd, 654 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1981).
3 Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Nortbgate Indus., Inc., 654 F.2d 1245, 1253 (8th Cir.
1981).
3- 4 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 1993).
3o- Id. at 91, 93-96. Ti lower court had resolved the priority dispute under U.C.C.
§§ 2-702, 2-403(1). This court relied on U.C.C. § 2-403(2). Although neither analysis is
particularly compelling, the point is that the priority dispute is not readily resolved.
30 802 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
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The repossessing creditor had no way of knowing about the buyers or
creditors interests at the time of conversion.
Similarly, in Centerre Bank NA v. New Holland Dmsion of Sperry
Corp., a seller of equipment on secured credit repossessed used equip-
ment traded-in on equipment it sold the debtor. The seller records showed
no previous sale, but the debtor had sold the equipment to a bank which had
leased it back to the shareholders of the debtor. They concealed the
transaction from the seller' and later delivered the leased equipment to the
debtor to make the sale resulting in the trade-ins. Although both the majority
and the dissent decided that the bank purchase of the equipment defeated the
prior security interest the case required resolution of significant factual
questions that could not be readily discovered or resolved by the repossessing
creditor.31
Because junior creditors have significant justifications for acquiring
inferior interests, they deserve consideration for modifying conversion
doctrines. Creditors acquire rights to satisfy a debt not rights to use and
enjoyment. Becoming obligated to buy the property is inconsistent with the
rights they sought and claim. Holding a creditor personally liable to buy
collateral merely because it guessed incorrectly on uncertain issues is
inappropriate unless some higher policy is furthered by conversion rules.
b. Buyers
Applying the same analysis to buyers produces more straightforward and
somewhat less compelling results. Buyers not in the ordinary course of
business can take free of the security interest if the secured party consents to
the transfer. If not, increase in the secured obligation can be limited to
advances made or committed to before the date the secured party learns of the
transfer.3" Again the question is raised: Why would any buyer aware of
these risks acquire property subject to a security interest without either
obtaining the consent of or giving notice to the secured party? The answers
for buyers are easier.
The court held that the creditor's entrustment under U.C.C. § 2-403(3) gave title
to the buyer free of the security interest as a buyer in the ordinary coure of busines
Loss of its security interest enabled the unperfected subsequent creditor to obtain priority.
Detennining buyer in the ordinary course status is diflicult when the buyer bas not taken
possession. Thunderbird Product, 802 P.2d at 1034.
832 F.2d 1415, 1416-17 (7th Cir. 1987) (Eschbach, ., dissenting).
-Id. at 1417.
310 Id. at 1417, 1425.
3 U.C.C. § 9-307(3).
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The buyer may know of the security interest but tactically decide to
proceed, either taking the value of the security interest into account or
hoping it will not be enforced. Under these circumstances, conversion's
forced sale is appropriate. The buyer sought ownership and either paid
what it expected or lost its gamble to obtain title. Likewise, buyers
without knowledge of the prior security interest because they failed to
search the files and relied on debtor representations do not present a
compelling case for additional protection.
However, buyers unable to find the prior interest due to inadequacies
in the filing system deserve protection similar to creditors. This situation
includes buyers who acquire the property at an execution or foreclosure
sale of a creditor they reasonably believed had priority. They are in the
same position as that creditor. Modifying conversion rules to limit
personal liability may be warranted under these circumstances because,
although the buyer sought ownership, it understood the interest to be
unencumbered.
c. Seller's Agents
Agents selling collateral are generally held to the same standards for
conversion as their principal. However, they frequently have no knowl-
edge that the sale is wrongful. Agents claim only a right to sell the
property, not title or a right to proceeds. They receive only a small fee for
their services, yet they may be of sufficient financial strength to make
them a desirable target for secured creditors seeking repayment of a
delinquent debt.
However, these same arguments could be made regarding conversion
of ownership interests. Do innocent agents deserve greater protection with
regard to conversion of security interests than ownership interests? The
agent facilitates deprivation of ownership rights by the mere sale.
However, the secured party's rights are unaffected if the new buyer is
located with reasonable effort and the security interest continues. In fact,
sale of the collateral in these cases is in the best interests of the secured
creditor, if it is the debtor's primary source of income. These factors
support consideration of conversion rules that provide agents greater
protection.
4. Appropriate Protection
Justifications exist for protecting an innocent converter's rights. But,
what is the nature of those rights, and what protections are not inconsis-
tent with the rights of the superior secured party? Just because a buyer's
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or junior creditor's rights are inferior does not mean they are non-existent.
Each is entitled, but not required, to redeem the property. Conversion as
a forced sale at the lesser of the property's fair market value or the
amount of the secured obligation3n is in essence a forced redemption.
Why should an innocent junior creditor be forced to redeem and expend
money on a debt that may not be collectible? Perhaps forced redemption
is appropriate for an innocent buyer who intended to acquire an owner-
ship interest."' Yet if the senior repossessed and foreclosed, the
innocent buyer could repurchase at the foreclosure price, an amount
invariably less than fair market value. These factors suggest several
accommodations: provide a way to avoid personal liability, ensure that a
converter has recourse against other parties to vindicate its interest, and
consider measuring damages by the value at a foreclosure sale rather than
fair market value.
a. Avoiding Personal Liability
A meaningful protection from personal liability permits the innocent
converter to relinquish possession. This modification to conversion
doctrine creates no incentive to shirk inquiry and file searching because
it does not alter the transferee's risk of losing the collateral to the secured
party. It simply avoids giving the innocent converter the additional risk
of personal liability for debtor misconduct in misrepresenting the
encumbered status of property or in failing to honor its obligations under
the security agreement. Implementing this protection requires either
changing the law regarding tender of. delivery.. 4 or expanding the
requirements for refusal of a demand."5
b. Allocating Ultimate Liability
An innocent converter should have legal recourse to pass the loss to
the most culpable party, assuming the party can be served and any
" Limiting damages to the amount of the secured obligation if less than the fair
market value of the collateral is virtually the only rule articulated by the courts to
distinguish conversion of security interests from ownership interests. See Chamberlain v.
Shaw, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 278, 283-4 (1836) (setting forth the rule long before the
explosion of security interests in personal property known today).
" This position would be particularly true, as contrasted with being subject to
replevin, ifthe property has become related to the buyer's "personhood." See Radin, =ra
note 13.
31 See s-pa notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
... See infra notes 347-54 and accompanying text.
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judgment enforced. Currently, the legal mechanisms to accomplish this
vary with the nature of the converter's interest. An agent can pass the loss
to its principal if it has a contractual right or if it successfully relies on
equitable remedies, such as fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, or unjust
enrichment.
An agent's rights after satisfying a conversion judgment depend on
whether conversion of a security interest constitutes a forced sale of the
ownership interest or the security interest. The court in Chadron Energy
Corp. v. First National Bank"'6 characterized it as a forced sale of the
security interest. By such a characterization, the converter, upon satisfac-
tion of the judgment, acquires not title but, by subrogation, the rights of
the prior secured creditor under Article 9 and its security agreement. If
characterized as the sale of an ownership interest, the agent obtains title,
but it has sold the property for the debtor so the good title presumably
inres to the buyer's benefit. If characterized as the sale of a security
interest, the agent obtains subrogation rights. These rights to the property
do not help in an action against the buyer, because it would have
defenses against the selling agent. If conceived broadly enough to include
subrogation rights to the secured obligation, however, they would permit
the agent to bring an action against its principal, the debtor.
Innocent buyers present a very different picture. They face equivalent
risks if they are liable in conversion or if the property is taken in
replevin. They either pay for the property and lose it or pay for it twice
to satisfy different obligations and obtain rights in it In either case,
innocent buyers should be able to recover the purchase price from a more
culpable seller. The Code's title warranty that the property is not subject
to a security interest, lien, or encumbrance unknown to the buyer
provides a potential mechanism.317 If that warranty is properly dis-
claimed, the buyer presumably knowingly assumed the risk of subsequent
liability in the full value of the goods.
Buyers at execution or foreclosure sales assume a much greater risk.
Section 2-312(2) of the Code excludes warranty of title in circumstances
indicating that the person is selling only such right as he or a third person
may have. That provision precludes buyers at execution sales from
obtaining a warranty of title.M  Official Comment 5 describes the
provision as covering sales in which liens are foreclosed.39 Does it
cover Article 9 foreclosure sales, or does the provision in section 9-504()
316 459 N.W.2d 718, 732-33 (Neb. 1990).
317 U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(b).
313 Id. at § 2-312(2).
319 Id. at cmt. 5.
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that any foreclosure sale is subject to Article 2 control?"2 Independent of
the possible statutory loss of the warranty, foreclosing creditors often disclaim
the warmnty in any bill of sale. In any event, recourse to title warranty is
uncertain for buyers at foreclosure sales. To the extent warranty protection is
unavailable, buyers must rely on the equitable remedies described for agents.
The buyer rights based upon satisfying the conversion judgment also
differ if conversion of a security interest is a forced sale of the ownership
interest rather than the security interest. With a forced sale of the ownership
interest, the buyer has title but paid for the property twice. A forced sale of
the security interest gives the buyer subrogation rights. The ramifications of
this are not clear. The buyer has purchased both the debtors equity in the
property and the security interest. Does that mean they merge and the buyer
has good title and no firther rights? Does it mean the buyer may recover
judgment against debtor on the subrogation claim but must return the
security? Or does buyer have title and a subrogation claim against debtor in
the amount of the security interest? Only the latter interpretation properly
allocates rights and liabilities.
Changes to Article 9 suggested by other commentators would also protect
buyers at foreclosure or execution sales. Ensuritg that buyers have actual
knowledge of prior security interests permits them to eliminate the risk'
Ensuring that buyers at executions or foreclosure sales take title free of all
security interests and liens also eliminates the risk.
The most troubling issues surrounding remedies for converters arise for
junior creditors. Murdock v. Blake illustrates the problem. A judgment
creditor received $2,821.63 from the execution sale. 4 Although the court
stated that the buyer would have the property subject to the prior security
interest, the judgment creditor was liable to a prior secured party in conver-
sion for $4,942.88, the value ofthe property at the time of sale. The judgment
creditor was now out almost twice as much as before the levy and execution,
yet by virtue of the execution sale its judgment had been satisfied. Here, the
debtor is the more culpable party and should bear the loss. Unless rights of
subrogation exist or the debt is deemed reinstated, the creditor is left only
with equitable claims such as unjust enrichment.
Treating conversion as a forced sale of the ownership interest provides
no protection. The good faith buyers at the execution sale presumably benefit
' Section 2-312(2) also excludes the wranty when circumstances give the buyer
reason to know the seller is not claiming title or only selling the title it or a third person
may have. See HILIMAN Er AL., sqra note 2, 25.02[5][a], at n.329.
3 See infra notes 426-28 and accmpanying text
' See infra notes 435-37 and accompanying text.
323 484 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971).
m Id. at 166-69.
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from the good title. Adopting the Chadron characterization of a forced
sale of the security interest provides only limited protection. First, it
subrogates the judgment creditor to the senior secured party rights to the
collateral in the hands of the buyers. The buyers, however, have defenses
against the judgment creditor's claims. In Murdock, for example, because the
buyers paid $2,821.63 for property worth $4,942.88, subject to a security
interest of at least that amount,' they apparently purchased without
knowledge of the security interest. Election of a conversion action against the
creditor rather than replevin or conversion against the buyers may effectively
insulate them from attack.
Subrogation provides a second right-an action against the debtor on the
secured obligation in the amount of the junior creditor conversion liability.
This claim is more theoretical than practical. It exceeds the judgment
creditor unpaid claim which necessitated levy against the debtor property.
These unfair consequences of conversion are eliminated only by limiting
conversion to appropriate wrongful acts.
C. When Is a Security Interest Converted?
If protections for innocent converters are inadequate under current
conversion law, what modifications would appropriately facilitate the
suggested protections? This question is best answered by examining the
current rules governing conversion of security interests and determining the
circumstances under which they produce unsatisfactory results as well as what
principles could be adopted or expanded to avoid those results.
Official Comment 3 to Uniform Commercial Code section 9-306 states
that a secured party has the right to repossess the property from a transferee,
"or in an appropriate case maintain an action for conversion."'  The
drafters did not elaborate on what constitutes an appropriate case. Is it
whenever the elements for the common law tort of conversion of other
interests in property can be established?
Courts in security interest cases often cite the Restatement for the rules
of conversion or use language similar to the elements set forth in the
Restatement' The Restatement definition of conversion" raises two
significant questions: What interference is sufficiently serious? When should
the converter "justly be required to pay?" The Restatement gives no
See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
484 P.2d at 169-70.
No other reference to conversion of a secured party's interest in property is made
in Article 9 or its comments.
12 See smpra notes 172-206 and accompanying text.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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consideration to those questions in cases where a security interest is
converted. Cases involving conversion of a security interest primarily discuss
only priority, not the seriousness of the interference or the justice of the
forced sale.
The injustice of finding conversion by innocent transferees has not gone
unnoticed. Attempts to mitigate the problem, however, have swept too
broadly. Louisiana adopted a non-uniform amendment to Article 9 in order
to preclude personal liability of a purchaser of collateral unless conspiracy to
defeat the security interest could be found?" Because the term "purchaser"
includes secured parties and lien creditors,3" this formulation protects most
persons giving value to acquire interests in property. The Louisiana approach,
however, sweeps too broadly by defining wrongful conduct too narrowly.
Interferences not rising to the level of conspiracy with the debtor may also
justify conversion liability.
A judicial attempt to avoid finding conversion of a security interest
suffers from a similar deficiency. The trial court in United States v.
Tugwel 333 limited the creditor to its Code remedy to recover proceeds
despite defendant improperly qualified refusal of the creditors demand for
delivey 3 First; the holding ignores the Code concept that the creditor can
pursue either the collateral or identifiable proceeds. 35 Second, it overlooks
protection provided by the tort doctrine of qualified refusal to deliver.'
If requiring collusion with the debtor is too narrow and requiring pursuit
of collateral is too broad, what limitations are appropriate? Focusing on the
nature of the act claimed to constitute conversion provides substance for the
skeletal concepts of serious interference, and justice is thus established.
Interferences with property which are serious enough to justify conversion
should exclude exercise of legitimate property interests of the actor. Buyers,
junior secured parties, and lien creditors obtain possession for value from one
m One notable exception is Installment Fin. Corp. v. Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc., 794
P.2d 751 (Okla. 1990). The court found no wrongful conduct on the part of the alleged
converter but expressly noted that it did not need to address whether the secured creditor
could repossess. Id. at 753. While justice and the seriousness of the inteference were not
expressly referred to, they are the essence of its holding.
" LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-306(2) (West 1993) provides in pertinent part:
A purchaser of collateral, however, incurs no personal liability on account of
unauthorized transfer unless he has conspired with the debtor to defeat the
interest of the secured party.
= U.C.C. § 1-201(32), (33).
'3 597 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1984), revd, 779 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1985).
m Ida at 487-88.
... See U.C.C. § 9-306. The Fourth Circuit recognized this in reversing the trial court
decision. Tugwel, 779 F.2d at 7.
3m See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
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legally empowered to transfer possession. Buyers have ownership of the
property, albeit subject to a security interest. Unless they have acted
wrongfully, they should not be personally liable to a secured party in
conversion, but should be merely subject to replevin or its equivalent so that
the secured party can enforce the security interest. Junior secured creditors
and lien creditors have rights to possession, to dispose of the property, and
to apply the proceeds to their obligations. Unless they have acted wrongfully,
they should not be personally liable for the fair market value of the collateral,
which is more than their disposition will bring, but should be merely subject
to replevin or its equivalent or their disposition should be subject to the prior
security interest. Requiring a wrongful act accommodates the converter's
property interests?
37
1. Refusal of a Demand
One traditional wrongful act constituting conversion is refuisal to
deliver property on demand by a person with a paramount interest.
Unqualified or improperly qualified refusals to comply with a demand
to deliver the collateral constitute conversion.3 Delivery precludes
liability"
1 The Restatement's definition of conversion includes the concept of wrongful
conduct. Id. at § 222A.
3' E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Halmar Distribs., In. (In re Halmar Distribs., Inc.), 968
F.2d 121, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that junior creditor refusing to deliver proceeds
it rightfully held in lockbox on demand by senior secured creditor was liable in
conversion); First Interstate Bank, NA. v. Interfund Corp., 924 F.2d 588, 591-93 (5th Cir.
1991) (explaining that second creditor decided not to buy a note and chattel paper that
had been delivered to it by the first creditor but held it instead as security for another loan
to the debtor and -upon refusal of a demand became liable in conversion as the initial
possession was rightfl); United States v. Tugwell, 779 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding
that buyer of collateral without knowledge of security interest was liable for conversion
for refusing to turn over collateral until storage charges were paid), rev'g 597 F. Supp.
486 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Lafayette Prod. Credit Ass'nv. Wilson Foods Corp., 687 F. Supp.
1267, 1274 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding buyer liable in conversion for failue to issue the
joint checks when it had knowledge of this requirement); Modem Living, Inc. v.
Niederhofer, 751 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that landlord's refusal
to pennit mobile home to be repossessed until back rent was paid was a conversion of the
mobile home); Farm Credit Bank v. F & A Dairy, 477 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Wis. Ct App.
1991) (explaining that buyer of dairy products encuabered by a security interest was
liable in conversion for refusal to pay price directly to the creditor); Longtree, Ltd. v.
Resource Control InI'l, Inc., 755 P.2d 195, 196 (Wyo. 1988) (noting that buyer not in the
ordinary course of business converted logs by refusing to surrender them to secured
party).
" E.g., Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank ofNew England-Old Colony Nat'lAss'n,
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If the converter believes in good faith that its interest is paramount,
it needs an appropriate avenue to pursue in resolving that claim, without
incurring conversion liability. Deferral of action to investigate the claim
is limited to a reasonable period of time. Conversion liability after a
refused demand turns on who has priority"' and because this deterni-
nation is often difficult,' an appropriate qualified refusal must permit
the party to present the priority issue to a court for resolution. Interplead-
er should constitute a qualified refusal.? 3 Interpleader is available, even
if the instituting party is an interested stakeholder and the interpleaded
property cannot be deposited with the court, as long as a bond is
posted.3 Unless a converter with a property interest files a timely
interpleader, it has two alternatives: deliver the collateral and file suit to
regain possession (and thus lose control) or refuse the demand and put
the claiming secured creditor to the effort and expense of a legal action
(and thus risk liability for conversion).
Is an improperly qualified refusal of a demand sufficiently serious to
justly find conversion?s The demand creates actual rather than mere
constructive knowledge of the security interest and its priority, and refusal
85 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. D.RtI. 1988) (holding that junior creditor was not liable in
conversion for holding certificates of title because it relinquished the certificates on
demand of the prior creditor), affad 897 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1990); Scholfield Bros., Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 752 P.2d 661, 662-63 (Kan. 1988) (holding no
conversion of secured creditor's interest by third party's insurance company who paid for
car damaged in collision in exchange for title and sent title to secured creditor, who had
refused to relinquish title).
' See Messemil v. Fulwider, 245 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551 n.5, 553 (Cal. CL App. 1988)
(stating that bailee only gets a reasonable period of time to investigate claim, not a fight
to demand a court order).
m' E.g., Polk County Bank v. Graven, 745 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding no conversion for secured creditor's refusal to deliver repossessed collateral to
other secured party, because refusing creditor determined to have priority); First State
Bank, NA. v. Arsiaga, 804 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that holder of
statutory lien for repairs to tuck had priority and was not liable for conversion for refusal
to deliver to secured party). But cf. Messerall v. Fulwider, 245 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551-53
(Cal. CL App. 1988) (explaining that lien for repair and storage costs was extinguished
by secured party's offer to pay so that futher demand for court order was a conversion
and rig to the storage costs was lost).
34 See nmpra notes 302-10 and accompanying text.
30 See RESTATEMENT §§ 239 cat. c, 240 cmt. e; WARREN, supra note 17, at 47-49.
'" See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988); 7 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRAcTICE
AND ROCEDUR § 1704 (1986) (generally describing requirements of interpleader); id
§ 1710 (explaining subject matter jurisdiction); id. § 1716 (describing requirement of
deposit in court or posting of bond).
3 See supra note 338 and accompanying text
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is an act inconsistent with the rights, so that the conduct is wrongful
Failure of the possessing party to return collateral puts the secured party
at the effort and expense of a replevin action. Although a debtor is
entitled to refuse repossession under U.C.C. § 9-503 and force the
creditor to use judicial remedies such as replevin, it generally has
contractual liability for such costs. Thus, third-party liability for the
refusal is consistent.
If a refused demand is sufficient for conversion liability, should it
also be a necessary condition? Requiring demand and refusal for
conversion of security interests is consistent with the nature of a security
interest. If the debtor has possession, the secured party cannot exercise its
rights without obtaining possession, which requires at least a demand for
delivery or self help. The secured party should not be placed in a better
position by a mere transfer. Requiring a demand permits the innocent
converter to avoid personal liability by tendering possession, and it allows
the secured creditor to receive the interest for which it bargained.
Moreover, requiring a demand and refusal more efficiently resolves
the question of whether damages should be market value or foreclosure
value.' If the innocent converter avoids liability by acquiescing in the
demand or interpleading, it achieves the same protection as the alternative
valuation without the uncertainty of determining foreclosure value. In
addition, if the demand is refused, the premium of market value over
foreclosure value helps recompense the secured party's additional costs
and expenses.
2. Exceptions to Demand and Refusal
Are the two traditional exceptions to the demand and refusal
requirement appropriate for conversion of security interests? The first
exception is that demand is unnecessary 'if the converter's possession is
wrongful. 7 What constitutes wrongful possession of property subject
to a security interest? If the converter's possession involves damaging the
' See mipra text accompanying note 291.
m E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Halmar Distribs., Inm. (In re Halmar Distribs., Inc.), 968
F.2d 121, 129-30 (lst Cir. 1992) (holding that conduct was not wrongful until demand
was refused); First Interstate Bank of Arizona, NA. v. Interfund Corp., 924 F.2d 588,
591-93 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining that second creditor decided not to buy a note and
chattel paper that had been delivered to it by the first creditor, but instead hold it as
security for another loan to the debtor and upon refusal of a demand becane liable in
conversion, as the initial possession was rightful).
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collateral, making changes to it that adversely affect its value, knowingly
engaging in delay tactics adversely effecting the secured party's rights, or
conspiring with the debtor, it would not be appropriate to allow the
converter to escape personal liability by tendering delivery. Refusing to
pay for the collateral should also establish conversion without the
necessity of another demandY9 In some cases finding wrongful posses-
sion, the converter is determined not to have an appropriate claim to the
property, such as cases involving bailees without rights to the proper-
ty' or junior creditors without liens or security interests."' In those
cases, if the converter asserted rights with a good faith belief that they
were legitimate, then requiring a demand is not an unfair burden.
The other exception to demand and refusal is if the collateral cannot
be delivered by the converter.' This situation clearly covers loss or
destruction of the collateral. Interpreted literally, however, this exception
could support a finding of conversion for a rightful transfer by a party
rightfully in possession. 3  Some commentators have relied on the
existence of a subsequent transfer to explain cases which hold the mere
transfer of collateral to be conversions, yet acknowledge that resale
' See mipra note 331 and accompanying text
3-E.g., Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 934 F.2d 635, 651-52 (5th
Cir. 1991) (stating that failure to pay for shipments by asserting offset rights is conversion
of the security interest by precluding priority as a buyer).
3' E.g., United States v. Smoky Valley Bean, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1551, 1552, 1554
(D. Kan. 1987) (stating that bailee of bean crop which was sold to pay storage charges
and past due account without consent of debtor or secured party was liable to secured
party in conversion); State Auto. Mut Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 792 S.W.2d 626,
627-28 (Ky. Ct App. 1990) (holding that insurance company that paid debtor for totaled
vehicle and buyer for scrap value were both liable to secured party for conversion because
title never passed to them).
... E.g., Associated Indus. v. Keystone Gen., Inc. (In re Keystone Gen, Inc.), 135
B.R. 275 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (explaining that unsecured creditor who claimed title
retention converted secured party's collateral by assuming control over itin a warehouse);
State Say. Bank v. Allis-Chhners Corp., 431 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that purchase money secured creditor was liable to secured creditor for converting
proceeds of the debtor's bulk sale of collateral because it could not establish that the
proceeds were of collateral in which it had a security interest).
3n, E.g., United States v. Fullpail Cattle Sales, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 73, 75 (E.D. Wis.
1985).
31 Courts have held that resale of collateral by a buyer is conversion. See, e.g., United
States v. McCleskey Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216, 1219 (5th Cir. 1969); American Furniture
Co. v. Extebank, 676 F. Supp. 455, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Empire Fire and Marine Ins.
Co. v. First Nat'lBank, 546 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Jeweler's Fin. Servs.,
Inc. v. Chapes, Ltd., 354 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Ranier v. Gilford, 688
S.W.2d 753, 755 (Ky. CL App. 1985).
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standing alone does not justify conversion liability?' The question of
the wrongfulness of a subsequent transfer is identical to the question of
the wrongfulness of the initial transfer. Unless the inability to deliver
results from loss, destruction, or some other wrongful act of the
converter, serious interference has not occurred. Absent such interference,
the secured creditor's claim to the collateral should be first. The mere
inability to deliver should not negate the need for a refused demand.
3. Are Collateral Transfers Wrongful?
In many cases, however, courts appear to merely use priority to
determine liability for conversion.355 One of the problems may be
judicial confusion of the paramount right to possession with the right to
damages for conversion. The conversion question involves more than
whether the prior creditor can regain possession in a replevin action 6
The right to possession is merely a question of priority. While priority is
necessary for a creditor to maintain a successful conversion action, lack
of priority is not wrongful. The interference must be of sufficient
seriousness that justice requires a forced sale of collateral.3
Is the mere transfer of collateral such an interference by either the
transferor, the transferee, or both? Making that determination requires
understanding the relative rights of the parties. A secured party's right to
possession generally requires default by the debtor. Prior to that time, the
original debtor can rightfully sell and encumber its equity in the
collateral, unless prohibited by the security agreement. Absent contractual
prohibitions, the mere transfer of that equity is not wrongful and should
not impose liability on either the transferor or transferee.
Do prohibitions on transfer generally contained in security agreements
elevate the mere transfer to conversion by either the transferor or
transferee? Courts have addressed several common transfers of collateral
in conversion cases: good faith buyers; agents of the debtor selling
'HIMAN ET AL., supra note 2, % 25.0113][a][ii], at 25-18, 25.01L3][a][iii], at 25-
21 to -23.
3 See, e.g., Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. HFH USA Corp., 805 F. Supp.
133, 135, 145 (W.D.NY. 1992) (stating that because the other creditor had priority,
repurchasing junior is liable in conversion as a matter of law).
31 See, e.g., Brescher v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 460 So. 2d 464 (F. Dist. CL
App. 1984); Shaw Mudge & Co. v. Sher-Mart Mfg. Co., 334 A.2d 357 (NJ. Super. CL
App. Div. 1975); Chase Manhattan Bank, NA . v. Thern-X Chem & Oil Corp., 14
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1232 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1974); Edgcomb Metals Co. v. Hydro-
Temp, Inc. 34 Pa. D. & C. 3d 129 (1984); Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971).
37 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
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without knowledge of the security interest; and junior creditors obtaining
a lien, possession, execution, or foreclosure. Some of the cases involve
the liability of transferees, while others involve the liability of transferors.
The rights and actions of transferors and transferees vary in important
ways which requires different analyses, but the distinctions are generally
not taken into account by the courts.
a. Impact of Section 9-311
Does validation by section 9-311 of the Uniform Commercial Code
of vohntary and involuntary transfers of a debtor's equity in collateral
defeat claims that mere transfers in violation of the security agreement
constitute conversion? The effect of section 9-311 on claims of conver-
sion is not clear on the face of the statute. It does not elaborate upon the
rights or interests obtained by a transferee.' The Official Comments
describe the section's purpose only as eliminating the title theory of
security interests 9
Section 9-311 could be interpreted to give the debtor both the power
and the right to transfer collateral. Under this interpretation, the transferor
does not engage in a wrongful act, so acceptance by the transferee is not
wrongful.' The situation is identical to having no prohibition in the
security agreement; thus, transfers, standing alone, are not conversions.
However, the terms of section 9-311 imply negation of contractual
limitations only on a debtor's power, not its right to transfer.f' This
interpretation can be profitably compared to transfers affected by a
negotiability statute. It provides no protection for buyers making
subsequent transfers or agents of a transferor. The transferors acted
.. U.C.C. § 9-311 cmts. 2 and 3 imply that lien creditors obtain enforceable rights
to the collateral, but leave to case law the determination of the nature of the rights and
their relationship to the security interest.
3- See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
30Cfi Peoples Nat'lBank & Trust Co. v. Excel Corp., 695 P.2d 444, 448 (Kan. 1985)
(stating that consent to sell which was conditioned on subsequent application of proceeds
protects a buyer without knowledge who has not breached a condition, even though seller
fails to satisfy the condition).
3 U.C.C. § 91-311 provides in pertinent part, "notwithstanding a provision in the
security agreement prol g any transfer or making the transfer constitute a defaul"
I The implication is that such clauses may still establish a default. See Joann H.
Henderson, The Judicial Creditor Versus the Artide Nine Secured Party, 17 IDAHo L.
REV. 193, 198-200 (1981); Willimn E. Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 2 U.C.C.
LI. 244, 246-47 (1970); Jack B. Justice, Secured Parties and Judgment Creditors-The
Courts and Section 9-311 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 Bus. LAw. 433, 438-39
(1975).
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wrongfully. Generally speaking, however, transferees taking from one not
having authority to transfer have not converted if a statute creates rights
of negotiability in the property-giving good title to good faith purchasers
for value.' The analogy is imperfect, however, because section 9-311,
unlike a negotiability statute, does not give the transferee rights free of
the security interest. Thus, section 9-311 supports, but does not compel,
finding transferees of collateral not liable in conversion. Courts, however,
have not provided support for interpreting section 9-311 as protecting
buyers in conversion actions.'
If the transferor is a junior creditor exercising its rights to the
collateral, the analysis is different. Section 9-311 expressly approves
creation of those rights. If their creation is not wrongful, is their mere
exercise wrongful? Courts have not consistently applied section 9-311 to
resolve the issue when either junior secured parties exercise dominion
over collateraP6 or judgment creditors obtain or enforce their
rights.- 5 Many cases construing section 9-311 involve secured parties
seeking to replevy collateral rather than seeking damages for conversion.
If section 9-311 bars replevin, it certainly bars conversion. Courts also
have failed to consistently resolve the relationship between section 9-311
and a secured party's replevin action.'
3 E.g., U.C.C. § 2-403.
30Production Credit Ass'n v. Nowatzldd, 280 N.W.2d 118, 121-22 (Wis. 1979),
addressed the issue without resolving it because conversion occurred by a refusal of the
secured party's demand for delivery.
3 Compare Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England-Old Colony, N.A.,
897 F.2d 611, 618-19 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that transfer of certificates of title to the
junior secured creditor, in contravention of the agreement with the senior secured party,
without more didnot constitute conversion because it is explicitly authorized by § 9-311)
with United States v. Cohoon, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 316, 322 (E.DN.C.
1990) (stating that § 9-311 did not compel dismissal of a conversion action by a senior
secured party against junior secured party who had disposed of collateral). See HmIMAN
ET AL., supra note 2, 25.02[4][b].
30 Compare Citizens Bank of Lavaca v. Perrin & Sons, Inc., 488 S.W.2d 14, 15-16
(Ark. 1972) (stating that § 9-311 shielded a levy and execution sale from a conversion
claim because the secured party's rights were not impaired); First Nat'l Bank v. Sheriff
of Milwaukee County, 149 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Wis. 1967) (stating that § 9-311 supported
levying creditor's actions because no default occurred prior to the levy giving a right to
immediate possession) with Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971) (stating
that § 9-311 permitted levy and execution, but judgment creditor was liable in
conversion).
3" Compare American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E., Inc., 576 P.2d 566,
568 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (explaining that § 9-311 did not entitle creditor with a junior
lien on inventory to foreclose before senior creditor could replevy); Brescher v. Associates
Fin. Servs. Co., 460 So. 2d 464, 465, 467 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1984) (explaining that §
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Part of the judicial confusion results from filing to separate two
distinct issues. The issue for conversion is whether the junior creditor's
actions are wrongfuL The issue for replevin is whether priority includes
the paramount right to possession While section 9-311 supports an
argument that the junior creditor's actions in taking possession or
enforcing its property interest are not wrongful, it does not support an
argument that priority does not include the paramount right to possession.
The decision in Murdock v. Blake' illustrates the judicial confu-
sion on these issues. The court stated that a judgment creditor could levy
and execute on the collateral because of section 9-311, with the buyer
taking subject to the prior security interest.' Because of the secured
creditor's right to possession under U.C.C. section 9-503, however, the
court held the levying creditor liable in conversion for $4,942.88, the full
value of the property at the time of the execution, even though the
execution sale brought only $2,821.63."'0 If levy and execution are
permitted by section 9-311, why is the secured party not obligated to
pursue the collateral rather than the levying creditor? If the property was
sold subject to the security interest and the security interest equaled or
exceeded the fair market value of the property, why did the execution
sale produce $2,821.63?
Although judicial support is equivocal, the better view treats section
9-311 as a shield to junior creditors in conversion actions based solely on
enforcement of their rights 7' and to transferees in conversion actions
9-503 permitted secured party upon default to replevy car in possession of sheriff whose
levy was validated by § 9-311); Grocers Supply Co. v. Intercity Inv. Properties, Inc., 795
S.W.2d 225, 226, 227 (rex. Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting the argument that § 9-311 entitled
a levying creditor to execute judgment with the sale subject to the security interest and
permitting the perfected secured party to repossess) with Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-
Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 A.2d 8, 9, 12 (DeL 1972) (stating that § 9-311 authorized
levy and execution, buyer took free of the security interest, and prior creditor's only claim
was to foreclosure proceeds); Altec Lansing v. Friedman Sound, Inc., 204 So. 2d 740, 741
(Fla. Dist. CL App. 1967) (explaining that § 9-311 precluded secured party from
dissolving the writ of execution, but that it had a right to pursue the collateral after the
sale); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Byrd, 707 S.W.2d 292, 294-95 (rex. CL App.
1986) (stating that § 9-311 supported the prohibition of the secured creditor from
enjoining execution sale absent showing probability of removal, destruction, or injury to
property).
See HaLmAN Er AL., aupra note 2, 25.02[2][b], [c].
484 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971).
SId at 169.
171 Id. at 169-70. The court simply stated that conversion required unauthorized acts
of dominion without describing the unauthorized acts.
" This position is similar to the result in early cases deciding that becoming a
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based solely on the transfer. To hold otherwise nullifies the statute. If
creditor's rights can be created, but enforcement constitutes conversion,
the effect is similar to prohibiting creation. Likewise, if power to transfer
the debtor's equity exists, but the transferee is liable in conversion, then
the effect is the same as prohibiting transfer. The Article 9 Study
Committee recommends a comment to support the view that mere
repossession or foreclosure by a junior secured creditor should not
constitute conversion.37 While this solution is certainly consistent with
the foregoing analysis, it is not sufficient.
b. Conversion By Transferees
Are transfers in violation of contractual provisions wrongful acts
constituting conversion by the transferee?7  Because conversion
requires interference with possession, transfers that do not involve taking
immediate possession, such as obtaining a security interest in contraven-
tion of a prohibition on encumbrances, are not conversions.374 Those
transfers involve only unexercised rights to possession. When creation of
the junior interest involves obtaining possession, as in the case of
attachment or levy, courts often find conversion.' 7 Contrary authority
pledgee of property belonging to someone other than the pledgor was not conversion.
Although this view departed from the rule holding a purchaser liable if its transferor had
no power to transfer, it was justified as facilitting commerce by helping lenders take
security. WARREN, supra note 17, at 92-94 (relying on the court's analysis of the issue in
Leuthold v. Fairchild, 27 N.W. 503 (Minm. 1886), modified, 28 N.W. 218 (Minn. 1886)).
312 &Udy Group Report, sura note 2, at 220-22.
s'Under § 228 of the Restatement, exceeding the authorized use of the chattel is an
at likely to constitute conversion of a chattel. In determining whether the authorized use
of a chattel has been exceeded, comment c directs inquiry to the nature of the agreement
between the parties. RESTATEMENT § 228 cnL c. In that context, however, the converter
is probably a party to the agreement. Should this inquiry be limited in its effect to the
parties to the agreement, or can it affect a third party's conversion liability? See ifra
notes 393-95 and accompanying text.
3
1
4 The issue is rarely raise& It was raised and rejected by the court in Chadron
Energy Corp. v. First Nat'lBank of Omaha, 459 N.W.2d 718, 724, 732 (Neb. 1990). The
Chadron court held the non-consenting juniors' security interest was not converted by the
senior's delivery of six stock certificates to the debtor, so a single certificate representing
the some number of shares could be transferred to a buyer whose acquisition was being
financed by the senior creditor. By the delivery and transfer back to it, the creditor
released its initial security interest and acquired a now security interest subject to the one
held by the nonconsenting, formerly junior, creditors.
's E.g., American Triticale, Inc. v. Nytco Servs., Inc., 664 F.2d 1136, 1139-40, 1146
(9th Cir. 1981) (reversing summary judgment because landlord attaching grain for rent
payments may be liable to secured party in conversion); Grocers Supply Co. v. Intemity
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involves a secured party's attempt to obtain possession rather than a
conversion action 76 Some courts, however, confuse these two is-
sues.' Repossession of collateral by a junior secured creditor presents
questions similar to those arising from attachment and levy and is held
to constitute conversion. 8 Although not required by the courts to
establish conversion, several of these decisions involved a junior creditor
which refused a demand for possession by the senior secured party.79
Inv. Properties, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (relying on conversion
precedents to find levying creditor who took possession of collateral with knowledge of
security interest liable for damages in the amount of the costs to regain control).
... E.g., Altec Lansing v. Friedman Sound, Inc., 204 So. 2d 740, 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967) (stating that since secured creditor was unable to dissolve a'writ of execution,
any sale would be suIject to the security interest); First Nat'l Bank v. Sheriff of
Milwauke County, 149 N.W.2d 548 (Wis. 1967) (denying replevin against sheriff
becamie U.C.C. § 9-311 precluded his possession being wrongful, and stating that buyer
at the sale will be subject to the security interest).
'" E.g., Grocers Supply Co. v. Intercity Inv. Proprties, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 225, 227
(Tex. CL App. 1990) (relying on precedents supporting the right of a secured creditor
with priority to replevy collateral from a levying creditor in order to justify imposing
damages based on conversion precedents).
' E.g., Centerre Bank, NA. v. New Holland Div. of Sperry Corp., 832 F.2d 1415,
1423 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that repossession of equipment was conversion of prior
creditor's interest); Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. HFH USA Corp., 805 F.
Supp. 133, 145 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that junior creditor repossessing goods it
sold was liable in conversion to senior creditor for the value of the goods); United States
v. Fullpail Cattle Sales, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 976, 982-83 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (holding that
repossessing purchase money creditor was liable in conversion because the other secured
creditor had priority); Sears Consumer Fin. Corp. v. Thunderbird Prods., 802 P.2d 1032,
1034 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that repossessing prior creditor was liable to a
subsequent creditor in conversion because U.C.C. § 2-403(3) gave good title via
entrustment, despite sale being wrongful, to the debtor of the subsequent creditor whose
hen was not properly recorded); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Town & Country Mobile
Homes, Inc., 574 P.2d 50, 53 (Ariz. CL App. 1977) (stating that repossessing consignor
converted security interest with priority); International Harvester Credit Corp. v.
Commercial Credit Corp., 188 S.E.2d 110, 112-13 (Ga. CL App. 1972) (explaining that
repossessing junior creditor converted collateral); Merchants Nat'lBank v. McCarthy, 16
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1139, 1143 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1975) (noting that time of
conversion was time of repossession); National Bank v. International Harvester Co., 421
N.W.2d 799, 800, 803-04 (N.D. 1988) (subjecting purchase money creditors who had
subordinated their interests to a bank to liability to the bank in conversion for repossess-
ing inventory); Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, Inc., 424 N.W.2d 649, 659 (S.D. 1988)
(stating that repossession of the assets of a business by junior secured creditor constituted
conversion of the prior creditor's security interest); Barnett v. Everett Trust & Say. Bank,
534 P.2d 836, 837-38 (Wash. CL App. 1975) (noting that repossession by junior was
conversion because title had passed to senior by judicial forfeiture procedure).
" E.g., Center-e Bank, NA. v. New Holland Div. of Sperry Corp., 832 F.2d 1415,
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None of the cases focus on the Restatement's principles that possession
pursuant to a facially valid court order or repossession that is not tortious
is not conversion?"
Transfer of possession to a buyer is another potential conversion of
the collateral. Although some courts have found against conversion by the
mere purchase of collateral,sI courts frequently hold that it constitutes
conversion, even referring to the transfer as a wrongful taking which
does not require the elements of demand and refusal.' Justification for
the inconsistent holdings is not readily available.' Several conversion
holdings rejected arguments like waiver or estoppel that could easily have
been accepted to avoid conversion liability.'
1427 (7th Cir. 1987) (Pschbach, L, concurring in part and dissenting inpat); Hong Kong
& Shanghai Banking Corp. v. HFH USA Corp., 805 F. Supp. 133, 135, 145 (W.D.N.Y.
1992); United States v. Fullpail Cattle Sales, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 976, 980 (E.D. Wis.
1986); Merchants Nat'lBank v. McCarthy, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1139, 1141
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 1975); cf. Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, Inc., 424 N.W.2d 649, 659
(S.D. 1988) (noting that defendant's argument that it had reasonable time to investigate
demand could be used as evidence demand had been made).
See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
" E.g., Standard Dyeing and Finishing Co. v. Anna Textile Printers Corp., 757 F.
Supp. 230, 239-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding no conversion by remote buyer who had
good title subject to the creditor's security interest); American Furniture Co. v. Extebank,
676 F. Supp. 455, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that buyer paying for goods subject to
a security interest by use of a set off did not convert them); Installment Fin. Corp. v.
Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc., 794 P.2d 751, 753 (Okla. 1990) (refusing to hold buyer of
vehicle with a fiaudulently obtained clean certificate of title liable in conversion without
actual or constructive knowledge of lien).
" E.g., United States v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, Inc., 764 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986); Taylor Rental Corp. v. J.L Case Co., 749 F.2d 1526
(11th Cir. 1985); Bartolan, Inc. v. Columbian Peanut Co., 727 F. Supp. 1444 (M.D. Ga.
1989); Chemical Bank v. Society Brand Indus. Inc., 624 F. Supp. 979 (S.DYN.Y. 1985);
ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. H & K Macth. Serv. Co.,'525 F. Supp. 170 (E.D. Mo. 1981); C
& H Farm Serv. Co. v. Farmers Says. Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1989); Lake Ontario
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Partnership of Grove, 526 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
' Chemical Bank v. Society Brand Indus., Inc., 624 F. Supp. 979, 983 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
" Although many of the conversion holdings involved farm products, that fact does
not distinguish the two approaches. The ordinary course of business purchase of farm
products is not free from security interests under U.C.C. § 9-307(1), so the issue is more
likely to arise in that context
3" E.g., United States v. Missoui Fanners Ass'n, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 35, 36 (E.D. Mo.
1984) (subjecting buyer of crops to liability in conversion to secured party who did not
waive consent requirement by accepting proceeds of other unconsented-to crop sales),
aff'd, 764 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986); United States v.
Riceland Foods, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (E.D. Ark 1981) (holding buyer of crops
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The fact that a few courts refuse to find conversion for the mere
purchase of collateral is evidence that the present rules do not always
achieve justice. Cases relying on defective analyses to avoid conversion
liability particularly support this thesis. The court in United States v.
Continental Grain Co.' held that a buyer of wheat purchasing from
the person who purchased from the original debtor was not liable for
conversion, because it was a buyer in the ordinary course of business.'
Section 9-307(1) of the U.C.C. protects buyers in the ordinary course of
business; however, it only protects them from security interests created
by their seller. Here, the security interest was created by the seller's
seller.'
Although not articulated in great detail, the appropriate analysis is
illustrated in Installment Finance Corp. v. Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc.'
In Hudiburg, a fraudulently obtained clean certificate of title was used to
transfer a car to a good faith buyer. The court found that without actual
or constructive knowledge of the lien, the buyer had not acted wrongful-
ly.' The focus on wrongfulness is noteworthy, because lack of knowl-
edge and good faith of the purchaser are generally ineffective defenses to
a conversion claim."' However, the Hfudiburg court noted that it was
not ruling on whether the secured party, which had a valid lien, could
repossess.' 2
liable in conversion despite having requested and obtained a list of debtors from the
secured creditor so joint checks could be issued, because filing of a financing statement
precluded the defense of estoppel for the inaccurate list); United States v. Midwest
Livestock Producers Coop., 493 F. Supp. 1001, 1002 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (holding purchaser
liable in conversion despite claim that standard practice of selling dry, diseased, or injured
cattle operated as implied consent of secured party); Wabasso State Bank v. Caidwell
Packing Co., 251 N.W.2d 321, 324-25 (Minn. 1976) (stating that course of dealing in
which sales in past transactions had not been objected to cannot be used to defeat
requirement in security agreement that consent be in writing).
'" 691 F. Supp. 1193 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
" Id. at 1194.
- The court's aversion to finding conversion liability in Corainental Grain Co. may
have been influenced by the secured party's knowledge of the sale with no objection mil
after purchaser paid and the secured party'sknowledge of the criminal past of the debtors.
Id. at 1196, 1199-1200.
"9 794 P.2d 751 (OkIa. 1990).
" 'Id. at 753.
" E.g., United States v. Equity Livestock Auction Mkt, 575 F. Supp. 1524 (E.D.
Wis. 1983); 11T Indus. Credit Co. v. H & K Mach. Serv. Co., 525 F. Supp. 170 (R.D.
Mo. 1981); State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 792 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. CL
App. 1990); Paris Am. Corp. v. McCausland, 759 P.2d 1210 (Wash. CL App. 1988).
"nHudibug, 794 P.2d at 752.
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Properly analyzed transfers standing alone do not justify conversion
liability. In reliance on transfer prohibitions, the secured creditor, upon
transfer of possession, can claim default, assert its rights to repossess, and
exercise its other remedies whether the original debtor or a transferee
possesses the property. Thus, possession by a transferee under a claim of
right is consistent with a security interest continuing in the transferred
property if the property remains unchanged and the secured party can
reasonably locate and repossess it.
c. Conversion by Transferors and Agents
Do transfers by third parties of encumbered property in violation of
prohibitions in the security agreement constitute wrongful acts justifying
conversion? A demand and refusal requirement, unless excused, would
preclude the secured party from suing transferors in conversion because
they no longer have possession. Two groups which may have legitimate
rights to transfer collateral are buyers making subsequent transfers and
agents of the seller. Each group raises different concerns in determining
whether demand and refusal should be excused.
(1) Subsequent Transfers
Does the subsequent transfer of collateral by a buyer justify conver-
sion? Courts have relied on subsequent transfers to establish conversion,
and commentators have found that it is a common element in many other
fact patterns when buyers are found liable in conversion.393 Holding the
mere transfer to be a conversion fails to address the fundamental
question-does justice require a forced sale? The issues raised by
subsequent transfers are generally the same as those raised by the liability
of transferees. Subsequent transferors are "debtors" whose rights are
subject to the security interest. However, they are not personally bound
by the prohibitions on transfer unless they specifically agreed. If they are
not bound, the subsequent transfer itself cannot be wrongful39
An additional question arises regarding the conversion liability of a
buyer who transfers the property. Can the secured creditor claim the
proceeds of that transfer? Strict application of the Code gives the secured
creditor a claim to the proceeds as long as they are identifiable because
3 See supra note 353; HmimAN Er AL., supra note 2, 25.01[3][a][ii], [iii].
Accord Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Colonial Trading Co., 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 131, 132
(1967) (stating that creditor had no right against purebaser who had resold the collateral);
see also Wm'M & SUMMERS, supra note 48, § 25-7.
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the transferor is a debtor under the Code, but there is contrary authori-
ty."' A right to identifiable proceeds helps justify limiting the conver-
sion liability of a subsequent transferor, absent wrongful conduct.
(2) Debtor's Agents
The broad sweep of modem conversion law is illustrated by its
application to the sale of collateral by agents, usually auctioneers of farm
products, selling for debtors who have not obtained the secured party's
consent." The wrongful act is representing the debtor in violating the
security agreement These cases track the general rule that a selling agent
is liable in conversion to owners, independent of actual knowledge.
Agents are exculpated from liability under limited circumstances which
rarely apply in these cases.' Section 9-311 does not protect agents
' Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Colonial Trading Co., 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 131, 132 (1967)
(stating that creditor had no right to proceeds in hands of purchaser who had resold the
collateral); see WHITE & SUMMERS, sqpra note 48, § 25-7.
'• E.g., United States v. Winter Livestock Comm'n, 924 F.2d 986, 988, 994 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding livestock broker without knowledge of the security interest liable in
conversion for selling debtor's cattle and remitting the proceeds to the debtor, who failed
to apply the proceeds to the loan); United States v. Bumette-Carter Co., 575 F.2d 587,
588-92 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding livestock broker in Tennessee without knowledge of the
security interest liable in conversion to secured party perfected in Mississippi when debtor
shipped for sale, within four-month grace period under U.C.C. § 9-103, without consent
and did not apply proceeds to the loan), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 996 (1978); Duvall-
Wheeler Livestock Barn v. United States 415 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding auctioneer
without knowledge of security interest liable to secured party in conversion for selling
debtor's cattle when written consent was required but not obtained and debtor did not
remit proceeds to secured party); United States v. New Holland Sales Stables, Inc., 619
F. Supp. 1162, 1164-66 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding auctioneer liable to secured party in
conversion); United States v. New Holland Sales Stable, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1379, 1387
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding auctioneer without actual knowledge liable in conversion when
cattle sold without consent of secured party); United States v. Equity Livestock Auction
Mkt., 575 F. Supp. 1524, 1527 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (stating that good faith and lack of
actual knowledge are not defenses available to an auctioneer of cattle when debtor did not
have consent to sell from secured party and demand by secured party was only required
if the debtor's sale was not wrongful); United States v. Holmes & Robinson, 575 F. Supp.
30, 30-31 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (denying livestock broker's motion to dismiss in claim of
conversion for selling cattle subject to security interest); United States v. Chesley's Sales,
Inc., 523 F. Supp. 528, 529 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (stating that good faith and lack of notice
are not defenses available to auctioneer selling for debtor in violation of security
agreement); Michigan Nat'lBank v. Michigan Livestock Exch., 439 N.W.2d 884, 893-95
(Mich. 1989) (holding auctioneer without actual knowledge liable to secured party in
conversion unless the secured party had waived its security interest).
' Compare United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 814-16 (5th Cir. 1971) (basing
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because it does not immunize the debtor, and the converter is its
agent. 9 Its policy of facilitating such transfers in the face of contractu-
al restrictions, however, should have as much relevance for agents as it
does for transferees.
The court's rejection of the agent's estoppel defense in United States
v. Riceland Foods, Inc.,3 illustrates the potential legal misunderstand-
ings of courts which apply conversion to security interests. In Riceland
Foods, a broker of crops requested and obtained a list of debtors from the
secured creditor so it could issue joint checks and avoid liability. The
secured party neglected to include the name of a particular debtor. The
court found conversion by relying on the fact that an effective financing
statement was on file.' Yet a financing statement is simply a notice
document designed to induce further inquiry. The broker made inquiry
and received a negative reply.
Liability due to constructive notice by a financing statement is
misplaced. A financing statement may be on file even though the secured
obligation has been satisfied."' Moreover, even if a secured obligation
exists, the security agreement may not require either joint payment or
consent to sell the farm products, one of which is a necessary element of
conversion. Finally, even if an agent searches before making a sale, that
search will not reveal financing statements filed between the effective
date of the search certificate and the time of the sale, a period that can be
lengthy.
402
Disenchantment with the agent rule is fairly widespread. The Eighth
Circuit has demonstrated dissatisfaction with the rule. In Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. v. Bowles Livestock Commission Co.,4' 3 that court
finding of no conversion by the seller's agent if the buyer acquired good title on a
negative implication from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 233(1)), rev'g 298 F. Supp.
226 (S.D. Tex. 1969) with First Nat'lBank v. Southwestern Livestock, Inc., 616 F. Supp.
1515, 1519-20 (D. Kan. 1985) (refusing to follow Hext approach to RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OP TORTS § 233(1)), a'd, 859 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1988).
3' But see Pmduction Credit Ass'n v. Equity Coop. Livestock Sales Ass'n, 261
N.W.2d 127, 130 (Wis. 1978) (stating that § 9-311 empowers transfer, so, absent a
provision making transfer a default, no wrongful act occurred).
39 504 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
40 Id. at 1261-63.
4" U.C.C. § 9-404 requires the debtor to make a written demand before a secured
creditor is obligated to provide a termination statement to the debtor in non-consumer
twsactions. The secured party has no obligation to file it Ternination statements ae
also subject to being lost or misfiled by the filing officer. Id.
2 See Bar Committee Report, suqra note 77, at 827.
4 937 F.2d 1350, 1353, 1356 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'g 739 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Neb.
1990).
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overturned the district court's decision following the federal common law
rule that an auctioneer is liable in conversion. Although the auctioneer
had notice that sales required secured creditor's permission, the court
found no liability because the collateral was brought to the auctioneer by
a third party to deceive it as to the identity of the actual seller.4  This
holding evidences judicial discomfort with the justice of applying the
general rule to security interests, because lack of actual knowledge and
good faith are generally irrelevant. The Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Progressive Farmers Marketing Agency 5 was more innovative, if less
convincing. The court found no conversion by a farmer's agent, who sold
hogs without knowledge of the security interest and remitted all proceeds
to debtor, by characterizing the agent as a buyer in the ordinary course
of business.
Several state legislatures have ameliorated the agent rule's impact.
Montana requires a special filing before auctioneers of cattle can be liable
for conversion.4°7 Georgia has a non-uniform provision in U.C.C.
section 9-307 which exempts commission merchants who sell livestock
or agricultural products for a fee from liability to secured parties unless
they have actual knowledge of the perfected security interest40 Idaho,
Iowa, Maryland, and Nebraska have adopted other non-uniform provi-
sions with a similar impact."
Virtually all the agent cases arise out of the farm products exception
to the buyer in the ordinary course rule in section 9-307(1). The wisdom
of that exception was subject to debate,40 and it has been partially
40 Id.
788 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (8th Cir. 1986).
SId. To be a buyer in the ordinary course of business, the agent would have to buy
and then resell The facts of the case do not support such a charact on.
4 MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-8-301 (1993); e.g., United States v. Public Auction Yard,
637 F.2d 613, 614-16 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying the statute in holding that an auctioneer
was not liable in conversion for selling a cow subject to a security interest because two
filings were necessary to protect secured party from auctioneer).
4" GA. CODE ANN. § 11-9-307(3) (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1993). This section was
adopted in lieu of the Official Text of subsection (3) relating to future advances.
40 IDAHO CODE § 28-9-307(1) (Michie 1980 & Supp. 1993) (stating that knowledge
is irrelevant, but special registration is required and the security interest cannot be on a
list distributed by the secretary of state); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9307(1) (West 1967 &
Supp. 1993) (including agents in the definition of buyers in the ordinary course of
business); MD. COM. LAW I. CODE ANN. § 9-307(1)(b) (1992) (holding knowledge of
perfection to be irrelevant); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69.109.01 (1992) (stating that no liability
exists for auctioneers acting in good faith without notice).
410 The farm products exception to U.C.C. § 9-307(1) is more of an historical relic
than a well-reasoned exception. See 2 GhMOIE, spra note 37, § 26-10, -11.
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overturned by the Food Security Act of 1985.!" To the extent the exception
survives, a key inquiry in determining the propriety of conversion liability for
agents remains. Who should bear the risk, the secured creditor relying on
farm products as collateral, or the agent facilitating sale and marketing of
such products? Secured creditors in this industry reduce their risks by relying
in part on notice to known dealers in farm products!' In addition, some
dealers protect themselves by communicating with known lenders to ensure
that the farm products they sell are sold fi of the security interests.413
Limiting conversion liability to conversion of proceeds by agents with actual
knowledge who do not make requested payments to the secured party
provides an effective way to encourage both of these market approaches to
allocating risks and is consistent with the approach taken in the Food Security
Act of 1985.'
d Conversion by Execution or Foreclosure
The most complex issues involving transferors of encumbered property
are raised by execution sales for levying creditors and foreclosure sales by
junior secured parties. Courts have held that non-Article 9 creditors proceed-
ing in violation of legal requirements lose priority and convert by taking
wrongfully!' 5 That outcome is appropriate unless an adequate alternative
41 7 U.S.CA. § 1631 (West 1988). The act permits buyers in the ordinary course of
business purchasing famn products from farmers to take free of security interests created
by the fanner, unless limited exceptions are met including an exception for complying
with a state-created filing system meeting standards set forth in the act The terms of the
act explicitly include agents selling for the farmer. See WHITE & SUMMERs, supra note
48, § 24-14.
41 See, e.g., Paducah Burley Floors, Inc. v. Peoples First Nat'lBank & Trust Co., 757
S.W.2d 196, 198-99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that buyer of tobacco crop converted
proceeds by failing to remit price to secured creditor as requested in a notice); Farm
Credit Bank v. F & A Dairy, 477 N.W.2d 357, 361-62 (Wis. CtL App. 1991) (stating that
refusing to pay price of purchased dairy products to party with security interest which had
requested payment was conversion). Notice to buyers and commission merchants or
selling agents is one of the ways to avoid them taking free of the security interest under
the Food Security Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1631(g) (West 1988).
43 See United States v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Ak. 1981)
(explaining that purchaser of crops requested and obtained a list of debtors from the
secured creditor so joint checks could be issued).
414 7 U.S.CA. § 1631(g) (West 1988).
415 E.g., Newport News Shipbuilding Employees' Credit Union, Inc. v. B & L Auto
Body, Inc., 400 S.E.2d 512, 515-16 (Va. 1991) (holding bailee with a prior statutory lien
for repairs liable in conversion to secured creditor for defective notice and advertising as
required by statute in its foreclosure procedure); Paris Am. Corp. v. McCausland, 759
P.2d 1210 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that superior landlord's lien expired due to
failure to comply with statutory procedure so that secured creditor had a viable conversion
claim because creditor continued to hold the collateral).
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remedy exists. Because of the apparent adequacy of the damage remedy in
U.C.C. section 9-507 together with the judicial enhancements baring
deficiency judgments or creating presumptions, 416 courts should not resort
to conversion and defeat priority when a foreclosing secured party violates its
Code obligations" 7
Is it wrongful if creditors comply with legal requirements? Execution has
been permitted by one court,418 but has been rejected by others!"9 Courts
have also split on whether a secured partys foreclosure constitutes conversion,
with more courts answering in the affiniative!" Courts finding no conver-
sion 2, protect the senior creditor by continuing its lien after the foreclosure
sale:2
416 See supra note 96.
417 Dobbs describes the measure of damages contained in U.C.C. § 9-507 for
foreclosure sales in violation of the obligations under the U.C.C. as statutory adjustments
for the typical damage remedy for conversion. 1 DOBBS, supra note 10, § 5.13(1), at 835-
36. But see United States v. Mid-States Sales Co., 336 F. Supp. 1099, 1103-04 (D. Neb.
1971); Davis v. Huntsville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 481 So. 2d 1103 (Ala. 1985); Day v.
Schenectady Discount Corp., 611 P.2d 568 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Davidson v. First Bank
& Trust Co., 559 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Okla. 1976), modified, 609 P.2d 1259 (Okla. 1977),
overruled on other groundr, Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Young, 612 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Okla.
1980).
413 Citizens Bank v. Perrin & Sons, Inc., 488 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Ark. 1972) (finding no
impairment of the secured party's rights).
4' E.g., Cooper v. Citizens Bank, 199 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973); National
Shawmut Bank v. Vera, 223 N.E.2d 515 (Mass. 1967); Smith v. Guzman, 16 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 852 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); accord Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164,
167, 169-70 (Utah 1971) (refusing to shield the levying creditor because U.C.C. § 9-311
"must be construed in light of" U.C.C. § 9-503).
42 E.g., United States v. Minster Farmers Coop. Exch., Inc., 430 F. Supp. 566, 577
(N.D. Ohio 1977); Johnson v. Conrail-Amtrak Fed. Credit Union, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 933 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1983); State Says. Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 431
N.W.2d 383 (Iowa CL App. 1988); Erlandson Implement, Inc. v. First State Bank, 400
N.W.2d 421 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Bank of Wiggins, 358 So.
2d 714, 716 (Miss. 1978); Interstate Discount Co. v. Eppley, 50 Pa. D.& C.2d 297, 298
(York Cty. Ct 1970); Burlington Nat'1 Bank v. Strauss, 184 N.W.2d 122, 123 (Wis.
1971). But see Hillman's Equip., Inc. v. Central Realty, Inc., 242 N.E.2d 522, 523 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1968), modfified 246 N.E.2d 383 (Ind. 1969) (holding that it is not conversion
when secured party agrees to subordinate his security to junior party).
' E.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Tennessee Bank Nat'lAss'n, 826 F.2d 434 (6th
Cir. 1987) (finding that second secured party did not convert collateral of first secured
party by taking it and selling it and applying proceeds to its debt); c Chadron Energy
Corp. v. First Nat'lBank of Omaha, 459 N.W.2d 718, 731-33 (Neb. 1990) (finding that
junior secured party had right to foreclose and retain foreclosure proceeds with sale being
subject to the senior security interest and that the conversion was by breaching a bailment
contract).
' U.C.C. § 9-504(4) only extinguishes subordinate security interests, and U.C.C. §
9-306(2) continues security interests upon sale, exchange, or other disposition of the
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The court holdings on whether it is wrongful for creditors to
repossess and foreclose or obtain levy and execution are most charitably
described as confused. Repossession by ajunior secured creditor and levy
on behalf of a lien creditor generally constitute conversion. Execution or
foreclosure, however, sometimes does not constitute conversion. Because
levy -or repossession is almost always a prerequisite to execution or
foreclosure, such rulings make little sense.
Is a right to sue junior creditors for conversion a necessary protection
for senior secured parties? The appropriate outcome in conversion cases
involving junior creditors depends not only on applying section 9-311 to
protect the exercise of the rights it justifies creating, but also on resolving
whether the Code contemplates junior creditors asserting rights to
collateral before senior creditors.
The Code provides little guidance on the meaning of priority if the
execution or junior foreclosure sale occurs first.4  The answers logical-
ly inferred from the Code are not always followed by the courts and do
not necessarily produce satisfactory results. Under the Code, when a
secured party forecloses, it has no obligation to identify other creditors
and give them notice. Junior interests are extinguished and foreclosure
proceeds are applied to (1) foreclosure expenses; (2) the secured debt; and
(3) the debt of junior creditors who demanded payment, with any excess
delivered to the debtor.42
If those provisions imply a prohibition of execution sales or junior
creditor foreclosures, then both having such sales and buying at such
sales would be serious interferences with the interest of the senior creditor
constituting conversion. That implication, however, generally is not
drawn. Rather, those provisions appear to imply that execution and junior
foreclosure sales are permitted with the buyer at the execution or
foreclosure sale taking subject to the senior security interest.
In determining the appropriateness of conversion liability under this
implication, three interdependent issues are raised. First, is a senior
creditor adequately protected if a junior realizes on the collateral first?
Second, is the concept of an execution or foreclosure sale subject to a
security interest viable for personal property? Third, can a senior creditor
claim priority to the proceeds of an execution or junior foreclosure sale?
collateral unless authorized by the secured party or defeated by a Code provision.
See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
4u U.C.C. § 9-504(3) only requires notice to those creditors that have made a request.
The survival of the senior's security interest is established from U.C.C. § 9-504(4) by
negative implication, because it states that all subordinate security interests ae
extinguished. U.C.C. § 9-504(1) establishes the priorities for payment of proceeds.
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(1) Protecting Senior Creditors
A senior creditor is adequately protected if it has notice of the junior
creditor's action and can assert its prior rights to the collateral. The senior
creditor ability to assert its rights arises on default, which is defined in the
security agreement. Security agreements commonly protect secured parties by
enmnerating encumbrance, transfer, and possession of the collateral by
another creditor as events of default. In the absence of such provisions, the
senior creditor cannot pursue the collateral and the junior creditor can proceed
with its levy and execution or possession and foreclosure. Conversion liability
is unavailable, because no right to immediate possession exists!'
The senior creditor need for notice, however, creates a more significant
problem. Because ajunior secured party is not required to give notice to the
senior and a levying creditor may not be so required, the senior may not learn
of the junior's actions even if they are defaults. Conversion liability, however,
is a cumbersome way to remedy this problem. Much more direct would be
a Code modification returning to the 1962 approach that required notice to
other creditors who have filed. '26 Seven states have already enacted non-
uniform versions of U.C.C. subsection 9-504(3) requiring greater notice of
Article 9 foreclosure sales. The most common additional requirement is notice
to any secured party who has filed a financing statement,427 thus ensuring
that most senior creditors get notice which enables them to protect their
interests. This problem is also one that has been identified for revision by the
Article 9 Drafting Committee!'
4' See mpura note 233 and accompanying text.
, See Byrne et al., supra note 4, at 1926-29; Starnes, mpra note 125, at 600-01.
427 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-9504C (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); CAL. COM. CODE
§ 9504(3) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (requiring publication in a newspaper, but not
searching files and giving notice to secured parties); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.504(3) (West
1990 & Supp. 1993) (requiring notice of foreclosure sale to be sent to any secured party
that has filed a financing statement, except in the case of consumer goods); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10:9-504(3) (1993) (requiring notice of the Article 9 foreclosure sales to
be given to any secured party who has filed a financing statement); TEYL Bus. & COM
CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (West 1991) (requiring notice of disposition of collateral tobe sent
to any secured party which has either filed a financing statement or notified foreclosing
secured party of a claim of interest in the collateral); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-
504(3) (West 1966 & Supp. 1993) (requiring foreclosure notice to be sent to secured party
that has duly filed financing statement, except in the case of consumer goods); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 409.504(3) (West 1966 & Supp. 1993) (requiring notice to be sent, except in the
case of consumer goods, to any secured party that filed a financing statement or who is
known by the foreclosing secured party to have a security interest in the collateral).
4 See Study Group Report, spra note 2, at 214-15.
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(2) Viability of Subject-to Sals
Permitting junior creditors to act first with the senior interest
remaining in the collateral is analogous to the real property approach, but
personal property implicates significantly different issues. Greater
potential unfairness to the senior creditor exists with personal property
collateral. With real property, the prior creditor's interest is not made
more difficult to enforce; only the identity of the property owner changes.
With personal property, however, the location also changes, so that
finding the property and its new owner could become significant burdens.
If a junior creditor foreclosing on real estate searches the records and
gives notice to the subordinate recorded interests, it has little risk in
foreclosing. A creditor with a junior interest in personal property,
however, faces a number of risks in exercising its rights first. Unless the
buyer is aware of the existence of the senior interest, the junior could
face a breach of warranty, fraud, or misrepresentation action. Under
current law, the junior may incur conversion liability to the senior by
enforcing its property interest or applying the proceeds to its debt. These
risks are particularly unsettling to a creditor who in good faith assumed
it had priority only to learn of a prior interest after the fct.4
Buyers at real estate foreclosures are also accorded more protection
because they can identify the liens, claims, and encumbrances continuing
against the property with more confidence. Unknown real estate interests
will not be enforceable against the buyer unless recorded. Also, more
certainty exists about where they are recorded. Moreover, unlike personal
property, the amount of any real property lien will be ascertainable from
the record. Personal property buyers have significant uncertainty in
determining prior interests.
Resolving whether a junior creditor can exercise its rights first by
simply relying on the negative implication of U.C.C. section 9-504(4)
ignores realities of execution and foreclosure sales. Buying at such sales
subject to a prior security interest may be a foolhardy venture, given the
priority rule in section 9-301(4) as to future advances.4 Moreover, the
Code has no mechanism for allocating secured obligations to particular
collateral, making redemption prices under section 9-506 uncertain. If the
collateral is part of a larger collateral pool securing a senior debt,
redemption requires payment of the "obligation secured by the collater-
42 See supra notes 301-09 and accompanying text.
430 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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al"'' and thus involves paying the fair market value. Under such
circumstances, no informed buyer would be willing to bid.4V n
Do purchasers at junior foreclosure sales account for the interest of
the senior in bidding on the collateral? Some commentators discussing the
appropriate interpretation of the Code regarding such foreclosures fail to
address the questionm ' No buyer taking subject to a security interest
is willing to pay the same price it would pay if the collateral were free
and clear. Furthermore, buyers do not compute the bid by merely
subtracting the amount of the continuing security interest'3 from the
price it would pay for clear title. They allow for risk and uncertainty. If
the sale is subject to a prior security interest of uncertain magnitude, the
only third person willing to buy would be one without knowledge of the
prior security interest.
Encouraging maximum price at execution and foreclosure sales is an
important policy. To accomplish this, the system must assure that buyers
have knowledge regarding the interests to which the property will be
subject. Execution and foreclosure sales by juniors inherently cause
uncertainty in that regard. Uncertainty reduces the price an informed
buyer will pay and disadvantages the debtor and all its creditors.
At least one group of commentators has suggested that the Code be
restructured to provide that any foreclosure sale give the buyer unencum-
bered title. 35 This approach maximizes the amount received at the
foreclosure sale and resolves which party is entitled to the foreclosure
proceeds. It works only if the Code requires notice to all creditors of
record so they can protect their interests. A single sale conveying good
title works best if the senior creditor controls it. To accomplish this, the
431 U.C.C. § 9-506.
SThe problem is illustrated by Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971),
where the court stated that a judgment creditor could levy on and sell collateral, but the
purchaser would take subject to a prior security interest. The court, however, held the
levying creditor liable in conversion for $4,942.88, the value of the property at the time
of sale, even though it had received only $2,821.63 at the execution sale. Id. at 166, 169-
70. Here, the buyers apparently did not take the security interest into account, because the
secured party was owed at least the fair market value of the collateral. No buyer with that
knowledge should have been willing to buy at the execution sale.
" The omission of this analysis is demonstrated by the assertion that "it is hard to
imagine that the amount of proceeds will vary significantly depending on the fortuity of
which secured party conducts the disposition." HniwAN Er AL., spra note 2,
25.02[5][b], at 25-87. Starnes, supra note 125, also fails to address the issue.
That amount cannot always be ascertained with certainty.
"sByrne et al, spra note 4, at 1926-31.
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Code would have to provide for the senior creditor's right to foreclose.
Junior creditors could control the sale by redeeming the collateral and
becoming the senior creditor.43
Buyers also could obtain clear title under a requirement that junior
creditors redeem the collateral pursuant to section 9-506 either before
foreclosing or by application of the proceeds. If the property does not
have sufficient value to satisfy the senior and leave some equity for the
junior, then the junior should not foreclose.
The issues surrounding dispositions of collateral by junior secured
creditors have been identified by the Article 9 Study Committee as issues
to be addressed by the Drafting Committee. However, the Study
Committee was of the opinion that wholesale revision of Part Five of
Article 9 may not be warranted even if necessitated by addressing those
issues. In any event, it requested some accommodation. One question
explicitly raised by the Study Committee was whether the junior should
be allowed to sell free of the senior interest if the senior failed to control
the collateral and disposition after receiving notice from the junior.
The law needs revision in connection with junior creditors exercising
rights prior to a senior secured party. However, Code revision, rather than
conversion doctrine, is the effective method. Although conversion liability
for exercising rights prior to a senior secured party discourages junior
foreclosure and execution sales (thereby protecting buyers and senior
creditors), it does not address other structural deficiencies. Moreover,
determining whether the junior's actions constitute conversion must
depend on what actions the Code authorizes the junior creditor to take.
(3) Right to Proceeds
Is a senior creditor entitled to proceeds of the execution or junior
foreclosure sale? Many courts permitting execution or foreclosure sales
simply do not address the question of rights to the proceeds.4 The
argument in favor of the senior creditor reasons that the prior creditor has
a security interest in identifiable proceeds of the collateral and the junior
creditor's disposition generates such proceeds.4 The Code generally
436 U.C.C. § 9-506.
-7 See Study Group Report, supra note 2, at 216-18.
43 Citizens Bank v. Perrin & Sons, Inc., 488 S.W.2d 14 (Ark 1972); Altec Lansing
v. Friedman Sound, Inc., 204 So. 2d 740 (Fa. Dist. CL App. 1967); First Nat'l Bank v.
Sheriff of Milwaukee County, 149 N.W.2d 548 (Wis. 1967).
' For a detailed argument of Article 9 support for this position, see HWflAN, EY
AL., supra note 2, 25.02[4][a], at n.265. See also Id 25.0214][b].
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protects the secured party upon the sale of collateral by providing a
security interest in both the transferred collateral and its proceeds, thereby
doubling the available security.
The counter-arguments are: (1) that the senior only has a claim to
proceeds "received by the debtor,"'  not those received by a creditor,
(2) that U.C.C. section 9-504 only provides a right to foreclosure
proceeds for junior creditors;,"' and (3) that such proceeds represent
only proceeds of the unencumbered portion of the collateral, which is the
debtor's equity that the junior encumbered pursuant to section 9-311. The
most powerful rejoinder to the debtor's equity argument is that if the
debtor sells to a buyer not in the ordinary course of business, then that
buyer only purchased the equity, but all identifiable proceeds of that sale
are still subject to the security interest. The debtor's equity argument also
assumes that the buyer only paid for that interest in the property. If the
buyer had no knowledge of the senior's interest and did not reduce its bid,
perhaps the senior should be entitled to the proceeds.
Claims to proceeds of execution or foreclosure sales have engendered
several divergent approaches. The appropriate approach under the Code
appears to be that set forth in Chadron Energy Corp. v. First National
Bank " 2 That court recognized that the security interest continued in the
collateral and in surplus foreclosure proceeds which must be returned to
the debtor" 3 This position is consistent with the Code definition of
proceeds, which includes the phrase, "received by the debtor," although
the import of that phrase is uncertain.m '
4
0 U.C.C. § 9-306(2) describes the proceeds to which a security interest attaches as
"any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor." Id. Whether
"received by the debtoe' modifies only collections or proceeds is a subject of debate.
Compare Centenre Bank, NA v. New Holland Div. of Sperry Corp., 832 F.2d 1415,
1419-20 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that security interest contimed only in proceeds received
by the debtor); HnLMAN, Er AL., supra note 2, 22.05[l][b], at 22-55 (stating that
debtor's receipt is a condition to continuation of the security interest in proceeds) with
Fanum v. C.L Merrill, Inc. 264 A.2d 150, 156 (Me. 1970) (stating that proceeds can be
received by anyone); RONAIn A D soN UN oRM COMMECiAL CODE § 9-306:24, at
152 (3d ed. 1985) (finding no requirement that debtor receive the proceeds). See
HMIIMN, Er AL., supra note 2, 25.01[4][a], at 25-34 to 25-37.
The Article 9 Study Committee has recommended deleting the received language to
avoid this limiting intpretation. Stdy Group Report, supra note 2, at 112-13.
441 See Continental Bank v. Krebs, 540 N.E.2d 1023, 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989);
HILIMN, Er AL., supra note 2, 25.02[4][a], at 25-70 to 25-71.
2 459 N.W.2d 718 (Neb. 1990).
" Id. at 732-33.
, See supra note 440 and accompanying text.
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However, the court in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Byrd"
denied the senior secured party's claim to surplus proceeds of the
execution sale to be returned to the debtor and required it to pursue the
collateral, so long as it was available.' Byrd is unusual because the
senior creditor was the buyer at the execution sale and claimed that the
collateral was worth less than its secured debt. It paid $18,500, the
judgment lien was only $7,677.98, and the senior creditor was owed
$19,349.81. It is not clear why the senior creditor paid more than the
judgment lien unless competing bidders were present. But why would
they bid if they take subject to a security interest in excess of $19,000?
The senior's bid in excess of the judgment lien also was apparently made
on the assumption that it would have access to the excess proceeds.
The opposite approach was taken in Maryland National Bank v.
Porter-Way Harvester Manufacturing Co. 7 where the court gave the
purchaser at an execution sale title free and clear of a prior security
interest and protected the prior secured creditor by subjecting the
proceeds of the sale to the security interest." While this approach
facilitates bidding at an execution sale by protecting the title of the buyer,
it raises many questions. What becomes of the claim of the executing
creditor when the proceeds are claimed by the senior creditor? Was its
judgment satisfied by the sheriff s sale? Can it bring a new action against
the debtor?
If the secured party is given a right to proceeds of an execution or
junior foreclosure as well as a continuing security interest in the
collateral" 9 two injustices may result. The proceeds were to satisfy the
4 707 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
4
4 Id. at 295. The lower court had ordered disbursement of the execution sale
proceeds to satisfy the lien creditor with the remainder to the debtor. Id. at 294. Thus, the
proceeds claimed would be 'received by the debtor."
447 300 A.2d 8 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972).
4" Id. at 12.
' The Code scheme of doubling the security interest upon transfer of the collateral
is justified by explaining that only one satisfaction can exist U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt 3. That
explanation is generally read to mean the creditor can recover both the proceeds and the
collateral if both are necessary to satisfy the secured obligation. This result doubles not
only the security but also the collateral. See Taylor Rental Corp. v. 1I. Case Co., 749
F.2d 1526, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument that double recovery was
inappropriate where secured party foreclosed on inventory collateral and then sued
supplier of inventory for conversion of collateral taken as trade-ins on inventory supplied
under representation that no security interest in the trade-ins existed). That outcome has
some negative consequences when applied to conversion. Consideration should be given
to permitting only one recovery on collateral, whether it is by recourse to the collaterl,
recourse to the proceeds, or recourse via conversion.
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junior's debt, but now are controlled by the senior who can also
repossess, resell the collateral, and apply the proceeds of the second sale.
Such double sales of collateral are an injustice to the buyer, unless it has
recourse against the junior. Likewise, permitting the senior creditor to
claim the proceeds of an execution or junior foreclosure sale is an
injustice to the junior creditor, because its recourse against the debtor for
the portion of the debt that had been satisfied by the proceeds now held
by the senior creditor is uncertain.4
If the Code contemplates junior creditors exercising rights subject to
a seciuity interest, then sales proceeds must be beyond the senior's reach.
This resolution was proposed by Hawkland and adopted by Louisiana as
an amendment to section 9-306(2) of the Code. It explicitly excludes
from the definition of proceeds "receipts that are derived from the
disposition of collateral by a secured party by way of public or private
sale ... or by way of judicial sale pursuant to applicable law.""45 The
Article 9 Study Committee has also recommended that proceeds ofjunior
foreclosure sales be protected from claims of the senior secured par-
ty452
Such an amendment also validates as a Code concept junior creditors
exercising rights first. Correspondingly, neither the junior's exercise of
rights nor the application of execution or foreclosure proceeds to its debt
should constitute conversion.
4. Are Transfers with Knowledge Wrongful?
If the mere transfer or exercise of rights is not wrongful, does actual
knowledge of the security interest make it a conversion? Although
knowledge of the paramount interest is not an element in establishing
conversion,4 it is relevant in certain contexts. Knowledge sometimes
changes a rightful act to conversion.4 Courts have relied on knowledge
of violation of a security interest to establish conversion.455 Knowledge
sometimes helps establish conversion when banks set off debts against
proceeds in bank accounts. Knowledge appears to play a role in
4" See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
411 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-306(1) (1993).
45f See Study Group Report, sipra note 2, at 218-20.
41 Knowledge was irrelevant when possession was virtually synonymous with
ownership, because an interference with possession was an interference with ownership.
454 See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
411 C & H Farm Serv. Co. v Farmers Sav. Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866, 872 (Iowa 1989);
First State Bank v. Shirley Ag Serv., Inc., 417 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Iowa 1987).
4
16 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 F.2d 998 (7th
Cir. 1974) (finding that bank's knowledge of creditor's demands was a factor in
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determining whether exercise of contractual rights constitutes conver-
sion.4  Conversely, a senior creditor's knowledge of a junior's applica-
tion of proceeds helps establish waiver if the senior does not act'
If knowledge can change a mere transfer to conversion, what
knowledge is sufficient? Knowledge of the existence of a security interest
should be irrelevant for junior creditors and transferees. Junior creditors
exercise legitimate rights and transferees receive legitimate rights.
Knowledge that they are subject to a security interest does not imply a
serious interference. If the prior secured obligation is satisfied without
default, then the secured creditor's right to possession never becomes
choate and no interference occurs. Knowledge that transfers are prohibit-
ed '59 has different implications. Transferees with such knowledge know
the transfer probably constitutes a default giving the secured party a right
to immediate possession. However, if for any number of reasons the
creditor does not exercise this right, then no interference occurs.
However, knowledge of the security interest by buyer transferors and
knowledge that transfers are prohibited by transferees and junior creditors
when the secured party declares default are relevant to conversion. But,
determining set-off not to be in the ordinary course of business); United States v. Security
State Bank, 686 F. Supp. 733, 736-37 (N.D. Iowa 1988) (explaining that unsecured
creditor with knowledge that waiver was conditioned on application of proceeds could not
rely on waiver and converted by setting off debt against deposited proceeds of secured
party). Knowledge is not a dear requisite to conversion liability for setting off bank
accounts. See generally Frances A. Reuer, Comment, Conflicts Between Set-offs and
Article Nine Security Interests, 39 STAN. L. REV. 235, 249-50 (1986) (discussing how set-
off disputes should be resolved and how knowledge or notice affects that resolution).
4' See, e.g., Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. United Airlines, Inc., 122 B.R.
871, 884-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that account debtor had been involved in the
financing and at the time of set off was following the direction of the debtor for the
benefit of the debtor); Central Washington Bank v. Mendelson-Zeller, Inc., 779 P.2d 697
(Wash. 1989) (finding that junior creditors with security interests in fruit crop to secure
payments for services knew of prior security interest and were liable to senior creditor in
conversion for retaiing commissions from the sales proceeds).
4 E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Halmar Distribs., Inc. (In re Halmar Distribs., Inc.), 968
F.2d 121, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that secured creditor originally waived right
to receive proceeds directly and thus made junior creditor's dominion in a lockbox
account not wrongful); De Kalb Bank v. Purdy, 562 N.E.2d 1223, 1232 (111. App. Ct.
1990) (stating that secured creditor cannot maintain action for conversion of collateral
when it had athorized the sale).
4" As a matter of right, this knowledge can only be obtained from the debtor. The
secured creditor has no obligation to disclose facts regarding its security interest U.C.C.
§ 9-208 states that only an obligation to provide the debtor with information on request
exists. In fact, the creditor may mcu liability to the debtor by disclosing information
which is confidential or proprietary without the debtor's consent.
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standing alone, such knowledge is not sufficient for conversion. Requiring
demand and refusal before holding third parties with such knowledge
liable in conversion is not an unnecessary formality or burden. It is
simply the mechanism whereby the secured party asserts its right to
possession.
5. Is Complicating Enforcement Wrongful?
Does a transfer that burdens the secured party in locating and taking
possession of the collateral constitute conversion? Courts have held that
a buyer who makes the collateral difficult to locate has converted it.'
Requiring demand and refusal under these circumstances may deprive the
secured party of its means to obtain compensation for its additional effort
and expense. Yet, if the "converter" did not act wrongfully, should it bear
that expense?
The critical question is whether lack of notice of the transfer to the
secured party justifies conversion. Without knowing the identity of the
transferee or location of the collateral, a secured creditor is burdened in
enforcing its rights to the property. A buyer is well advised to request
authorization of the transfer from the secured creditor to either take the
property free of the security interest or limit its liability to future
advances."' Lien creditors also limit liability for future advances by
giving the secured party notice."2 Junior secured parties have no
incentive to notify senior creditors of their foreclosure, but avoid
problems with the buyer by giving notice of the senior security inter-
est.'3 The buyer, of course, has an incentive to notify the senior
creditor.
If transferors or transferees with knowledge of the security interest
fail to give notice and the secured party has no independent knowledge
of the transfer, conversion liability may be appropriate. However, perhaps
the most just resolution would still require demand and refusal, while
imposing liability for the secured party's costs, expenses, and delays in
learning of the transfer.
A more difficult question arises when the transferor and transferee
have no knowledge of the security interest and the secured party has no
"E.g., Sumnitomo Bank v. Product Promotions, Inc., 717 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that collateral that was commingled with property of corporation into which
debtor merged rendered resulting corporation liable to secured party for conversion).
4'See sqra notes 41, 311 and accompanying text.
"'See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
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knowledge of the transfer. Such a situation contains no wrongful act to
justify conversion. Before the secured party can bring a conversion action,
it must learn of the transfer, With that knowledge, adding a demand and
refusal requirement is not an undue burden. In addition, under these
circumstances, conversion liability allocates the risk of inadequacies in
the filing system and uncertainties regarding priority to an innocent third
party rather than a creditor who is not carefully monitoring its debtor and
collateral. Such a shift is not a compelling reason to find conversion.
Other significant risks to the secured party involve events subsequent
to the transfer that burden the secured party. Generally, subsequent events
out of the control of the converter can change a non-tortious interference
into conversion." On the other hand, the same impairment obtains if
the subsequent event occurred with the security under the debtor's control.
Under these circumstances, the creditor is protected only if the event
constitutes a default. The default, however, exists independent of who
controls the collateral.
Should a transferee also become personally liable for the same occur-
rence? The appropriate analysis in these situations compares the impact
of such events on the rights of the secured creditor with the impact if the
original debtor had remained in possession. Such an analysis comports
with the fact that the secured creditor purposely left the debtor in control
of the property and only gains control upon taking definite steps after
default. That analysis furathers the policy underlying section 9-311, which
includes facilitating the transfer of the debtor's equity in encumbered
property.
6. Conversion of Proceeds
Three important issues arise in applying conversion law to security
interests in proceeds. Can one convert intangible proceeds? Do the nature
of proceeds and claims to them justify different rules for conversion?
What principles should govern a senior secured party's conversion claim
to proceeds delivered to a junior secured party?
The expansion of conversion from a tort relating only to
chattels to a tort encompassing intangible interests has continued
into the arena of converting security interests. Third-party buyers and
others have been held liable for the conversion of intangible proceeds of
collateral taking the form of an account receivable,"5 funds in a bank
See smpra note 177 and accompanying text.
"'E.g., Paducah Burley Floors, Inc. v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 757
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account" or monies due under an insurance policy. If proceeds
take the form of money, which can be treated like a chattel, then courts
often require specific identification of the money. Nothing appears
to justify blocking the application of conversion doctrines, properly
conceived, to intangible proceeds.
The nature of proceeds, however, raises different issues in determin-
ing the appropriate role of conversion doctrines. If the proceeds are cash
proceeds, then obtaining possession is the same as recovering damages
measured by their fair market value. Unless the converter is no longer in
possession, replevin and conversion produce the same result.
Cash proceeds and other proceeds that are negotiable may be
governed by different priority rules than those that governed the original
collateral."9 This feature requires a more intricate conversion analysis,
particularly if the negotiable proceeds are proceeds of proceeds. Is a
junior creditor collecting accounts receivable which are proceeds of its
inventory collateral protected from conversion if the accounts are paid
S.W.2d 196 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that buyer of tobacco crop converted proceeds
by failing to remit price to secured creditor as requested in a notice); Farm Credit Bank
v. F & A Dairy, 477 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Wis. CL App. 1991) (finding that refusal to pay
price of purchased dairy products to party with security interest in them was conversion
by wrongful exercise of control).
' E.g., United States v. Security State Bank, 686 F. Supp. 733, 736 (N.D. Iowa
1988) (explaining that unsecured creditor acting as clerk to debtor liquidating collateral
at request of secured party converted proceeds of sale by setting off its debt against
portion of proceeds in bank account); National Acceptance Co. v. Virginia Capital Bank,
498 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (E.D. Va. 1980) (holding bank with unperfected security interest
in receivables which exercised set-off of bank account liable in conversion to secured
creditor with priority claim to accounts receivable), modified, 673 F.2d 1314 (E.D. Va.
1981); C & H Farm Serv. Co. v. Farmers Say. Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1989)
(holding that set-off of identifiable proceeds of grain sales in overdrawn bank account
against unsecured obligations to bank was conversion of secured creditor's collateral).
SE.g., First Nat'lBank v. American Gen. Fire & Casualty Co., 927 F.2d 1126, 1127-
28 (10th Cir. 1991) (reversing summary judgment because filing gave insurer constructive
notice of security interest so payment of insurance proceeds to debtor, rather than secured
creditor, may constitute conversion; they are proceeds when payable not when received
by the debtor); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Bank of Forest, 368 So. 2d 1273 (Miss. 1979)
(holding tortfeasor's insurance company liable in conversion for paying value of damaged
auto to debtor rather than to its secured party).
4 E.g., Do Kalb Bank v. Purdy, 562 N.E.2d 1223, 1232 (111. App. Ct. 1990). But see
Privitera v. Addison, 378 S.E.2d 312, 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that converted
money did not need to be specifically identifiable to maintain conversion action).
' U.C.C. § 9-312(6) provides that the creditor has the same priority in proceeds as
in the collateral, but § 9-312 only applies if another section of Article 9 does not provide
a priority rule. U.C.C. § 9-309 provides that rule for negotiable collateral
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with money or negotiable instruments that the junior creditor takes as a
holder in due course?47 Because the definition of proceeds includes
"proceeds of proceeds," the outcome should not differ from the outcome
if the negotiable collateral were simply proceeds. Such complexity
requires a court to make a very careful analysis to avoid confusion.
If proceeds produce cash flow (accounts, instruments, and chattel
paper), the value decreases each time an installment or a particular
account is collected. This regularly diminishing value has two important
ramifications. First, no double recovery can exist with this collateral.
Second, any collections by a junior creditor necessarily limit the recovery
by the senior creditor. No meaningful choice between pursuing the
collateral or the proceeds exists, because the collateral becomes less
valuable by the amount of the proceeds.
These features make it more difficult to establish the appropriate role
of conversion for proceeds. They support the argument that a senior
creditor should recover proceeds in the hands of the junior, including
proceeds of "foreclosure." They are also consistent with the concept of
only having one foreclosure on personal property collateral and then
applying the proceeds in accordance with priority principles.47' On the
other hand, the Code automatically creates the security interest in
proceeds, thereby giving each secured party a right to dominion and
control472
Most courts find the junior creditor who receives proceeds to be
liable in conversion.473 Even exercising contractual or legal rights to
See Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs., 655 F. Supp. 807 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (finding conversion by accepting checks the junior creditor held in due course
because the underlying accounts were converted), revd, 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988).
4" See supra notes 429-37 and accompanying text.
4 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. Courts readily find conversion if
the creditor receiving proceeds is determined not to have had a security interest in the
collateral, because the right to proceeds then fails. E.g., Centerre Bank, NA. v. New
Holland Div. of Sperry Corp., 832 F.2d 1415, 1423 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that
assignment of a sales contract as proceeds constituted conversion upon detennination that
the junior's security interest had terminated); State Sav. Bank v. Allis-Chalners Corp.,
431 N.W.2d 383 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (holding creditor liable for converting proceeds
of the debtor's bulk sale because it could not establish they were from its collateral).
'4 Compare Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc., 654 F.2d 1245 (8th
Cir. 1981) (reversing summary judgment that held creditor collecting proceeds of accounts
receivable did not convert on the grounds that the collecting creditor did not have priority
because the earlier creditor's financing statement contained an adequate description), rev'g
490 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1980); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Hobbs Equip. Co., 707 F.
Supp. 1276 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (holding that junior creditor with mistaken belief that its
security interest had priority was liable to senior creditor for conversion of the proceeds
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monies constituting proceeds may subject the junior secured party to
conversion liability' Although courts have not articulated it as a different
rule for the conversion of proceeds, knowledge of a requirement that
payments be remitted to the secured party appears to be necessary before
filure to remit constitutes conversion4 75 Knowledge under these cireum-
stances may simply be the equivalent of a refusal to deliver upon a demand.
If dominion and control are rightful, should all claims for conversion of
proceeds be subject to a demand and refusal requirement? Demand and
refusal resolves the issue of wrongfulness, but focuses on our final inquiry.
Because the debtor often decides which creditor receives the proceeds as
payment on the debt what limits a senior creditor from recovering all
proceeds ever paid to the junior creditor? Conversion is avoided by establish-
ing that the funds have not yet acquired or have lost the status of pro-
ceeds." A security interest continues in proceeds only so long as they are
from sale of collateral delivered to it by the debtor), affid in part and rev'd in part, 894
F.2d 1287 (11th Cir. 1990); Farmers State Bank v. Production Credit Ass'n,755 P.2d 518
(Ken. 1988) (finding that creditor with knowledge of the senior's interest converted
proceeds of sales by debtor by receiving them); Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v.
Fairview State Bank, 766 P.2d 330 (Okla. 1988) (holding that creditor to whom Payment
in Kind Diversion Program ('TIK") payments had been assigned and paid was liable to
secured creditor with priority in the crop that was not harvested in order to receive the
PIK payments because they were proceeds); with Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of
New England-Old Colony Nat'lAss'n, 897 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that junior
creditor may not be liable in conversion for applying sales proceeds if it received them
fiom commingled account in the ordinary course of business).
' E.g., Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. United Airlines, Inc., 122 B.R. 871,
884-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding conversion where an account debtor, at the debtor's
request, exercised set-off rights in connection with paying an account to be paid directly
to the secured party); C & H Farm Serv. Co. v. Farmers Sav. Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866
(Iowa 1989) (finding that application of identifiable proceeds of grain sales to overdrawn
account was conversion of secured creditor's collateral); Central Washington Bank v.
Mendelson-Zeller, Inc., 779 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1989) (holding junior creditors with security
interests in fiuit crop to secure payments for services liable to senior creditor in
conversion for retaining commissions from the sales proceeds).
' E.g., Paducah Burley Floors, Inc. v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 757
S.W.2d 196 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that buyer of tobacco crop converted proceeds
by filure to remit price to secured creditor as requested in a notice); Farm Credit Bank
v. F & A Dairy, 477 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that knowing
refusal to pay price of purchased dairy products to party with security interest in them
was conversion by wrongful exercise of control).
46 E.g., C & H Farm Serv. Co. v. Farmers Say. Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1989)
(stating that only those proceeds in the bank account that were identifiable could be the
subject of conversion); Chadron Energy Corp. v. First Nat'lBank of Omaha, 459 N.W.2d
718, 732 (Neb. 1990) (finding that proceeds of junior foreclosure were proceeds subject
to senior security interest only to the extent they were surplus to be received by the
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identifiable.' Payment of proceeds in the ordinary course of business has
been held to terminate the security interest in them.78 Thus, payment of
proceeds to a junior creditor may be protected if the junior can establish that
the payment was in the ordinary course of business. 79 The Article 9 Study
Committee suggests that a Code comment be added to explain that good faith
collection of proceeds without knowledge of the senior's security interest
should be immune from claims to the proceeds by the senior secured
patty.W ' This suggestion appears to be a close equivalent of stating that
such collections are in the ordinary course of business.
The doctrine of waiver also provides some appropriate limitations. The
prior secured party loses a claim to conversion if it waives its right to receive
and apply the proceeds.' If demand is not made in a timely manner after
the secured creditor has knowledge of the application of proceeds, then filure
to demand should be deemed a waiver.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conversion, although classified as a tort, reflects resolution of
conflicting property claims in its origins, remedial mechanisms, and
debtor); Lake Ontario Prod. Credit Ass'nv. Partnership of Grove, 526 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1988) (finding that debtor's law firm which held proceeds of sale of cows was
not liable for conversion of proceeds, as proceeds must be traced into the hands of the
debtor); accord Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England-Old Colony, 897
F.2d 611, 619-22 (1st Cir. 1990).
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt. 2(c); see, e.g., J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 991
F.2d 1272, 1275-80 (7th Cir. 1993); Farmers & Merchants Nat'I Bank v. Sooner Coop.,
Inc., 766 P.2d 325, 330 (Okla. 1988). But cf. Linn Coop. Oil Co. v. Norwest Bank
Marion, N.A., 444 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1989) (defeating claim that payments to
creditor were protected by an ordinary course exception). See generally Robert H. Skilton,
The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account Under Artide 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1977 So. ILL. UNIv. LI. 120 (discussing the problems faced by
'secured creditors when debtor places proceeds in a general bank account). Accord General
Elec. Co. v. Halmar Distribs., Inc. (In re Halmar Distribs., Inc.), 968 F.2d 121, 129 (1st
Cir. 1992) (finding proceeds paid into lockbox account to be ordinary course of business).
' Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England-Old Colony Nat'lAss'n, 897
F.2d 611, 620-22 (1st Cir. 1990) (remanding for determination of whether payments of
proceeds had been made in the ordinary course of business).
40 See Study Group Report, supra note 2, at 222.
" E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Halmar Distribs., Inc. (In re Hahmar Distribs., Inc.), 968
F.2d 121, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that prior secured creditor waived right to
receive proceeds by acquiescence, making junior creditor's dominion vis-a-vis lockbox
account not wrongful until demand revokes waiver).
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typical applications. Acknowledging this characteristic of conversion
should enhance future doctrinal development by facilitating the articula-
tion of divergent principles when appropriate to further policies underly-
ing its different applications. Property and priority rules and policies are
critical to appropriate conversion rules when resolving disputes between
claimants with conflicting property interests. Similarly, tort and compen-
sation principles and policies should exert greater influence on its rules
when resolving interferences with property interests not based upon
conflicting claims of right.
Resolving conflicting property claims in conversion actions requires
a focus on the nature of the interest converted and on the property rights
of the converter. In applying conversion to security interests, the interest
protected should be the secured creditor's right to dominion and control.
This conception permits remedying interferences with intangibles as well
as with possession-dominion and control-of tangible property. When
conversion remedies interference with a security interest, a converter
satisfying the judgment should be treated as having acquired the security
interest, not the title to the property.
Focusing on the rights of the converter requires determining whether
a forced sale of the security interest is just. An analysis of justice and the
rights of transferees of property subject to a security interest suggests
modifying current conversion rules to require that converters act
wrongfully before incurring personal liability for conversion. Transfers of
property subject to a security interest, standing alone, are not wrongful,
and thus conversion liability should not lie. Determining whether transfers
of collateral were wrongful and constitute conversion should begin with
a requirement that the converter refuse the prior secured party's demand
for the collateral. This requirement gives the secured party a way to
exercise its right to dominion and control and provides the party with a
conflicting interest an opportunity to avoid personal liability by relin-
quishing possession or interpleading the property. Demand and refusal
should be excused only when the converter's conduct was wrongful and
the secured party would be injured by the return of the collateral (it has
been damaged or modified to reduce its value), or delivery has been
precluded (through loss or destruction), or possession by the secured party
knowingly has been made more difficult (through use of delay tactics
with actual knowledge of the prior interest or collusion with the debtor).
Because conversion provides an important remedy for secured parties
and often provides the vehicle for addressing unresolved issues regarding
the meaning of priority under Article 9, development of conversion
doctrines must be coordinated with resolution of related issues under
Article 9. This need is particularly apparent with regard to the rights of
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junior creditors. Including key conversion rules relevant to security
interests in Article 9 would both facilitate the reconciliation of inconsis-
tencies between conversion doctrines and Article 9 concepts and
coordinate future development.
A. Judicial Accommodations
Section 9-311 of the U.C.C. should be interpreted to preclude the
finding that the mere transfer of collateral or the mere creation or
enforcement of a lien or security interest in collateral constitutes wrongful
dominion or control over personal property which in turn constitutes
conversion. Refusal by the transferee with dominion and control of a
demand for delivery by the secured creditor should be required to
establish conversion. Exceptions to that requirement should be limited to
loss, damage, or destruction of the property, collusion with the debtor, or
failure to notify the secured party of the transfer if the party converting
had actual knowledge that the transfer violated the security agreement.
Claims that a junior secured party converted proceeds raise sensitive
issues, particularly if the junior received proceeds as payments from the
debtor. Requiring demand and refusal for proceeds is an important
starting point, but some demands may be inappropriate. The rule that
proceeds paid in the ordinary course of business become unidentifiable
and lose their status as proceeds needs to be carefully developed and
applied to avoid enforcing unjust demands for delivery of proceeds.
Courts also need to carefully develop comprehensive waiver rules to
preclude reliance on conversion by secured parties in circumstances that
provide them an unfair advantage over innocent converters. Well-defined
waiver rules are particularly important when the conversion claim
involves proceeds. Failure to proceed against third parties in a timely
manner after obtaining actual knowledge of transfer should preclude
conversion actions. Finding waiver when the senior secured party
knowingly acquiesces in payments or collections helps achieve a just
balance.
B. Legislative Accommodations
The most effective coordination of conversion doctrines with Article
9 principles and policies involves addressing conversion in the Code. This
goal can be accomplished by setting forth basic rules for conversion of
security interests that correlate with Code principles in a provision
analogous to U.C.C. section 3-420 relating conversion to negotiable
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instruments. Perhaps the most appropriate location of such a provi-
sion would be a new subsection to section 9-311. The following provision
is suggested:
(2) The law of conversion applies to interferences with security
interests. Transfer of collateral subject to a security interest does not
constitute conversion by any person who obtained dominion and control
of the collateral, unless that person makes an unqualified or improperly
qualified refusal to relinquish the collateral on demand by a secured
party with priority and a current right to dominion and control. Demand
is unnecessary if. (i) the collateral has been lost, destroyed, or material-
ly damaged while in the person's dominion and control; (ii) the person
no longer has dominion and control due to its wrongful act; or
(iii) dominion and control was obtained with actual knowledge that the
transfer violated the security agreement and the secured party was not
notified of the transfer or was obtained in collusion with the debtor. A
person satisfying a judgment of conversion acquires thereby an
assignment of the security interest converted.
Various revisions to Article 9 recommended by the Study Committee
will also help rationalize the interaction of conversion and Article 9. Of
particular importance will be revisions expanding the notice requirements
upon foreclosure and elaborating on the rights and remedies in connection
with foreclosures by junior secured parties.
' See supra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.
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